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Foreword 
The Belgian Cybercrime Centre of Excellence for Training, Research and Education is Belgium’s central 
coordination, collaboration and knowledge sharing platform in the fight against cybercrime. B-CCENTRE 
coordinates research teams at various universities which collaborate across disciplines on specific 
cybercrime, cybersecurity and cyberforensics related topics in both fundamental and applied research 
activities. Together with experts from public sector and industry partners, the academic B-CCENTRE 
partners design and teach basic and advanced trainings on specific cybercrime topics and develop 
and implement awareness raising initiatives in Belgium. B-CCENTRE does not only focus its efforts on a 
national level, but engages in the fight against cybercrime beyond the Belgian borders through numerous 
contacts with similar centres abroad. B-CCENTRE is the Belgian node in the European network of 
Cybercrime Centres of Excellence and collaborates with the main European and international 
organisations dealing with cybercrime. It is sponsored by the Prevention of and Fight against Crime 
Programme of the European Union, under contract HOME/2010/ISEC/AG/INT-011, and co-funded by the 
academic partners, under the coordination of the KU Leuven. 
The B-CCENTRE started its activities in spring 2011 and has since launched and supported numerous 
activities to enhance knowledge and knowledge sharing related to cybercrime, digital forensics, 
cybersecurity, online behaviour and risks, privacy, data protection and other related topics in Belgium 
and beyond. This book provides an overview of the results of the legal research performed in the frame 
of the EU sponsored B-CCENTRE project, 18 April 2011-17 November 2014. There is a similar publication on 
the results of the criminological and of the technical research performed. These three publications are 
complementary to the B-CCENTRE report of activities.  
For further reading we refer to the publications section under the research tab on our website, www.b-
ccentre.be, where you can find the links to the published articles of which the abstracts are included in 
this publication. On the site you can also find information about B-CCENTRE partners and activities as well 
as an overview of relevant actors, education programmes and awareness raising activities in Belgium 
and other interesting leads. 
We wish you an interesting read and welcome your feedback on the work done. 
 
 
 
 
 
Ann MENNENS 
Manager B-CCENTRE 
KU Leuven – iMinds – ICRI/CIR 
Sint-Michielsstraat 6, box 3443, BE-3000 Leuven  
ann.mennens@b-ccentre.be 
www.b-ccentre.be 
@B_CCENTRE 
 
 
Disclaimer: All publications listed represent the opinions of their author(s) and do not represent the 
official position of the B-CCENTRE, nor of the European Commission on the topics discussed. 
5 
 
With the financial support from the Prevention of and Fight against Crime Programme of the European Union 
European Commission – Directorate-General Home Affairs 
 
Executive Summary 
Overview 
In the B-CCENTRE Project, Work package 3 deals with the legal aspects of cybercrime. It is devoted to 
fundamental and applied scientific research and the development and organisation of advanced 
training courses in the law discipline.   
The three main legal research topics defined in the project relate to: 
 
• The purpose specification principle in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (L1) 
• Taxonomy and legal impact of illegal conduct and content risks for minors on social network 
sites (SNS) (L2) 
• Adaptation of the Belgian criminal law and procedures to specificities of the cybercontext (L3) 
Furthermore, a series of advanced legal cybercrime training modules were planned in English/Dutch (L4) 
and French (L5).  
The objectives set have largely been met since additional study work has been performed by the 
dedicated research teams, including also researchers funded on other than B-CCENTRE resources. 
Activities have resulted in a Legal Research Report, several published articles, legal education and 
training modules and have been presented at different conferences, seminars and training sessions1.  
Themes covered 
The legal research developed in the frame of the B-CCENTRE project builds further on research lines 
already started at the respective departments, namely privacy and data protection, online investigations 
and evidence gathering. The expertise developed by the KU Leuven Research Departments ICRI and The 
Institute of Criminal Law as well as UNamur’s CRIDS former to the project start, were one of the reasons 
why these research institutes have played a key role in the development of the project.  
Stimulated by the B-CCENTRE environment and resources, research focussed in the past three years and 
a half specifically on cybercrime and on topics of relevance for law enforcement dealing with it on a 
daily basis, be it police or magistrates. 
The use of cyberspace and the challenges related to it are evolving rapidly thanks to fast changes in the 
technology and tools used. Improvements and changes and with them new challenges and dangers 
occur at increasing speed. Considering the fast evolution of the research matter, it was not possible to 
foresee all the legal implications that needed to be studied further related to the technological changes. 
In the course of the project additional research was therefore performed and presented in articles and 
at the B-CCENTRE seminars and conferences.  
Still, the two main legal challenges in the fight against cybercrime in Belgium centre around  
• the trade-off between ensuring a high level of security for citizens and preserving their 
fundamental rights, such as the right to privacy.  
• The interpretation of the existing legal basis for application in the virtual world, for preventive 
and repressive measures and actions 
 
1 Most information on these activities is available on the B-CCENTRE website – www.b-ccentre.be. 
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These topics are studied in detail by ICRI when looking into the use of technical applications that can be 
employed for improving (physical) security, identity management, enhancing a safer internet 
experience, prevention, discovery and stopping of malicious attacks. Research includes the purpose 
specification, modalities for blocking illegal content, the modalities for use of information sharing 
platforms, legal basis for crawling and monitoring (anti-botnet), privacy and data protection issues 
related to biometric applications and the need to avoid spoofing, identity theft on social media, data 
breach notification and accountability of surveillance practices. Specific attention has also been given 
to the particular situation of children on SNS, both as a user and as a victim. The EU approach towards 
cybersecurity has been studied and an analysis was made of the EU guidelines in the field of 
cybersecurity.  
The KU Leuven Institute of Criminal Law centred its research around three general topics: the substantive 
criminal law on cybercrime, criminal investigative measures in a digitalised environment and jurisdictional 
issues related to the cross-border nature of cyber investigation. 
Many of the publications are in Dutch. This was a deliberate choice. Although from an academic 
perspective this might have been less ‘lucrative’ for the individual researchers, it was a deliberate choice 
not to preach to the converted, but to target on purpose a broader Belgian audience of practitioners, 
local decision makers and scholars to raise awareness as to the possibilities, challenges and compatibility 
discussions at the crossroads of Belgian, supranational and international law. The B-CCENTRE allowed 
however to have some of the Dutch texts translated into English, as the stakes of the debate go beyond 
the specific Belgian situation and the same legal issues will arise all over the world. 
The publications on substantive criminal law analyse the implementation of traditional and new IT-specific 
legal provisions in practice. Several provisions in the current legal framework were found wanting as to 
their compatibility with the ‘online = offline – principle’, which the Belgian government and parliament 
takes as the basis of their legislative policy. The incoherent approach which the Belgian parliament has 
towards the traditional criminal offence of ‘document’ forgery and new IT-forgery provides a good 
illustration. 
The publications on criminal investigative measures focus on the implementation of the existing Belgian 
legal framework in the specific context of cyber investigative practice, and more particular in the context 
of social media as a source for evidence gathering. The current outdated framework poses many 
difficulties, which necessitates research to find workable and ‘human rights - proof’ solutions. 
One particular issue thoroughly investigated is the problem of territorial jurisdiction in the context of search 
and seizure of data. In contrast to traditional physical criminal evidence, digital evidence is linked to 
several territories resulting in anomalies with regard to the application of the well-established territoriality 
principle as the leading criterion shaping jurisdiction. These research results are published in this report. A 
similar jurisdictional problem arises when the cooperation of internet service providers is ordered.  
The multi-sector and multi-disciplinary approach 
The enhanced cooperation of the academic researchers with experts from public and private sector in 
the framework of the B-CCENTRE project has substantially increased the societal relevance of the 
research and opened up some new ways of reflection.  
The non-disclosure agreement signed by all academic partners reinforced the needed trust relation for 
exchange of sometimes sensitive information and increased cooperation amongst partners from different 
sectors. It also opened up the possibility of involving academics in some of the thinking regarding the 
challenges law enforcement is confronted with on a daily basis in the application of the existing legal 
basis, be it Belgian or European.  
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The multi-disciplinary approach taken for the implementation of the B-CCENTRE project ensured that 
measures taken on a legal level would be technically viable and vice versa. The co-operation with IT-
experts is important, both for a better understanding of the possibilities of law enforcement and for the 
limitations.  
A multi-disciplinary view is also provided in the Cybercrime training for magistrates, as well as in the 
cybercrime education developed at Master and LLM level. Several experts are invited to provide their 
insights and knowledge to the legal community and discuss with them the implications this could have 
on the work of the legal experts.  
European cooperation 
B-CCENTRE has substantially stimulated exchanges with scholars and experts in other countries, thanks to 
the subsidies provided for organising exchanges with academic peers from other countries, in the EU and 
worldwide and for participation to conferences, seminars and workshops organised in Europe and 
beyond. This provided excellent food for thought for the research performed but also an occasion and 
platform for sharing expertise and research results.  
 
In particular results have been shared with the other Cybercrime Centres of Excellence, by inviting them 
as participants and as speakers at B-CCENTRE seminars and conferences, by sharing insights and results 
at meetings of the 2CENTRE network (e.g. CyNC in Dublin in December 2013) and making it available on 
the dedicated 2CENTRE platform on the Europol Platform for Experts (EPE) 
 
Most of the work done has been reflected in articles published and in training material made available 
in the different seminars and workshops, involving actors from public and private sector. All of this is made 
available via the website and the research results are bundled in the B-CCENTRE Legal Research Report. 
This material is publicly available to interested parties.   
B-CCENTRE impact 
After three years and 7 months of B-CCENTRE activity in the legal area, a number of changes have 
occurred in the Belgian landscape. Partners have got to know each other much better and a trust relation 
has been established between different actors, like e.g. academics, Police, Magistrates, State Security, 
Defence, Data Protection Authority (DPA). This results in increased knowledge exchange and 
cooperation, and also positively impacts the level of the education and training provided, e.g. training 
provided to magistrates and magistrates to be: introduction of new courses related to cybercrime and 
improvement of courses thanks to the knowledge gained, and involvement of field experts in provision of 
education thanks to the network established. The number of experts who are knowledgeable in 
cybercrime related legal matters has increased substantially and more and more specialised cybercrime 
magistrates are being formed.  
 
Overall there is an increased expertise and knowledge in Belgium on the legal aspects of 
dealing with cybercrime, and a circle of trust has been established between actors. 
 
As to the Institute of Criminal Law, the B-CCENTRE has brought new impulses in the field of cybercrime 
(co-operation with African countries, the peculiar situation of working with Russia), which was an incentive 
to support other research in this field: a Malawi scholar is conducting research on co-operation of law 
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enforcement with the private sector in Africa, an Erasmus Mundus PhD researcher from the University of 
Kazan (Russia) on the procedural guarantees regarding digital evidence, is working with us this year. 
Overall, the co-operation within the B-CCENTRE has mainly strengthened the personal links with people 
or institutions which the academic actors often knew by name or publications, but who are now partners 
or potential partners for future research. 
Possible policy recommendations at Belgian/EU level 
Though very much referring to legal-technical issues, all publications made in cooperation with B-
CCENTRE contain policy oriented suggestions. Input from and exchanges with the Federal Computer 
Crime Unit (FCCU), prosecutors and judges, helped the researchers to understand the urgency of certain 
issues and gave them insight into the practical concerns underlying innovative interpretations of the law 
or technical problems. The exchanges often provided for more layered and nuanced approaches to the 
issues, although as independent academics, we sometimes disagreed with some of the project partners 
on international law or human rights issues. 
The impact on case law and future legislation is hard to assess, but as a major reform of the Belgian Code 
of Criminal Procedure is envisaged, it is likely that the publications and their authors will be taken into 
account when it comes to general policy theories, like the one on geo-localisation of investigative action 
on the Internet. 
The way forward 
The B-CCENTRE project has provided a strong energy boost for legal cybercrime related research in the 
participating legal research departments but also to peer research institutes in Belgium and beyond. The 
PhD work started under the project will be continued and delivered in the coming years resulting in new 
substantiated views on cybercrime related legal work. Several publications and presentations on the 
topics researched will be made available to a wider audience. 
New research will be and has already been defined to continue on the basis set by the B-CCENTRE 
project. Seminars and conferences will be organised to keep up to date with the fast upcoming changes 
in the digital world. The sessions organised in the course of the B-CCENTRE showed that there is a keen 
interest in the topics and that there is a need for continuation and enhancement of the training and 
education modules developed as well as of the possibilities for knowledge exchange.   
Through participation in the Belgian Cyber Security Coalition the research members hope to continue to 
supply their research finding to people in practice, disseminate them to different target audiences and 
receive impulses for further legal research. 
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Partners 
Applicant organisation/Coordinator 
KU Leuven 
KU Leuven is the largest academic institution in Belgium and one of the oldest European universities as it 
was founded in 1425. It is a research-intensive, internationally oriented university that carries out both 
fundamental and applied research.  It is strongly inter- and multidisciplinary in focus and strives for 
international excellence. To this end, KU Leuven works together actively with its research partners at 
home and abroad. 
 
With a research expenditure of € 365 million in 2012, the KU Leuven is a leading research university in 
Europe. KU Leuven is also a member of the League of European Research Universities (LERU), a group of 
twenty European research-intensive universities committed to the values of high-quality education in an 
internationally competitive research environment. More than 200 KU Leuven researchers are 
permanently working on information and communications technology related issues. They belong to 
different university departments with a strong tradition in multidisciplinary research on information and 
communications technology issues. 
 
The Interdisciplinary Centre for Law & ICT - ICRI 
ICRI is co-ordinating the activities of the Belgian Cybercrime Centre of Excellence for Training, Research 
and Education - B-CCENTRE. 
The Interdisciplinary Centre for Law & ICT (www.icri.be) is a research centre at the Faculty of Law of KU 
Leuven dedicated to advance and promote legal knowledge about the information society through 
research and teaching of the highest quality. ICRI is among the founding members of the LEUVEN Centre 
on Information and Communication Technology (LICT) and the Flemish ICT Research Institute iMinds. 
Currently, ICRI is part of the iMinds Security Department, a de facto “one-stop-shop for ICT security 
research”.  
ICRI is committed to contribute to a better and more efficient regulatory and policy framework for 
information & communication technologies (ICTs). Its research is focused on the design of innovative legal 
engineering techniques and is characterised by its intra- and interdisciplinary approach, constantly 
aspiring cross-fertilisation between legal, technical, economic and socio-cultural perspectives. By 
conducting ground-breaking legal research in a spirit of academic freedom and freedom of inquiry, ICRI 
aspires to a place among the centres of excellence in the area of law & ICT in Europe and beyond.  
As from 1 July 2014 ICRI merged with the Leuven Centre of Intellectual Property Rights (CIR) with which it 
has been collaborating for several years. The full integration of complementary expertise will enable the 
new research unit to expand its mission and vision in future research and teaching activities. 
 
Institute of Criminal Law 
The Institute of Criminal Law was founded in 1983 as a separate Institute within the Research Unit Criminal 
Law and Criminology in the Faculty of Law of the KU Leuven. The specificity of criminal law as a legal 
branch and its technical-legal idiosyncrasies require specialisation. This does not imply, however, that the 
staff of the Institute would lock itself up in its own field. On the contrary: criminal law often sanctions 
violations in other areas of the law. Furthermore criminal procedures, intended to result in criminal 
sanctions, usually function alongside or together with other formal or informal sanctioning mechanisms. 
That is why criminal law scholars are ideal partners for all kinds of interdisciplinary cooperation.  
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 Without ignoring general knowledge and practice, the Institute’s staff specialises in research on Terrorism 
and organised crime, White collar crime (in particular Cybercrime), Criminal procedure and evidence 
gathering in a digital world, Protection Mechanisms in Criminal Procedure, Sentencing and the Execution 
of Sanctions. Within each area there is continuous concern for the interplay between national and 
international (particularly European) norms and policies on the one hand and between substantive law 
and procedure on the other. 
The research of the Institute related to cybercrime, digital evidence and investigative measures in a 
digitised world focuses on the current substantive and procedural legal framework. It looks for 
shortcomings and anomalies and aims to make suggestions for improvement. It analyses the legal 
possibilities of detecting, prosecuting and punishing criminal activities in our digital information society 
and investigates the procedural requirements of digital evidence gathering. It also looks into the 
international cooperation, in particular regarding the jurisdictional issues related to digital evidence 
gathering. 
Co-beneficiaries 
University of Namur (UNamur) 
Former Facultés Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix (FUNDP) 
CRIDS 
The Research Centre on Information, Law and Society (CRIDS) at the University of Namur brings together 
more than fourty senior and junior researchers to address questions relating to information systems and  
technological choices that match the ethical requirements of a human life. This includes a large scope 
of issues, from the protection of digital consumers or patients to the privacy protection, from new modes 
of governance to the production of common cultural goods, from electronic communication law to issues 
raised by systems of profiling and personalisation but also questions raised by the fight against cybercrime 
and the protection of IT security. The mission statement of CRIDS is to lead applied and fundamental 
researches with a critical regard and a permanent care for the democratic and human values. CRIDS is 
and has been involved in several FP6 and FP7 projects. It is in charge of many national and regional R&D 
project and has been awarded by the Belgian Science Policy Office for the quality of its research. 
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Manager 
Ann Mennens 
Ann Mennens is the Manager of the B-CCENTRE Project. She started working in 
September 2011 at ICRI, KU Leuven to organise the work of the Belgian Cybercrime 
Centre of Excellence for Training, Research and Education. She coordinates the 
activities of several academic research groups, public sector bodies and 
businesses in Belgium dealing with cybercrime. She initiates, supports and manages 
interdisciplinary research on cybercrime and cyber security, the development and 
teaching of basic and advanced cybercrime trainings. She is active in setting up 
and creating awareness raising initiatives related to safe online experiences, both 
for businesses and organisations, as well as the general public. She is representing 
the B-CCENTRE in conferences and working groups in Belgium, the EU and worldwide. 
She is one of the founding members of the Belgian Cyber Security Coalition, a coalition of public 
authorities, the academic world and the business sector joining forces against cybercrime in Belgium. It 
brings together more than 50 key players to share knowledge, raise awareness among citizens and 
businesses and issue recommendations for a more efficient policy. www.cybersecuritycoalition.be 
For over 20 years, she has led various projects in the field of Justice and Security, involving governmental 
and other actors from the EU Member States and beyond. The fight against crime and cooperation 
between judicial authorities and law enforcement in the EU, have been at the core of the projects under 
her management. She has a track record of creating networks and systems for cooperation, information 
exchange and dissemination and of organising training programmes for several target groups, in 
particular Police and Judiciary. 
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Professors  
Prof. Dr. Jos Dumortier 
Jos Dumortier is Professor-emeritus of ICT Law at the University of Leuven 
(www.kuleuven.be), Director of the Interdisciplinary Research Centre for ICT and 
Law (ICRI) (www.icri.be) from 1990 till 2014 and Research Leader in the iMinds 
Security Department (www.iminds.be) until 2014. With his research team he 
participated in a series of European and national ICT-related R & D projects in 
particular in the areas of privacy and identity management, information security 
and e-business. He is the co-founder of the B-CCENTRE (www.b-ccentre.be) which 
he headed for more than three years.  Jos  Dumortier is a member of the Bar of 
Brussels and partner in “time.lex”, a law firm specialised in information and 
technology law (www.timelex.eu). He participates in the boards of several national and international 
scientific and business associations and is a member of various editorial and program committees. He is 
the editor of the International Encyclopedia of Cyber Law and the author of more than one hundred 
books and articles on legal issues related to the information society. 
Prof. Dr. Frank Verbruggen 
Frank Verbruggen is Professor at the Institute of Criminal Law of the KU Leuven, Belgium. He teaches 
Criminal Law, the Law of Criminal Sanctions, European Criminal Law and International Criminal Law. He 
set up the course on ‘Cybercrime and Crime Control in a Digitising World’ in the master programme of 
the Law Faculty1. He is a guest professor (Belgian) Criminal Law and Procedure at the University of Hasselt.  
He has studied the impact of the fight against organised crime and terrorism on criminal law and 
procedure. His current research focuses on pan-European principles legitimising and limiting mutual 
recognition in criminal matters and legal aspects of the fight against cybercrime, particularly its impact 
on law enforcement’s investigative powers, international cooperation and evidence law.  He also is a 
lawyer at the Leuven Bar, as of counsel with Lovius. 
 Yves Poullet 
Yves Poullet has been the director of CRIDS since its creation in 1979 until 
August 31, 2010. He conducted various researches in the field of new 
technologies with a special emphasis on privacy issues, of individual and 
public freedom in the Information Society and of Internet Governance. 
Moreover, he is full professor at the Faculty of Law at the University of 
Namur (UNamur) and Liège (Ulg). 
He has been during 12 years (1992-2004) member of the Belgian 
Commission on Data Protection (Commission belge de protection de la 
vie privée). In addition, he was since its origin, member of the Legal Advisory Board of the European 
Commission and the president of the Task Force "Electronic Democracy and Access to public records". 
He is a founder of the European Telecommunication Forum, ECLIP and FIRILITE. He also chaired the Belgian 
Computer Association ABDI (Association Belge de Droit de l'Informatique). 
1 This course has been taught for the first time in the academic year 2013-14 in Dutch. It will be lectured in an English 
language version by prof. Panzavolta from 2014 onwards. 
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Researchers 
Charlotte Conings 
Charlotte Conings studied law (specialisation criminal law) at the Law Faculty of 
the University of Leuven, from which she graduated in June 2011. She participated 
in the Erasmus exchange programme and spent half a year in Montpellier, France, 
studying at Université Montpellier I. Since September 2011 she is a PhD candidate 
at the Institute for Criminal Law of the University of Leuven and an affiliated 
researcher at the B-CCENTRE.   
Under the supervision of Prof. dr. Frank Verbruggen, Charlotte is preparing a PhD on 
the criminal procedure regime for search in the physical and digital world. She 
published several articles and gave presentations at national and international 
conferences on topics related to her research such as computer searches, criminal investigation and 
social media, remote searches in the cloud, the duty to decrypt and  hacking by law enforcement. Within 
the framework of the B-CCENTRE, she has co-organised the expert seminars concerning online criminal 
investigations and intrusive methods of cyber investigation. She further co-organised two legal advanced 
trainings concerning criminal investigation with regard to social media platforms. 
Fanny Coudert 
Fanny Coudert obtained her law degree in French and Spanish law in 2000 at the 
Université Panthéon–Sorbonne in Paris and University Complutense of Madrid 
(maîtrise en droit integrée français et espagnol). In 2001, she obtained a Master 
degree in ICT Law (special award for dissertation) at the University Complutense de 
Madrid, and in 2004, she obtained a pre-doctorate degree (D.E.A) at the same 
University (Magna Cum Laude). During her doctorate training studies, she worked 
as a data protection auditor, and as an in-house lawyer in a consumer 
organisation. She is a member of the Madrid Bar Association since 2001. 
In July 2006 Fanny joined ICRI where she conducts research in the field of privacy. 
She is preparing a PhD on the topic of "The purpose specification principle in the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice: towards renewed data protection principles for information-based practices in the field of 
Security" under the supervision of Prof. Dr. J. Dumortier and Prof. Dr. F. Verbruggen. She currently focuses 
on the principle of accountability and privacy by design in the context of surveillance through her 
participation to two FP7 EU projects PARIS (PrivAcy pReserving Infrastructure for Surveillance) and PRIPARE 
where she focuses on the development of training courses on the concept of privacy-by-design. She 
previously conducted research on  privacy and virtual worlds within the FP7 project +Spaces (Policy 
Simulation in Virtual Worlds), privacy and video surveillance within the FP7 EU project SCOVIS (Self-
Configurable Cognitive Video Supervision) and the EU FP6 projects DYVINE (Dynamic visual networks), in 
Belgian projects such as FLEXYS (Flexible Traffic Management) or SPAMM (Solutions Platform for Advanced 
Mobile Mesh). She also worked on privacy and biometrics, location data, ID theft and forensic/risk profiling 
(Network of Excellence FIDIS - Future of Identity in the Information Society and TURBINE).  
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Kristel De Schepper 
Kristel De Schepper studied law at the Law Faculty of the University of Leuven and 
the Université Robert Schuman in Strasbourg (Erasmus exchange programme). 
After obtaining her law degree in 2006, she practiced law at the Antwerp bar for 
five years. She first joined the Institute of Criminal Law as a teaching assistant in 2008, 
later in 2010 she became a researcher. Her research interests are cybercrime, white 
collar crime and criminal investigation in a digital society.  
Within the framework of the B-CCENTRE, she has co-organised the legal expert 
seminars concerning online criminal investigations and intrusive methods of cyber 
investigation and conducted research in the field of substantive criminal law issues 
related to cybercrime. She is preparing a PhD entitled “Criminalisation of espionage and information 
abuse to protect business secrets” under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Frank Verbruggen. In general, she 
examines whether our (Belgian) substantive criminal law is up to the challenges of the information society. 
On the basis of a case study of the criminalisation of economic espionage, the research intends to 
establish criteria which should guide lawmakers considering the use of criminal law in our digital 
information society. She also participates in the FP7 EU project EKSISTENZ (Harmonised framework allowing 
a sustainable and robust identity for European Citizens) where she conducts research on criminal law 
measures to combat identity theft. 
Karel Demeyer 
Karel Demeyer obtained a Master’s degree in both Criminological Sciences and 
Applied Computer Sciences. At ICRI, he was part of the team setting up the B-
CCENTRE (Belgian Cybercrime Centre of Excellence for Training, Research & 
Education). He joined in September 2011 The Leuven Institute for Criminology 
(Catholic University of Leuven) until 2013. During his time at ICRI he was concerned 
with the research design of the B-CCENTRE project and contributed to the legal 
research. Karel has now joined the Belgian Federal Police and will start working in 
the Federal Computer Crime Unit (FCCU). 
 
Franck Dumortier 
Franck Dumortier has a degree in law and a post-graduate diploma in law and 
management in communication and information technologies. He is assistant 
teacher and senior researcher at the Information Technology, Law and Society 
Research Centre (CRIDS) at the University of Namur since 2005. His research 
particularly focuses on the impact of technologies such as RFIDs, biometrics, 
surveillance cameras and online social networks on the fundamental human right 
to privacy.  His researches also cover the field of cybercrime legislation. He 
participated in numerous national and European projects and published 
numerous articles in those research fields. 
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Karine e Silva 
Karine e Silva (LL.M.) is a legal researcher at the Belgian Cybercrime Centre of 
Excellence for Training, Research and Education (B-CCENTRE) within the 
Interdisciplinary Centre for Law and ICT (ICRI) at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 
(KUL) since March 2013. She investigates data privacy issues in the implementation 
of cybercrime mitigation tools in the frame of the EU Advanced Cyber Defence 
Centre (ACDC) project and information sharing networks on the protection of 
critical infrastructure in the European Control System Security Incident Analysis 
Network (ECOSSIAN) project. Her interests lie in the promotion of multistakeholder 
approaches to cyber security and the development of international public-private 
partnerships against cyber incidents.  
Catherine Forget 
Catherine Forget has a degree in law and a post-graduate diploma in social law. 
She is researcher at the Information Technology, Law and Society Research Centre 
(CRIDS) at the University of Namur since 2014. She is lawyer since 2014. Her research 
particularly focuses on the impact of technologies on the fundamental human 
right to privacy. Her researches also cover the field of cybercrime legislation.  
 
 
 
Claire Gayrel 
Claire Gayrel worked a period for the European Regional Development 
Found (ERDF) in French Guyana, before joining the CRID in September 2008. 
She graduated in European Law and political sciences. Her researches 
currently focus on transborder data flows and on the protection of personal 
data in the Justice, liberty and security area of the European Union.   
 
Els Kindt 
Dr. Els Kindt is a post-doc legal researcher at the Center for Law and ICT (ICRI) at the Law Faculty of the 
KU Leuven, Belgium. She graduated in law in 1987 at the KU Leuven and obtained a Master of Laws (LL.M) 
in 1988 in the United States. Her research focuses on privacy and identity management and includes in-
depth research of the legal aspects of biometric data processing. She participated as principal legal 
researcher in various national and EU projects, including B-CCENTRE. Before joining ICRI, she practised law 
as an IP and ICT law attorney in an international law firm in Brussels. She is a frequent speaker at 
international events and has published several articles on recent developments in IT law, has been invited 
as expert, is lecturer on European privacy and data protection and electronic contracts and is member 
of the editorial board of 'Computerrecht' and ‘Privacy en Informatie’. Her Ph.D was on legal aspects of 
biometric data processing. She is a member of the Belgian national Privacy Commission (Replacing 
member - National Registry Committee - 2014-2020). 
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Eva Lievens 
Eva Lievens holds a law degree from the University of Ghent (2002), a Masters 
degree in Transnational Communications and Global Media from Goldsmiths 
College, London (2003) and a Phd in Law from KU Leuven (2009). She has been a 
member of the Interdisciplinary Centre for Law & ICT (www.icri.be) since 2003 and 
is currently a Postdoctoral Research Fellow of the Research Fund Flanders, working 
on a project titled 'Risk-reducing regulatory strategies for illegal and harmful 
conduct and content in online social network sites'. Her research focuses on legal 
challenges posed by new media phenomena, such as the regulation of audiovisual 
media services, user-generated content and social networks, with a specific focus 
on the protection of minors and fundamental rights. She has also been involved in 
the creation of the B-CCENTRE (Belgian Cybercrime Centre of Excellence for Training, Research & 
Education). Eva is a member of the Advisory Committee of the BE SIC II-project (EU Safer Internet 
Programme) and the Belgian Film Evaluation Committee, and is the Associate Editor of the International 
Encyclopaedia of Laws – Media Law (edited by Prof. dr. Peggy Valcke).  She is the Programme 
Coordinator of the Masters in Intellectual Property Rights and ICT Law, in which she teaches the course 
Public Government & Cybercrime Law, and a Guest Professor at Ghent University, where she teaches 
Media Law and Copyright Law.   
Ruben Roex 
Ruben Roex is a legal researcher at the Interdisciplinary Centre for Law and ICT at 
KU Leuven. After obtaining his master’s degree in economics, law and business 
administration (2009) as well as his master’s degree in law (2011), he worked almost 
3 years for the Belgian Cybercrime Centre of Excellence for Training, Research and 
Education. During this time, he worked on a wide range of legal topics in the areas 
of cybercrime and cybersecurity. He has also been involved in various teaching 
activities in these areas. 
 
Phillippe Van Linthout 
Mr. Van Linthout is currently Judge in the Court of First Instance of Antwerp in 
Belgium.  As an Investigating Judge, he works on a daily base in Internet and 
Information Security-related cases. He was appointed to treat terrorism cases as a 
specialised Investigating Judge (since December 2009). 
Mr. Van Linthout specialises in ICT crime and trains his fellow magistrates in the area.  
His career has seen him assuming various responsibilities as an Investigating Judge 
(since September 2006), former Deputy Public Prosecutor, Public Prosecutors Office 
of Dendermonde (Belgium) (Special Criminal Law Section (1998-2006)), and a 
Lawyer (barrister, bar of Gent - Belgium). 
Mr. Van Linthout is assigned as expert of the Belgian delegation in the Convention Committee on 
Cybercrime (T-CY) of the Council of Europe. 
Mr. Van Linthout holds the “European Certificate on Cybercrime and Electronic Evidence”, École 
Nationale de la Magistrature (Paris - France) - CYBEX (2009), in addition to the Diploma “D.E.A. de Droit 
Pénal et Sciences Pénales”, Université Paris II, Panthéon-Assas, France (1996) (specialisation in criminal 
law) and a Master in Law from the KU Leuven, Belgium (1995). 
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Mr Van Linthout is a lector at the KU Leuven (the Catholic University of Leuven, Institute for Criminal Law) 
and is magistrate-cybercrime-expert for the B-CCENTRE (The Belgian Cybercrime Centre of Excellence for 
Training, Research and Education). He is a member of the Belgian Cybercrime Cell (the Belgian National 
Cybercrime Taskforce) and the Belgian National Platform on Telecommunication. He publishes regularly 
on the subject of cybercrime. 
Mr. Van Linthout’s teaching assignments include teaching at the 
European Commission Technical Assistance Information Exchange 
Instrument (TAIEX),  at the joint regional project of the European Union 
and the Council of Europe on cooperation against cybercrime under 
the Instrument of Pre-Accession Cybercrime@IPA Regional Co-
operation in Criminal Justice, at the Academy of European Law (ERA), 
at the European Judicial Training Network (EJTN), at The Society for the 
Policing of Cyberspace (POLCYB) and at the Belgian Judicial Training 
Institute (IGO); he also trains law enforcement agents (the Standing 
Police Monitoring Committee-, Federal- and Local Police agents) and 
lawyers (barristers).  
He is - together with Jan KERKHOFS who is Federal Magistrate at the 
Federal Prosecutor’s Office in Brussels - the author of the Belgian 
cybercrime standard work and field manual “Cybercrime”. 
 
http://www.politeia.be/mailing/html/polpub20131021cybercrime.html 
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B-CCENTRE Project objectives for the Legal research track 
In the B-CCENTRE Project, Work package 3 deals with the legal aspects of cybercrime. It is devoted to 
fundamental and applied scientific research and the development and organisation of advanced 
training courses in the law discipline.  The research and education activities in this Work package were 
drawn on the expertise built up by the academic partners over the past decades and planned to provide 
urgently needed in-depth knowledge on specific and advanced cybercrime issues experienced by law 
enforcement, both police and judiciary and other involved partners, such as e.g. ISPs, registrars, barristers. 
The three main research topics defined in the project relate to: 
• The purpose specification principle in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (L1) 
• Taxonomy and legal impact of illegal conduct and content risks for minors on social network sites 
(SNS) (L2) 
• Adaptation of the Belgian criminal law and procedures to specificities of the cybercontext (L3) 
Furthermore, a series of advanced legal cybercrime training modules were planned in English/Dutch (L4) 
and French (L5). Expert seminars were foreseen to deal with: 
• Special (intrusive) investigative methods and the specificity of the cybercontext (L6) 
• International legal cooperation in cybercrime matters (L7) 
• Adapting Belgian criminal law and procedure to specificities of the cybercontext (L8) 
The objectives set have largely been met since also additional study work has been performed by the 
dedicated research teams, including also researchers funded on other than B-CCENTRE resources.  
Activities have resulted in a Legal Research Report (this publication), several published articles, legal 
education and training modules and have been presented at different conferences, seminars and 
training sessions.  Most information on these activities is available on the B-CCENTRE website – www.b-
ccentre.be. 
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B-CCENTRE defined Research (L1 to L3) 
In the framework of the B-CCENTRE project, three specific research activities have been foreseen. The 
three main research topics defined in the project relate to: 
 
• L1: the purpose specification principle in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
• L2: Taxonomy and legal impact of illegal conduct and content risks for minors on social network 
sites (SNS) 
• L3: adaptation of the Belgian criminal law and procedures to specificities of the cybercontext 
Hereafter a summary is provided on the research results obtained to date.  
The purpose specification principle in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
Under L1 Fanny Coudert conducted research on the challenges faced by law enforcement authorities 
and the regulators to implement the purpose specification principle to regulate surveillance practices. 
The research resulted in the publication and presentation at internatinoal conferences of three papers 
that respectively dealt with the rationale of the purpose specification principle and the challenges faced 
in the re-use of information by law enforcement authorities, the conditions for use of this information as 
valid evidence before a court and finally the role that the principle of accountability can play to ensure 
the legitimacy of surveillance practices: 
(1) Coudert, Fanny, Dumortier, Jos, Verbruggen, Frank (2012), Applying the purpose specification 
principle in the age of Big Data: the example of integrated video surveillance platforms in France, 
ICRI Research paper 6/2012. This paper explored the rationale of the purpose specification 
principles and the difficulties in applying this principle in the context of access by law 
enforcement authorities to private video recording. It dealt with the issue of the re-use of 
information collected by private actors for legitimate reasons for the prevention and investigation 
of criminal offenses. 
(2) Coudert, Fanny, Gemo, Monica, Beslay, Laurent, Andritsos, Fivos (2012) Pervasive Monitoring: 
Appreciating Surveillance Data as Evidence in Legal Proceeding, 4th International Conference 
on Imaging for Crime Detection and Prevention (ICDP 2011), vol, 1-6. This paper dealt with the 
issue of the legitimacy of digital evidence, more specifically it analysed the conditions 
information collected of shared with law enforcement authorities could be used as valid 
evidence before courts. It looked at the specific issue of participative policing, i.e. when citizens 
voluntarily record events with their smartphones and share this information with the police for the 
investigation of criminal offenses. 
(3) Coudert, Fanny (2014) Accountable Surveillance Practices: Is the EU Moving in the Right 
Direction?, in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Privacy technologies and Privacy, vol 8450 
2014, 70-85. Aware that the purpose specification principle cannot always act as strong a priori 
safeguards, this paper examined the role that can be played by the principle of accountability 
to ensure the legitimacy of law enforcement practices in the prevention, detection and 
investigation of crimes. 
Taxonomy and legal impact of illegal conduct and content risks for minors on SNS 
Within the framework of the B-CCENTRE project, under L2, in combination with an FWO Postdoctoral 
Project on Risk-reducing regulatory strategies for illegal and harmful conduct and content in online social 
network sites, a taxonomy of illegal and harmful content and conduct risks was developed, starting from 
relevant social science research (a.o. the EU Kids Online Study). Risks such as grooming, sexting and 
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bullying were defined, their prevalence was examined and their impact in the social network sites (SNS) 
environment was studied. In a second step, the applicability of the current legal framework (criminal law, 
privacy legislation, media regulation, fundamental rights, etc.), both at European and national (Belgian) 
level, to these risks was assessed.  
Focusing on two risks that are particularly important in social networks, sexting[1] and cyberbullying[2], 
the degree of protection that this framework offers as well as the gaps in the current legislation were 
identified. With regard to sexting, it was found that whereas a strict interpretation of child pornography 
legislation could lead to its applicability to sexting, the more recent legislative documents at European 
level clarify that the rationale of this type of legislation is not to criminalise consensual sexual conduct 
between minors that have reached the age of sexual consent. Both the Council of Europe Convention 
on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (2007) and the EU Directive 
on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography (2011) state 
that signatories or Member States may exclude the production and possession of sexual images by and 
of minors that have reached this age from criminalisation. Distribution or transmission of such images, 
however, may still be criminalised. Although the further transmission of sexting images (so called 
‘secondary sexting’) may certainly cause harm, the question remains whether this type of ‘offense’ 
should be dealt with on the basis of the provisions that were created to fight child pornography and 
child abuse. A new, carefully tailored legal provision to address this may be more appropriate. A relevant 
consideration is whether this should be a criminal provision or not. In any case, if harm does occur, it may 
-
be possible to rely on national provisions related to civil liability. Two additional concerns regarding 
sexting were identified. First, difficulties may arise when the age of sexual consent and the age used in 
provisions that are applied to sexting diverge. This can lead to situations where minors can legally 
engage in sexual conduct but may not take pictures that are sexually suggestive. Although from certain 
perspectives this may be desirable since harm may be caused if the images are used involuntarily at a 
later date, one may wonder whether every type of conduct that can potentially lead to harm should 
be regulated. At the very least, this situation may be confusing to teenagers, who may not be aware of 
this divergence. Second, on the basis of the image itself it may be very difficult to assess whether the 
image was taken voluntarily or not, as consensual sexting images may look exactly the same as images 
that are taken under duress. It will thus be very important to judge each case on an individual basis, 
taking into account the intention of the minors involved and the particular circumstances. With regard 
to bullying, research showed that a number of existing legislative provisions may be relevant to cases of 
cyberbullying on SNS. In Belgium, for instance, most of these provisions, such as provisions related to libel, 
defamation, harassment or stalking, are formulated in a technology-neutral manner, which implies that 
they may also be applied in a SNS environment. There is thus no need for new legislation to address this 
issue. However, this does not mean that the application of these provisions may not be confronted with 
obstacles, such as the potential anonymity of perpetrators or the fact that the majority of popular SNS 
providers are located abroad, hindering effective enforcement of the national legislative provisions.     
Research results related to this topic have been presented at the International COST Cyberbullying 
Conference in Paris in June 2012 and the ITS Regional European Conference in Vienna in July 2012. In 
addition these results have been included in peer-reviewed book chapters: 
• Lievens, Eva & Valcke, Peggy, “Regulatory trends in a social media context”, 557-580, in: Price, 
Monroe & Verhulst, Stefaan, Routledge Handbook of Media Law, Routledge, 2012, 616 p.;  
[1] “Sexually explicit content communicated via text messages, smart phones, or visual and web 2.0. activities such as 
social networking sites”: Ringrose et al. (2012), A qualitative study of children, young people and ‘sexting’ - A report 
prepared for the NSPCC, http://www.nspcc.org.uk/Inform/resourcesforprofessionals/sexualabuse/sexting-research-
report_wdf89269.pdf, 9.  
[2] “Being cruel to others by sending or posting harmful material or engaging in other forms of social cruelty using the 
Internet or other digital technologies”: Willard (2007), Educator’s guide to cyberbullying and cyberthreats, 
http://csriu.org/cyberbully/docs/cbcteducator.pdf, 1.  
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• Lievens, Eva, “Children and peer-to-peer risks in social networks: regulating, empowering or a 
little bit of both?”, in: van der Hof, Simone, van den Berg, Bibi, Schermer, Bart (eds), Minding 
Minors Wandering the Web: Regulating Online Child Safety, Information Technology & Law 
Series, Springer Press / Asser Press, 2014, 191-209  
• Lievens, Eva, “Risico’s voor jongeren op sociale netwerken bekeken vanuit juridisch perspectief”, 
in: Valcke, Peggy, Lievens, Eva and Valgaeren, Pieter Jan (eds), Sociale Media: Actuele 
juridische aspecten, Intersentia, 2013, 29-66) 
and peer-reviewed journal articles: 
• Lievens, Eva, “Risk-reducing regulatory strategies for protecting minors in social 
networks”, Info - The journal of policy, regulation and strategy for telecommunications, 
information and media 2011, Vol. 13, No. 6, 43-54 
• Lievens, Eva, “Bullying and sexting in social networks: Protecting minors from criminal acts or 
empowering minors to cope with risky behaviour?”, International Journal Crime, Law & 
Justice 2014, Vol. 42, Iss. 3, 251-270. 
Adaptation of the Belgian criminal law and procedures to specificities of the 
cybercontext 
Under L3 Kristel De Schepper conducts research on the adaptation of Belgian criminal law to the 
specificities of the cybercontext. Within this framework, she prepares a PhD entitled “Criminalisation of 
espionage and information abuse to protect business secrets” under the supervision of Prof. dr. Frank 
Verbruggen. In general, she examines whether Belgian substantive criminal law is up to the challenges of 
the information society.  
In an information society a different approach towards the protection of valuable economic information 
can be considered.  Management and corporate policy decisions nowadays are taken in the ‘virtual 
world’, and economically valuable information is increasingly stored on digital data systems, what makes 
it more vulnerable. Confidential information can be very valuable and as such, worth protecting against 
espionage by insiders or outside competitors. Not all information is however worth protecting because of 
its intrinsic value. Existing cybercrime offences often seem to focus on the means used to access the data, 
rather than on their actual content. This leads to a very broad indirect protection of all the digitally stored 
information, regardless of their intrinsic value. The criminalisation of cybercrime is therefore often a two-
edged sword and the legislator needs to carefully consider possible side-effects of an extensive 
criminalisation. The research hypothesis is that a better focus on and a sharper definition of the legal 
interest (Rechtsgut) protected by specific offences, will lead to more respect for the idea of criminal law 
as the ultimate resort and to a more efficient use of criminal law. On the basis of a case study of economic 
espionage and the violation of business secrets, the research intends to establish the criteria which should 
guide lawmakers considering the creation and use of criminal law.  
The PhD is expected to be defended at the KU Leuven in 2017. Preliminary research was presented at a 
conference organised by the Centre for Methodology of Law at the KU Leuven on May 12, 2011, initial 
results at a seminar “Cyber Space Invaders: Criminal Jurisdiction on the Internet” organised by the B-
CCENTRE and the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies on October 2, 2012 in Leuven and at a 
doctoral seminar “‘Data espionage’: traditional property offences versus IT-specific offences. On the 
difficulties to define legal goods in a digitised society” at the Institute of Criminal Law on June 21, 2013. 
The first presentation resulted in a substantive contribution in the book “Zakengeheim” (Trade secrets), 
published in 2012. Other topics related to the research were also disseminated in peer-reviewed journals 
Auteurs & Media in 2012 and Tijdschrift voor Strafrecht in 2013. These articles focus on jurisdictional issues 
in a cybercontext and more specific on the Belgian Yahoo case. A judicial saga started when the Belgian 
prosecution service sued US dotcom Yahoo, Inc in a Belgian criminal court for its failure to respond to a 
Belgian prosecutor’s request to reveal data concerning Belgian Yahoo-clients. This case illustrates as no 
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other the problems of jurisdiction in a digital context. When the Belgian criminal law enforcement power 
to order data-handover is applied to a non-resident foreign ICT-operator and the failure to comply 
amounts to a Belgian criminal offence, the jurisdiction issues become very complex. These issues, and 
more specific the location problems in cyber investigation and the enforceability of the duty to 
cooperate of ISPs, appear to be a crucial challenge in the area of cybercrime and will most likely be the 
subject of further fundamental academic research the upcoming years. 
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Publications - Abstracts 
Guidelines For Privacy-Friendly Default Settings 
Ausloos, J., Kindt, E., Lievens, E., Valcke, P., & Dumortier, J. 
The debates regarding privacy on social networks often relate to the amount of control an individual has 
- or should have - over his/her personal data. This has resulted in many social networks gearing up their 
privacy settings panes, offering more fine-grained control to their users. Paradoxically, it seems as if these 
controls do not contribute (a lot) to the protection of individuals' privacy in practice. Every control in the 
privacy settings pane has a 'default', a value to which it is set when the user remains inactive. Naturally, 
most social networks align these default settings to their own business interests which usually do not 
coincide with their users' privacy interests. This paper attempts to evaluate the importance of having in 
place 'privacy-friendly default settings' as a way to protect individuals' privacy and personal data more 
effectively. After a critical assessment of their benefits and drawbacks, the paper sets forth some concrete 
guidelines that can be used to establish privacy-friendly (default) settings. Last, but not least, the paper 
evaluates the potential legal bases of such privacy-friendly default settings. 
Ausloos, J., Kindt, E., Lievens, E., Valcke, P., & Dumortier, J. (2013). Guidelines For Privacy-Friendly Default Settings. ICRI 
Working Paper Series. 
Les perspectives de légitimation des échanges des oeuvres sur les réseaux peer-to-
peer en Belgique 
Colin, C. and Dusollier, S. 
Les échanges illégaux d'oeuvres sur les réseaux peer-to-peer sont un phénomène difficile à combattre. 
Si une solution répressive de type HADOPI constitue l'une des voies possibles, elle n'est pas la seule. Il 
pourrait être envisageable d'élaborer un système d'autorisation de ces échanges tout en rémunérant les 
titulaires de droits pour l'exploitation ainsi faite de leurs oeuvres. Telle est l'orientation — dans les grandes 
lignes et en gardant à l'esprit leur différence de philosophie — des deux propositions de lois belges 
récentes appréhendant cette problématique. Ce dispositif d'autorisation se fonderait nécessairement sur 
un contrat impliquant les fournisseurs d'accès à Internet et les titulaires de droits à travers les sociétés de 
gestion collective. Plusieurs variantes de contrats sont possibles, dépendant du degré d'implication des 
fournisseurs d'accès dans le modèle. Et tout l'enjeu est là : comment réussir à convaincre les fournisseurs 
d'accès à Internet de jouer un rôle dans ce dispositif alors qu'a priori rien ne les y incite ? L'article propose 
une réflexion sur le modèle contractuel pouvant être mis en place pour autoriser les échanges en peer-
to-peer ainsi que sur les moyens pouvant amener les fournisseurs d'accès à s'impliquer dans de tels 
processus contractuels. 
Colin, C. and Dusollier, S. (2012). Les perspectives de légitimation des échanges des oeuvres sur les réseaux peer-to-
peer en Belgique. Larcier, 259-305. 
Locating criminal investigative measures in a virtual environment. Where do searches 
take place in cyberspace? 
Conings, C. 
State sovereignty is aimed at the organisation of a society and the protection of its citizens and their 
fundamental rights. Its existence depends upon internal recognition (by the people subjected to the 
sovereign power) and external recognition (by other sovereign states). In order to fulfil its organising and 
protective function, a state enjoys a range of powers, such as the power to prescribe and adjudicate 
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behaviour and the power to enforce law. Those powers are basically limited to a specified territory. The 
restricted territorial scope enables the peaceful coexistence of equal sovereign states, which are similarly 
responsible for order and peace within their territory. However, it is not always clear where to draw the 
territorial line. Within its territory, a state is empowered to prohibit certain acts through criminal law. 
Nevertheless, sometimes the localisation of the criminal behaviour seems difficult. Therefore, legal 
doctrine spelled out multiple localisation theories which help determine the locus commissi delicti, for 
example by means of the activity criterion or the ubiquity criterion. The same problem occurs in the 
context of criminal procedure, more specifically the criminal investigation phase. The problem arises 
whenever the location of the evidence sought is not clear or the location of access to the evidence 
differs from the location of the evidence itself. Where does a wiretap take place? Where do we have to 
locate a visual surveillance? Which location is decisive: the location of the subject under investigation, 
the location of the evidence searched for or the location of the investigating authority? Although the 
localisation difficulty clearly arose with regard to these more traditional investigation measures, the 
problem was never explicitly addressed. With respect to interception of telecommunications, the EU 
convention on mutual assistance in criminal matters however silently shifts focus in localising the 
investigative action from the object sought to the subject under investigation. Today, we can no longer 
put off dealing with this problem in a more explicit manner. The digitalisation of evidence confronts us 
more than ever with these questions. Where do digital (remote) searches take place? The current 
European nor international framework provides us with a clear answer. After going through the different 
existing approaches of the European Union and Council of Europe, we take a step back and try to answer 
the localisation question by referring to the ratio of territorial sovereignty. The following questions are 
therefore at the heart of the paper: Where should we locate (digital) investigation measures in order to 
maintain the desired interplay between fundamental rights protection, sovereignty and territoriality? 
What position should the EU and Council of Europe adopt in this matter in order to restore the balance 
between (1) internal power to organise society and protect fundamental rights (including the power to 
exclude other states) and (2) the need for external cooperation and bonding?  Which approach can 
assure the full effect of the Rule of Law within a virtual context? 
Conings, C. (2013). Locating criminal investigative measures in a virtual environment. Where do searches take place 
in cyberspace?. NC (dutch) & see Annex I of this B-CCENTRE Legal Research Report (English) 
Traditional forgery vs. IT forgery (in Dutch: Reële Valsheid Vs Virtuele Valsheid.).  
Conings, C. 
The computer crime act of 28 November 2000 provided a first "update" of the Belgian criminal law and 
procedure law, driven by ICT developments and their potential abuse. IT forgery got introduced into the 
Belgian Criminal Code as a new offence, turning the creation and use of false digital files into an offence. 
This offence however shows striking similarities to the traditional crime of forgery. The question is therefore 
which characteristics distinguish one offence from the other. Do these characteristics justify the different 
legal regimes for each one of them?  
A comparison of both criminal acts clarifies that the difference lies exclusively in the object thereof. The 
traditional crime of forgery concerns the falsification of non-computerised, written data. In contrast, the 
IT forgery refers to computer data, which includes visual and spoken representations of information. In 
practice, it is often difficult to make the distinction. Moreover, the use of different criminal provisions leads 
to different treatment of similar situations. The result of legislative intervention is therefore incompatible 
with the “offline=online” principle which the legislator had established at the outset.  
A fusion of both into one offence with a larger object seems appropriate. The legislator acknowledged 
the problem of the outdated and complex Belgian legal framework concerning forgery in 2000. It is time 
to solve this problem by creating a new, single and simplified offence of "forgery of legally relevant 
information".  
Conings, C. (2013). Reële Valsheid Vs Virtuele Valsheid. NjW. 
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Remote searches: borderless or pushing back frontiers? (in Dutch: Van een 
netwerkzoeking naar online doorzoeking: grenzeloos of grensverleggend?) 
Conings, C., & Oerlemans, J.J. 
A network search allows law enforcement officers to investigate IT systems remotely. The exact scope of 
the investigative measure is not always clear though. In the article, the authors examine whether the 
investigative measure can only be applied starting from an IT-system already under investigation or 
whether it also allows law enforcement to investigate systems remotely, starting from their own IT systems. 
Furthermore, the authors look into the (im)possiblity to apply the power covertly. They finish by looking into 
the jurisdictional issues, related to remote searches of computer systems. Throughout the article, the 
authors look at the Belgian as well as the Dutch approach, which reveals interesting similarities and 
differences between both legal frameworks.  
Conings, C., & Oerlemans, J.J. (2013). Van een netwerkzoeking naar online doorzoeking. Computerrecht 
Social media: a new challenge for law enforcement. (in Dutch: Sociale media Een 
nieuwe uitdaging voor politie en justitie 
Conings, C., & Van Linthout, P. 
Over the last decade, several technical evolutions made it possible for each one of us to participate 
actively in the creation of a new phenomenon often called the web 2.0. With the emergence of different 
forms of social media people can create webpages without any help of computer experts and easily 
share all sorts of information through different types of platforms. They can sell or buy goods on the 
internet, communicate by chat, by video or by voice, share their latest holiday photos or even their 
deepest thoughts. However, the possibilities that cyberspace has to offer are not only beneficial to well-
intended people but also to diverse types of (cyber)criminals. Not only can crime be committed in this 
new, virtual world. Social media are also an important tool to help criminals in committing their crimes in 
real world or to facilitate the communication and organisation of criminal groups. That is why social media 
enclose a load of information which can be precious for law enforcement. This contribution looks at the 
different legal possibilities and problems which law enforcement can face while taking access to social 
media, while investigating within these social media and when ‘social-media-evidence’ is used in court. 
Due to the fact that Belgian criminal procedural law still focuses on the real world, law enforcement faces 
plenty of legal difficulties and legislative action is long overdue. Nevertheless this text makes clear that a 
creative and open-minded approach of the matter can already offer important opportunities in 
investigating crime. In other words, law enforcement can also enjoy the possibilities of social media, even 
today, but these possibilities are only a small part of the bigger picture, which requires legislative 
intervention. 
Conings, C., & Van Linthout, P. (2012). Sociale media Een nieuwe uitdaging voor politie en justitie. Panopticon. 
Privacy and the regulation of 2012 
Costa, L. and Poullet, Y. 
This paper explores the European Commission’s proposal for a new Regulation to update and reform data 
protection law in Europe. As regards the Regulation itself, without presenting an exhaustive analysis of all 
the provisions, this paper aims to highlight some significant changes proposed to the data protection 
regime by comparison between Directive 95/46 and the proposed Regulation. It takes particularly into 
account legislative innovation concerning data protection principles, data subjects’ rights, data 
controllers and data processors obligations, and the regulation of technologies. Before analyzing these 
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innovations, it introduces some considerations about the Commission’s choice to use a Regulation instead 
of a Directive to harmonise national data protection regime. 
 Costa, L. and Poullet, Y. (2012). Privacy and the regulation of 2012. C.L.S.R., 254-262. 
Applying the purpose specification principle in the age of "Big Data": the example of 
integrated video surveillance platforms in France 
Coudert, F., Dumortier, J., & Verbruggen, F. 
The proliferation of data made available to businesses, governments and individuals, also referred to as 
the “data tsunami” or the age of “big data”, heavily challenges the application in practice of the 
purpose specification principle, one cornerstone principle of the data protection framework. In order to 
illustrate these difficulties, this paper takes as example a growing phenomenon, the deployment of 
integrated video surveillance platforms that link networks originally installed for distinct purposes and 
managed by different actors. Focus is put on France where the government passed a law to authorise 
law enforcement agencies to access private video surveillance networks for purposes of fighting crimes 
against properties and persons. We conclude by formulating policy recommendations tending to counter 
the dilution of safeguards when implementing the purpose specification principle in networked systems. 
Coudert, F., Dumortier, J., & Verbruggen, F. (2012). Applying the purpose specification principle in the age of "Big Data": 
the example of integrated video surveillance platforms in France. ICRI Working Paper Series. 
Accountable Surveillance Practices: Is the EU Moving in the Right Direction? 
Coudert, F. 
The European Union is introducing into the Data Protection Package a new data protection principle, the 
principle of accountability. Data controllers will be compelled to adopt policies, organisational and 
technical measures to ensure and be able to demonstrate compliance with the legal framework. The 
expected benefits are threefold: to foster trust in personal data management practices of data 
controllers, to increase visibility of personal data processing activities and to raise data controllers’ privacy 
awareness. Surveillance practices, because of their inherent opacity, could greatly benefit from 
reinforced accountability obligations to gain public’s trust. This paper critically analyses whether the 
policy options taken by the European Union to operationalise the principle of accountability are likely to 
meet this goal. 
Coudert, Fanny (2014) Accountable Surveillance Practices: Is the EU Moving in the Right Direction?, in Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science, Privacy technologies and Privacy, vol 8450 2014, 70-85 
Pervasive Monitoring: Appreciating Citizen’s Surveillance as Digital Evidence in Legal 
Proceedings 
Coudert, F., Gemo, M., Beslay, L., & Andritsos, F. 
Images or video streams, extracted from data acquired through surveillance systems and intended to be 
used as evidence in court, should have all attributes of conventional digital evidence, meaning that they 
should be admissible, authentic, reliable, complete and believable. This paper discusses the first three 
attributes that surveillance systems should comply with to be submitted as evidence in legal proceedings 
and it identifies some of the obstacles in the way through harmonisation. The focus is on data gathered 
from a range of ad hoc sources present at the scene of an incident, including smartphones and wireless 
sensor networks (used for safety, security or traffic management/environmental monitoring). New 
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scenarios for crowd-sourced surveillance mediated by law enforcement supervision are further 
considered. Specific attention is brought to the compliance with privacy requirements that often 
condition the admissibility of the evidence. 
Coudert, F., Gemo, M., Beslay, L., & Andritsos, F. (2011). Pervasive Monitoring: Appreciating Citizen’s Surveillance as 
Digital Evidence in Legal Proceedings. 4th International Conference on Imaging for Crime Detection and Prevention 
(ICDP 2011). 
Le droit au respect de la vie privée face aux nouvelles technologies 
Degrave, E. and Poullet, Y. 
Souligner l’impact de l’article 22 de la Constitution sur le développement des technologies fait écho aux 
commentaires divers entendus sur les bancs du Sénat lors des travaux de la révision constitutionnelle de 
1994 qui introduisit l’article 22 dans la Charte fondamentale de la Belgique. La Constitution se doit de 
traduire les « principes essentiels qui doivent gouverner sa société», « être le reflet de conscience de son 
peuple et des exigences qu’il attend du pouvoir » et donc « traduire fidèlement l’évolution de sa pensée 
(...). Dès lors, il apparaît essentiel que la vie privée et familiale soit protégée des risques d’ingérence que 
peuvent constituer, notamment par le biais de la modernisation constante des techniques de 
l’information, les mesures d’investigation, d’enquête et de contrôle menées par les pouvoirs publics et 
organismes privées ». En d’autres termes, la considération des risques encourus par nos libertés du fait des 
technologies nouvelles était d’emblée au cœur des préoccupations de nos constituants lorsqu’il s’est agi 
de justifier la consécration de l’article 22 de la Constitution. 
Degrave, E. and Poullet, Y. (2011). Le droit au respect de la vie privée face aux nouvelles technologies. Les droits 
constitutionnels en Belgique, 1001-1035.  
Removing and Blocking Illegal Online Content 
Demeyer, K., Lievens, E., & Dumortier, J. 
In 2011, the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Combating the Sexual Abuse, 
Sexual Exploitation of Children and Child Pornography was adopted, repealing and updating the 2004 
Framework Decision on this topic. The much debated Article 25 of this proposal requires Member States 
to ensure the prompt removal of child pornography websites hosted in their territory and to endeavor to 
obtain the removal of such websites hosted outside their territory. It also leaves the option for Member 
States, subject to several safeguards, to block access to such websites to users within their territory. Both 
these policy choices are highly controversial and much debated, both at the level of the European Union 
and within Member States. This article analyzes both mechanisms, describing them from a technical as 
well as a legal point of view, in order to provide more clarity as to the advantages and drawbacks of 
these policy options. 
Demeyer, K., Lievens, E., & Dumortier, J. (2012). Removing And Blocking Illegal Online Content. Policy & Internet. doi: 
10.1002/poi3.8. 
The protection of business secrets in criminal law: ‘send in the cavalry’? 
De Schepper, K. & Verbruggen, F. 
In recent years, the press continuously reported about companies that were experiencing problems with 
economic espionage and the "loss" of sensitive information. How should we deal with such modern 
threats? Our Belgian Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code, after all, still date back to the time of 
the horse and carriage: the nineteenth century. Hence the almost sacred importance attached to 
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writings, hence the heavy penalties in the Penal Code for property crimes. That nineteenth century also 
saw the last heyday of the cavalry: as army unit mobile, overwhelming and difficult to stop, but sometimes 
also proud and increasingly vulnerable due to the development of new weaponry. The judicious use of 
the cavalry made it possible to recover from seemingly lost situations and often decided crucial battles. 
Criminal law is actually the cavalry of law, the little discrete forces that were called upon in need.  
Is such nineteenth-century legal heavy cavalry still appropriate in the twenty-first century information 
society? In that society the evident value of physical, tangible and removable goods is less outspoken 
compared to that of intangible assets and "information" is an important but difficult definable legal 
interest. One should however not be a card player to know that it is much more difficult, or less interesting, 
to play either with all cards on the table or with a "snitch" who briefs your adversary. Consequently, is 
seems to be obvious that secret information as a socially valuable legal interest deserves protection under 
criminal law. Yet this complex legal matter has largely remained criminal wasteland. We hope to change 
that in the future, but it explains why this contribution only purports to be a timid and incomplete 
exploration and why it is limited to pointing out some substantive criminal law opportunities and 
challenges for the criminal procedure in this context. 
De Schepper, K. en Verbruggen, F. (2012), De bescherming van het zakengeheim in het strafrecht: cavalerie of 
calvarie? In Zakengeheim, die Keure, 131-188. 
How to enforce a duty to cooperate in a virtual context? 
De Schepper, K. 
On October 12, 2012, the court of appeals of Brussels discharged US-based company Yahoo! Inc. of the 
Belgian omission offence of a refusal to cooperate with the Belgian legal authorities. This article comments 
on this judgment. According to the author, the duty to cooperate of article 46bis of the (Belgian) Criminal 
Procedure Code also applies to foreign providers of electronic communication services when they 
actively offer these services in Belgium. The location of the establishment is therefore not decisive for the 
territorial scope of the Belgian criminal offence of a refusal to cooperate. It however does determine the 
way in which the public prosecutor can activate this procedural duty to cooperate. That should happen 
by relying on legal assistance from US authorities. The ‘virtual accessibility’ of these entities does not 
detach Belgium of its international obligations to use formal channels of communication. 
De Schepper, K. (2012). Medewerking in een virtuele context? Ya! Hoo echter afdwingen?, A&M, 239-243. 
Belgian substantive and formal criminal jurisdiction in the case of prosecution of 
foreign electronic service providers for failure to cooperate. Can Alien Space Invaders 
evade the Belgian Pac-Man? 
De Schepper, K & Verbruggen, F. 
The Belgian Yahoo case revolves around the territorial scope of a duty to cooperate with a criminal 
investigation, particularly in the case of IT-service-providers without physical presence on the Belgian 
territory. Article 46bis of the Belgian Code of Criminal Procedure imposes a duty to identify an ICT-
application or its user, when ordered to by a Belgian public prosecutor. Belgian law enforces this duty by 
imposing a criminal fine in case of refusal or insufficient co-operation. The Yahoo-case raised the question 
how Belgium could enforce this investigative measure and use the criminal sanction in a trans-border IT 
context and the question whether foreign electronic service providers can be punished by the Belgian 
criminal courts for ignoring a direct order from a Belgian prosecutor?  
The vast possibilities which electronic communications offer to the public, create a corollary need for 
investigators rapidly to obtain access to such information. As Belgium uses criminal punishment to ensure 
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the co-operation of private entities with investigative measures, the case illustrates the intricate 
interrelation of substantive criminal law jurisdiction (punishment of certain acts) with procedural criminal 
law jurisdiction claims (the legal obligation to cooperate with a criminal investigation). This interrelation 
complicates the answer to the classical question which State can claim jurisdiction over the internet, its 
players and its users. International public law regulates and limits the jurisdictional claims of individual 
States, Traditionally, it has appeared less opposed to an extensive application of substantive criminal law 
by States (“substantive criminal jurisdiction claims”), as long as those states do not effectively press home 
these claims through the trans-border use of force or compulsion, of intrusive law enforcement actions or 
the imposition of sanctions. This “procedural criminal jurisdiction” is therefore more likely to enter into 
conflict with the territorial sovereignty of other states. Do the traditional criteria of international law, which 
originate from the real world of physical national borders, still apply in the “virtual world” of the internet? 
Belgium’s broad substantive criminal jurisdiction over those who fail to co-operate with Belgian law 
enforcement does not present an international legal problem, but the authors believe Belgium cannot 
use this offence to obtain foreign evidence from foreign-based operators without respecting the 
international rules on mutual assistance in criminal matters. They reject the extensive interpretation of 
Belgian territorial jurisdiction invoked by the Belgian prosecutor. That broad substantive territorial scope of 
substantive criminal law should not, in their view, be used to circumvent international law limits on 
extraterritorial law enforcement activity. That being said, the case illustrates all the more clearly how 
pressing the need for more workable international cooperation is in the digital context. States should 
reach agreements which provide law enforcement from partner countries easy access to certain data. 
De Schepper, K. & Verbruggen, F. (2013). Ontsnappen Space Invaders aan onze pacmannen? De materiële en 
formele strafrechtsmacht van België bij strafbare weigering van medewerking door elektronische diensverleners, T. 
Strafr., 143-166 (Dutch) & English version in this B-CCENTRE Legal Research Report  
The ‘cloudy’ limits of IT-forgery and IT-fraud 
De Schepper, K. 
This article annotates a recent decision in an interesting cybercrime case. This decision allows us to 
analyse some tricky legal issues related to IT-forgery and IT-fraud, like the different criminal protection of 
forged writings and forged data, the interpretation of the constitutive element ‘legal value’ of IT-forgery 
and the very broad criminalisation of IT-fraud.  
De Schepper, K. (2015), De troebele grenzen van informaticavalsheid en informaticabedrog, (upcoming) 
Criminal law in the business practice  
De Schepper, K. and many others 
This book approaches criminal law and criminal procedure from the practical standpoint of the business 
practitioner. The criminal law as a business risk is for many business practitioners still very unknown. However 
the actuality indicates that the criminal risks to the business are not negligible. 
Criminal law deserves more attention in the risk management of most enterprises. Its risk should be 
thoroughly assessed and analyzed. This allows the business practitioner to formulate an appropriate policy 
to deal with these risks (criminal liability, fraud, criminal investigations, etc.). 
Hence, this book is primarily addressed to managers, risk managers, corporate lawyers, internal and 
external audit services, etc., who wish to overcome the "criminal" vulnerability of their company. The book 
also pays attention to cybercrime, which is a growing problem in the context of the business practice, 
and to cyber investigation, given the emerging importance of these investigative measures and duties to 
cooperate with law enforcement in that context. 
Strafrecht in de onderneming – derde herziene editie, Intersentia, to be published in 2015 
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La surveillance par caméras: de la supervision de lieux vers l’observation 
systématique de personnes 
Dumortier, F. 
La délimitation entre le champ d’application de la loi caméras et celui de l’article 47sexies du Code 
d’instruction criminelle est encore devenue plus incertaine à la suite de l’évolution technologique 
récente des caméras. Outre le fait que celles-ci sont souvent utilisées en réseau et connectées à des 
bases de données, elles peuvent actuellement être couplées à des algorithmes qui leur permettent 
aisément de « suivre » une personne déterminée ou de repérer automatiquement des évènements et 
objets particuliers dans des lieurs relativement vastes. En l’état actuel de la législation, une telle 
observation proactive systématique de personnes par ces acteurs privés peut-elle être qualifiée de 
traitement de données judiciaires illicite au sens de l’article 8 de la loi vie privée si elle n’est pas réalisées 
sous le contrôle d’une autorité publique dans le conditions fixées par l’article 47sexies du Code 
d’instruction criminelle ? 
Dumortier, F. (2013). La surveillance par caméras: de la supervision de lieux vers l’observation systématique de 
personnes. Anthemis, 333-342. 
Europe's Fragmented Approach Towards Cyber Security 
E Silva, K. 
The article proposes a deeper insight into the variety of concepts used to describe the term cyber security 
and the ways in which it has been used in recent years. It examines the role of three important actors 
involved in the internet governance arena, namely governments, private sector and civil society, and 
how they have influenced the debate. To this end, this paper analyses how different organisations, 
industry and societal actors see cyber security and how their interests influence the way the debate has 
evolved. The difficult balance between security and fundamental rights, although not new to 
governments and society, is of great importance for the internet. Citizens have engaged in favour of an 
open internet. However, little attention has been paid to the demands of citizens and how they may 
contribute to a concept of cyber security that brings society to its core. The paper states that for 
cyberspace to be open and supportive of innovation, the practice of cyber security needs to internalise 
the interests and perspectives of end users. A multistakeholder approach to cyber security asks a more 
participative environment where the rules of the game are decided with public participation and 
consultation, giving citizens the means and methods to influence the way cyber security is conceived 
and implemented. The paper concludes that although a citizen centric approach towards cyber security 
should be the way forward, this seems to be yet far from being included in the governmental agenda. 
The methodology applied in the paper was mainly focused on desk research. 
E Silva, K. (2013). Europe's Fragmented Approach Towards Cyber Security. Internet Policy Review. doi: 
10.14763/2013.4.202. 
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EU Information Sharing Platforms: Cybercrime Meets Data Protection 
E Silva, K. 
Recently, information sharing initiatives focused on the fight against cyber crime have become more and 
more popular. The proliferation of these platforms can be associated to the need for cooperative efforts 
from different stakeholders, as well as to the private sector control of the IT operations in the market. IT 
companies have risen to be strategic players in promoting and ensuring security. Effective information 
sharing calls for distribution of key information that often classifies as personal data in the terms of the law. 
Despite the proliferation of information exchange against cyber crime, this process was not followed by 
a more flexible application of data protection rules. This has created a grey zone in which security experts 
may be violating the fundamental right to privacy and data protection while trying to keep Internet safe. 
The goal of this paper is to clarify the data protection mechanism applicable to the activities of many 
technicians, who are often far from legal discussions and do not understand the legal issues involved in 
their work. It aims to bridge the gap between lawyers and security experts while providing short guidance 
on how to take part in information sharing systems without violating data protection laws. Finally, it aims 
to fortify the response against cyber crime by incentivising stakeholders to join efforts in cooperative 
networks within the limits of the law. 
E Silva. K. (2014). EU Information Sharing Platforms: Cybercrime Meets Data Protection. Future Security 2014, Sep 2014, 
Conference Proceedings (upcoming). 
Zombie Alert: Assessing Legitimacy of P2P Botnet Mitigation Techniques 
E Silva, K. & Roex, R. 
This paper covers the legal analysis of crawling, a technically relatively advanced technique for gathering 
intelligence on a P2P botnet, a decentralised network of infected computers under the control of a bot 
master. The intel acquired via the crawling technique can subsequently be used to deploy mitigation 
techniques such as sinkholing, which disrupts botnet operations.  We have chosen crawling for its 
relevance in practice as well as the attention it has been given in scholarly discourse. In the article, we 
present a high level overview of the technique’s basic functionalities and requirements, before we 
perform a legal assessment of the legitimacy of the different aspect of this technique according to data 
protection and criminal procedure law. In this paper, we look at crawling as a technique against P2P 
botnets to examine two questions: 1. What are the legal grounds justifying the use of crawling by private 
sector and individuals, with special attention to data protection legislation; 2. What are the legal grounds 
justifying the use of crawling by law enforcement and their value in court. Due to our familiarity with the 
Belgian and Dutch legal systems, the analysis of the aforementioned questions is limited to the legal 
frameworks of Belgium and The Netherlands. Therefore, we look at the differences between both 
jurisdictions in dealing with the issues that arise when crawlers are used by private sector and individuals 
as an intelligence gathering technique and by law enforcement in a criminal investigation. 
E Silva, K. and Roex, R. (2014). Zombie Alert: Assessing Legitimacy of P2P Botnet Mitigation Techniques. 25th ITS Europe, 
June 2014, Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier (upcoming). 
How to dismantle a botnet - the legal behind the scenes 
E Silva, K. 
Law enforcement actions targeting botnets have recently gained greater attention. The past year struck 
our attention with international takeover and takedown efforts led by cooperative networks formed by 
industry and law enforcement. A closer look into the Gameover Zeus & Cryptolocker (2014, U.S.) 
disruptions reveals that law enforcement has found creative ways to investigate and prosecute 
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botmasters. The analysis of the Gameover Zeus & Cryptolocker disruptive operations is a powerful source 
of clarifications for security experts and law enforcement agents. Today several questions left unanswered 
could pave the way to the future of botnet disruptions. For instance, what made those legal actions 
possible, while others are still on the waitlist? What is actually stopping law enforcement from taking 
action; in cases they already informed on the existence and functioning of botnets? Why is the U.S. 
leading the botnet fight? By looking at the operations recently led by U.S. law enforcement and the 
takedown of Bredolab in the NL in 2010, this paper aims to answer the questions above and approximate 
security experts from the struggles and barriers faced by law enforcement in the EU and overseas. 
E Silva, K. (2014) How to dismantle a botnet - the legal behind the scenes, conference proceedings BotConf2014 
(upcoming) 
Legal aspects: biometric data evidence rules and trusted identities 
Kindt, E.J. 
Biometric characteristics could play a role as means for binding electronic documents and transactions 
to a person and for identifying that person. However, one of the conditions for biometric methods to be 
used as an electronic signature, is that spoofing vulnerabilities are adequately assessed and appropriate 
solutions are developed. Anti-spoofing measures are also crucial in electronic identity schemes which 
may include biometric characteristics. For these schemes, privacy and data protection issues remain to 
be solved as well. 
 Kindt, E.J. (2014). Legal aspects: biometric data evidence rules and trusted identities. Handbook of Biometric Anti-
Spoofing. 
Privacy and Data Protection Issues of Biometric Applications: A Comparative Legal 
Analysis 
Kindt, E.J. 
Biometric characteristics, such as facial images, fingerprints, iris and voice, are increasingly used in 
automated systems to identify, to recognise or to verify identity claims of persons. An appropriate legal 
framework for biometric applications is however not yet in place. This book discusses all critical privacy 
and data protection aspects of biometric systems from a legal perspective. The book which has an 
interdisciplinary approach contains an explanation of the functioning of biometric systems in general 
terms for non-specialists. It continues with a description of the legal nature of biometric data and makes 
a comparison with DNA and biological material and the regulation thereof. It further reviews the opinions 
of data protection authorities in relation to biometric systems and current and future EU law, whereby a 
detailed analysis is made of the situation in Belgium, France and the Netherlands. It concludes with an 
evaluation of the proportionality principle and the application of data protection law to biometric data 
processing operations, mainly in the private sector, and with several suggestions for more safeguards in 
legislation. 
Kindt, E.J. (2013). Privacy and Data Protection Issues of Biometric Applications: A Comparative Legal Analysis. Law, 
Governance and Technology Series. 
Best Practices For Privacy And Data Protection For The Processing Of Biometric Data 
Kindt, E.J. 
Self-regulatory initiatives by data controllers can contribute to a better enforcement of data protection 
rules. This is especially important for the use of biometric data in identity management systems, because 
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of risks of use as unique identifiers and identification. This chapter explains the Best Practices which were 
developed in the Turbine project. These Best Practices recommend inter alia the creation of multiple 
trusted revocable protected biometric identities, which are irre- versible and unlinkable. 
Kindt, E.J. (2013). Best Practices For Privacy And Data Protection For The Processing Of Biometric Data. Security and 
Privacy in Biometrics. doi: 10.1007/978-1-4471-5230-9. 
Bullying and sexting in social networks from a legal perspective: Between enforcement 
and empowerment 
Lievens, E. 
The availability and use of social networking sites creates both opportunities and risks for their young users. 
This paper evaluates the applicability of the current legal framework to (cyber)bullying and sexting, two 
types of behaviour that are increasingly occurring between peers in the social networking environment. 
The analysis includes a mapping of applicable provisions at the European and national level, an analysis 
of the Terms of Service of two social networking providers and an overview and assessment of self-
regulatory initiatives that have been taken by the industry in this area. The ultimate goal is to identify a 
number of elements for a comprehensive strategy to ensure that risks of (cyber)bullying and sexting are 
dealt with in a manner that empowers young users. 
Lievens, E. (2012). Bullying and sexting in social networks from a legal perspective: Between enforcement and 
empowerment. ICRI Working Paper Series. Also: LIEVENS, E. (2014), “Bullying and sexting in social networks: Protecting minors 
from criminal acts or empowering minors to cope with risky behaviour?”, International Journal Crime, Law & Justice, Vol. 42, Iss. 
3, 251-270; Lievens, E. (2013), “Risico’s voor jongeren op sociale netwerken bekeken vanuit juridisch perspectief”, in: 
Valcke, Peggy, Lievens, Eva and Valgaeren, Pieter Jan (eds), Sociale Media: Actuele juridische aspecten, Intersentia, 
29-66 
Children and peer-to-peer risks in social networks: regulating, empowering or a little 
bit of both 
Lievens, E. 
Social networking services (SNS) are an important part of many children and teenager’s media use. As 
they communicate and share content by means of these services, minors may also engage in more risky 
behaviour, leading to reciprocal harassment which may blur the lines between victims and offenders to 
a greater extent than in the offline world.  However, due to the specific nature of SNS, the use, and 
especially the implementation and enforcement of, traditional types of legislation are confronted with 
many obstacles. After identifying certain legal implications, this chapter examines the potential of 
alternative regulatory mechanisms and empowerment techniques (co-regulation, technical tools, media 
literacy, information provision mechanisms). The goal is to provide guidelines for the development of 
regulatory strategies which reduce peer-to-peer conduct and content risks in user-centric environments 
for children and young people while safeguarding fundamental rights and public interest goals. 
LIEVENS, E. (2014), “Children and peer-to-peer risks in social networks: regulating, empowering or a little bit of both?”, in: VAN DER 
HOF, Simone, VAN DEN BERG, Bibi, SCHERMER, Bart (eds), Minding Minors Wandering the Web: Regulating Online Child Safety, 
Information Technology & Law Series, Springer Press / Asser Press, 191-209 
Les saisies et perquisitions de matériel informatique : les "garde-fous" entourant leur 
mise en oeuvre 
Losdyck, B. 
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Les saisies portant sur du matériel informatique peuvent avoir lieu dans bon nombre d'hypothèses : 
commercial, pénal, droit d’auteurs et droits voisins, …Il appert, dans la pratique, que les saisies et 
perquisitions de matériel électronique sont de plus en plus fréquentes tant dans le milieu professionnel 
qu'ailleurs. Bien que l'on comprenne aisément le développement de ces pratiques et l'utilité de recourir 
à celles-ci, se pose aujourd'hui la question de savoir si celles-ci sont entourées de garanties suffisantes afin 
d'assurer le respect des droits de l'individu, notamment le droit au respect de sa vie privée. 
Losdyck, B. (2013). Les saisies et perquisitions de matériel informatique : les "garde-fous" entourant leur mise en oeuvre. 
R.D.T.I., n°52, 21-49. 
Chronique de jurisprudence – criminalité informatique 2009-2011 
Omrani, F. and Dumortier, F. 
Au cours des trois années de jurisprudence couverte par cette chronique 2009-2011, d’importantes 
décisions ont été prononcées en matière de hacking, de possession d’images pédopornographiques 
(l’affaire Hissel) mais aussi quant à la notion de fournisseur de services de communications électroniques 
(l’affaire Yahoo !) La présente chronique aborde successivement le faux en informatique, la fraude 
informatique, l’abus de confiance, le hacking, le délit de presse, le harcèlement et la possession d’image 
pédo-pornographique mais aussi des questions de procédures. Bien qu’il soit prématuré de faire état 
d’une tendance à proprement parler, on relève que les cours et tribunaux ont appliqué des infractions 
de droit commun à des données informatiques dans le cadre du délit de presse et de l’abus de 
confiance. 
Omrani, F. and Dumorier, F. (2014). Chronique de jurisprudence – criminalité informatique 2009-2011. R.D.T.I., n°48-49, 
198-208. 
Identiteitsdiefstal via sociale media. Een juridische benadering van een 
maatschappelijk fenomeen 
Roex, R. 
Social media, to be understood as internet based applications associated with the ideological and 
technological foundations of the Web 2.0, have demonstrated their ability to reach a vast number of 
people simultaneously. Such a wide reach entails significant opportunities for economic and social 
exploitation. In this contribution we zoom in on the dark side of these social media and look at how 
criminals exploit them via a phenomenon commonly referred to as ‘identity theft’. The main objective is 
to outline how the Belgian legal framework aims to cope with this particular type of criminal conduct. By 
first selecting an acceptable definition of the phenomenon and then analysing the applicable legal 
framework as well as recent case law, we can conclude that a) the law provides several provisions which 
qualify as candidates for penalising identity theft, and b) that the procedural tools foreseen in the Belgian 
Criminal Procedure Code through broad interpretation of the Court of Cassation allow law enforcement 
to take decisive action. 
Roex, R. (2013). Identiteitsdiefstal via sociale media. Een juridische benadering van een maatschappelijk fenomeen. 
Sociale media – Actuele juridische aspecten Intersentia. 
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Uw data op straat: toedekken of melden? De meldplicht bij gegevenslekken: een 
stand van zaken 
Roex, R. 
Data breaches seem to be everywhere nowadays, causing damage to organisations irrespective of their 
size. A data breach has an impact on several different stakeholders at once, from the individual seeing 
his data published on the web to companies suffering civil liabilities and governments confronted with 
increased public expenditure to cope with the phenomenon. It is therefore important that every single 
one of these stakeholders takes active initiatives towards mitigating the effects of a breach, including 
reporting them. The contribution provides an overview of the currently applicable obligations to report 
and those that are in the regulatory pipeline. 
Roex, R. (2014) Uw data op straat: toedekken of melden? De meldplicht bij gegevenslekken: een stand van zaken. 
Private Veiligheid Politeia. 
Les mesures de filtrage et de blocage de contenus sur l’internet: un mal (vraiment) 
nécessaire dans une société démocratique ? Quelques réflexions autour de la liberté 
d’expression 
Van Enis, Q. 
Les mesures de filtrage et de blocage sont susceptibles de mettre à mal la liberté d’expression sur le 
réseau. La présente étude vise à analyser l’impact de telles mesures sur le droit protégé par l’article 10 
de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. Une attention particulière est accordée à 
l’exigence de proportionnalité qui dérive de cette disposition et qui impose aux autorités publiques d’en 
faire assez sans en faire trop lorsqu’ils tentent de sauvegarder d’autres intérêts légitimes. 
Van Enis, Q. (2013). Les mesures de filtrage et de blocage de contenus sur l’internet: un mal (vraiment) nécessaire dans 
une société démocratique ? Quelques réflexions autour de la liberté d’expression. Rev. trim. dr. h., n°96, 859-886. 
Vie privée et protection des données à caractère personnel 
Van Gyseghem, J., de Terwange, C., Herveg, J. and Gayrel, C. 
Le présent ouvrage est consacré à la protection de la vie privée et des données à caractère personnel. 
Dans l’approche suivie, il ne s’agit pas de proposer au lecteur un précis sur le droit au respect de la vie 
privée dans son ensemble. La matière est en effet tentaculaire et un tel ouvrage devrait couvrir le droit à 
l’intégrité physique et morale, au nom à l’honneur, à l’image, à une vie familiale, à un environnement 
sain, et la liste est loin d’être close. L’objectif de cet ouvrage consiste plutôt à mettre à disposition des 
praticiens et de toute personne confrontée à des questionnements liés à la protection des individus face 
aux développements techniques et sociétaux et à la tournure que prend notre société, un outil apportant 
les réponses juridiques à de tels questionnements. 
Van Gyseghem, J., de Terwange, C., Herveg, J. and Gayrel, C. (2013). Vie privée et protection des données à 
caractère personnel. Politeia. 
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“To Shut Down, Push Start”: Sixth in Series of Judgments in Belgian Yahoo Case Goes 
Back to Square One 
Verbruggen, F.  
Critical analysis on a decision of the Antwerp court of appeals from 2013, in which it convicted a US based 
electronic service provider for failure to heed a Belgian local prosecutor’s direct order to hand over data 
concerning e-mail-use. The author first wonders whether under Belgian law the type of information 
requested, actually required a judicial warrant rather than a decision from a prosecutor. Subsequently, 
he questions the conclusion of the court: that the matter was of a purely Belgian territorial nature and 
that therefore international law on mutual legal assistance and US law were irrelevant. The author 
advocates a less unilateral approach to criminal jurisdiction claims over internet operators in a cross-
border context and stresses the urgency in replacing traditional MLAT-bureaucracy by more workable 
tools for law enforcement. 
Verbruggen, F. (2014), ‘Om af te sluiten, druk op Start’: zesde rechter in Belgische Yahoozaak schaart zich achter 
eerste, Computerrecht, 129-140. 
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B-CCENTRE-ICRI contribution to London International Cyber Conference, 
London, 1-2 November 2011.  
On 1-2 November the UK hosted the London International Cyber Conference to discuss norms of 
acceptable behaviour in cyberspace and to build the broadest possible international consensus around 
basic standards of behaviour which will enhance security and confidence in the networked world, i.e. on 
how to realise the benefits of cyberspace.  The British Government wanted to start the dialogue between 
major actors in cyberspace, involving industry, academic experts and representatives of civil society. The 
conference attracted representatives of more than 80 governments and international organisations. The 
then Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vanackere reacted in a constructive manner to this initiative, 
willing to contribute actively to the conference. In order to prepare the Belgian input, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs collected feedback and input from the academic world and civil society to feed the 
Belgian contribution. B-CCENTRE contributed with argumented considerations regarding the Trade-off 
between ensuring a high level of security for citizens and preserving their fundamental rights, such as the 
right to privacy, as feedback on a UK ‘food for thought’ paper sent to the participants which contained 
already 7 principles which could be the core of the norms to be established by international consensus. 
The B-CCENTRE input was appreciated by the Belgian delegation to the Conference. 
Trade-off between ensuring a high level of security for citizens and preserving their 
fundamental rights, such as the right to privacy.  
F. Coudert 
This brief paper highlights the threats posed to privacy by the methods and tools used by law enforcement 
agencies when fighting cybercrime. It also tries to show that privacy and security should not be 
approached as conflicting values but rather as mutually reinforcing ones insofar as they both tend to the 
same objective, namely the protection of Freedom. The challenge however resides in turning this vision 
into reality. To that end, three action tracks are put forward: (1) at policy level, best practices developed 
should contain the commitment of public authorities to fully take into account the criteria developed by 
the ECtHR case law under article 8 (right to privacy) into the legislative framework directed to the fight 
against cybercrime; at technology level, two approaches should be fostered, (2) the one of “privacy-by 
design” that looks at limiting the impact of a given technology on individuals’ right to privacy from the 
design phase of such technology, and (3) the one of “accountability-by-design” that pretends to 
integrate in the technology accountability mechanisms that will enable its users to demonstrate they 
have acted in full respect with individuals’ fundamental rights. All three mechanisms are intended to foster 
trust. 
1. Problem statement: to what extent is privacy challenged in policies fighting against 
cybercrime. 
The pervasive, ubiquitous and invisible nature of cybercrime requires law enforcement to use investigation 
methods with similar characteristics. In order to adequately answer these new threats, law enforcement 
agencies should make use of powerful new technologies such as data mining and matching tools that 
use statistical methods to extract characteristics or tendencies in human behaviour, and foster 
collaboration, resulting in an increase in the information exchange between these agencies and with the 
private sector. 
Opaque and proactive technologies. The use of the aforemetioned technologies improves the efficiency 
of investigation methods, e.g. by increasing the rate of crime detection through intelligent software 
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detecting identity fraud or suspicious financial transactions. They however enable more intrusive practices 
such as targeted surveillance, investigation or use of search powers.2  
These technologies are mainly characterized by two prevalent features: their opaqueness to the people 
being monitored and their proactive nature. The fight against cybercrime requires law enforcement 
agencies to evolve their traditional operative methods based on reaction to crimes and focused on the 
gathering of conclusive evidence of wrongdoing ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ to put before a criminal 
court3, towards proactive surveillance that targets the (alleged or potential) criminal and not the crime4. 
Proactive surveillance makes use of methods taken from the Insurance sector and managerial philosophy 
where data analysis and crime intelligence are pivotal to an objective, a decision-making framework 
that facilitates crime and problem reduction, disruption and prevention5. Both methods have always 
existed in policing practices but new technologies allow an increase in scale and thus in the intrusiveness 
of the surveillance performed. This also directly affects the role of the police operative because of the 
increased automation of surveillance systems where ’the human component is being limited to 
construction and evaluation roles, with decision-making carried out by computer software through 
mathematical codes.´6 
These new investigation tools require the collection of (personal) data in an unrestricted way, not always 
linked to specific and predefined purposes but rather to cover the mere possibility that these data may 
become useful at some (undefined) point. Such is for instace the case of the new data retention policies 
as implemented under Directive 2006/24/EC, the so-called Data Retention Directive7. 
Increase exchange of information. A second threat to privacy is to be found in the increase of personal 
data exchange between law enforcement agencies. This phenomenon is fostered by two paralell trends: 
(a) the internationalisation of security threats that require an increased coordination of law enforcement 
agencies and (b) the expansion of the concept of Security which leads to a progressive (re)integration 
of the tasks and functions of law enforcement agencies, security services and intelligence agencies8 
which ultimately results in increasing overlaps, in the blurring of organisation boundaries and in the 
integration of databases. As a way of example, cross-border police cooperation becomes central in the 
Communication on the Stockholm Programme: better exchange of information is identified as one 
essential policy goal for the EU in the AFSJ. 9 This is furthermore reinforced by the fostering of information 
sharing practices, not any more relying on a voluntary basis such as under Interpol, Schengen, Europol 
and Eurojust Conventions, but rather on an obligation to make available information on an automatic 
basis under the principle of availability, for instance implemented under the Treaty of Prüm10. The principle 
2 CROSSMAN G. et al., Overlooked: Surveillance and Personal Privacy in Modern Britain, Liberty, 2007. 
3 Institute for Prospective Technological Studies, Security and Privacy for the Citizen in the Post-September 11 Digital 
Age: a prospective overview, July 2003, p.99. 
4 NORIS C., The Intensification and Bifurcation of Surveillance in British Criminal Justice Policy, Eur J Crim Policy Res (2007) 
13:139–158, 2007. 
5 See in that sense, RATCLIFF J.H., Intelligent-led policing, In; Wortley, R, Mazerolle, L, and Rombouts, S (Eds) Environmental 
Criminology and Crime Analysis (Willan Publishing: Cullompton, Devon), 2008. 
6 WOOD D.,  The Evolution of Algorithmic Surveillance and the Potential for Social 
Exclusion, 2003, as quoted in BROWN I. , KORFF D. , Privacy and Law Enforcement, UK Information Commissionner study 
project, Foundation for Information Policy Research, 2004. 
7 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data 
generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or 
of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC, OJ L 105 13.04.2006 p. 54 
8 GREENWOOD D. and HUISMAN S., Transparency and Accountability of Police Forces, Security Services and Intelligence 
Services, George C. Marshall Association / DCAF, 2004. 
9 HUSTINX P. , Data protection and the need for an EU Information management Strategy, Speech delivered at the first 
meeting under Swedish Presidency of the Council Ad Hoc Working Group on Information Exchange, 2009, Brussels. 
10 The Treaty of Prüm was incorporated to the European framework by the Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 
2008 on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime´, OJ 
2008 L 210, 6 August, 2008. 
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of availability11 ´entails that information needed for the fight against crime should cross the internal 
borders of the EU without obstacles´12.  
Increases in information exchange are not limited to law enforcement agencies but also take place 
between these agencies and the private sector. Information gathered in the course of the private sector 
activities is further requested for purposes of fighting against cybercrime. The tracking of Internet users’ 
activities becomes pivotal in order to solve crimes such as pedophilia or identity theft but requires the 
active involvement of Internet Service Providers. Whereas it helps law enforcement agencies with the 
investigation of crimes, it also subjects individuals to a detailed monitoring of their daily activities. Private-
public partnership is not new, at least in the field of law enforcement, but its impact on citizens is 
reinforced by the use of data mining technologies that aggravates the pervasive nature of the 
surveillance. 
2. The importance to respect fundamental rights such as the right to privacy when deploying 
policies to fight cybercrime to secure cyberspace as a trusted environment. 
As stressed in the UK paper, cyberspace should be secured as a trusted environment. Only if the right 
balance is struck between the need for Security and the need to respect fundamental rights, such as the 
right to privacy, can this trust be constructed.  
 Security and privacy are often presented as the two faces of the same coin continuously influenced by 
external factors.13 In words of the Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (2003), “if for some reason 
the perceived need for individual and collective security increases, emphasis on the maintenance of 
privacy tends to decrease.”14  Since 9/11, emphasis has however been put on the increase of Security 
through the use of new technologies often without proper prior debate about their societal implications, 
particularly in terms of fundamental rights. Privacy is often presented as a mere obstacle to the 
implementation of more efficient Security practices. 
Deciding on the opportunity to deploy a certain technology, on the goals this technology is expected to 
meet or on its legitimate conditions of use should however necessarily go through a prior societal debate 
where the impact on fundamental rights is carefully assessed. Taken the example of the introduction of 
video surveillance and face recognition systems into public places, Browyer (2004) identifies three 
questions that should be answered before deciding their deployment, namely: “1) when or whether a 
sophisticated high-tech application works well enough to be worth deploying, 2) which elements of 
privacy are essential and which are inessential, and 3) what level of increased safety can come through 
the introduction of this technology.”15 
 
To answer these questions, the metaphor of balancing of interests is often used. This has however been 
criticized by several scholars, all pointing out the fact that it inevitably leads to a “zero-sum game”, 
incapable of providing satisfying solutions.16 The debate would thus consist in assessing how much ‘liberty’ 
could be lost and how much security is consequently gained. In words of Bowyer, “the full depth and 
meaning of Benjamin Franklin’s warning about trading liberty for security is not always appreciated. He 
posted the tradeoff as one giving up “essential liberty” in order to obtain “a little temporary safety”. Thus 
11 European data Protection Authorities, Declaration on the Principle of Availability, with Common Position and 
Checklist, adopted on 11 May 2007, Spring Conference of the European Data Protection Authorities, Cyprus, 10-11 
May 2007. 
12 European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion on the Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the exchange 
of information under the principle of availability, COM (2005) 490 final, 17 May 2006. 
13 COUDERT, Fanny  (2010) When video cameras watch and screen: Privacy implications of pattern recognition 
technologies, Computer Law & Security Review 26 (2010), Issue 4, 377-384 
14 Institute for Prospective Technological Studies. Security and privacy for the citizen in the post-September 11 digital 
age: a prospective overview; 2003.  
15 Bowyer KW. Face recognition technology: security vs. privacy, IEEE Technology and Society Magazine; Spring, 2004 
16 see e.g. Hayes B. There is no “balance” between security and civil liberties - just less of each. In: Essays for civil liberties 
and democracy in Europe. Essay, no. 12; 2006, ECLN.org; 2006 
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we can expect that much of the disagreement in this area comes down to whether the increase in safety 
is judged to be little or much, and temporary or permanent.’17 
 
A more positive understanding of the terms of the debate should be preferred. Privacy and Security 
should be considered as mutually reinforcing values working together towards the same goal, namely 
contributing to a greater level of Freedom. In that sense, WALLACH for instance suggests considering 
human rights as an ethic of power. In words of this author, ‘every exercise of political power entails two 
elements. First, it presupposes the need to overcome an extent social conflict or difficulty facing human 
beings and citizens. As such, the exercise of political power is essentially contested. Second, a purpose 
always informs the exercise of political power, and that purpose signifies a relationship to an ideal 
community. While the purpose for which power is exercised does not inherently belong to the fact of its 
exercise, power without a purpose is sheer force. Insofar as the purpose of power is justified as a social 
practice, that purpose comprises an ‘ethics’’18.  
 
3. How to implement cybercrime practices respectful of privacy 
 
The challenge however resides in realising this greater Freedom for citizens in practice, i.e. a greater level 
of Security while adequately protecting their privacy. Several aspects should be considered.   
 
First of all, at level of policy making, a series of criteria should be taken into account where drafting 
Cybercrime legislation. These criteria have been elaborated through the years by the European Court of 
Human Rights (hereafter, ‘ECtHR’) through its case law on article 8.2 (right to privacy) in order to ensure 
the foreseeability of law enforcement practices and to prevent abuses of power. Article 8§2 explicitly 
admits as legitimate aims of derogation motives such as national security, public safety, the prevention 
of disorder or crime or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Such derogation should 
however be ‘in accordance with the law’ and ‘necessary in a democratic society’, i.e. ‘relevant and 
sufficient’ and proportionate. The case law of the ECtHR has mainly focused on the verification of the first 
criteria, ‘in accordance with the law’, giving way to the development of a detailed jurisprudence on the 
requirements a law should meet to qualify as foreseeable and accessible. The law should install clear, 
detailed rules governing the scope and application of measures, as well as minimum safeguards 
concerning duration, storage, usage, access of third parties, procedures for preserving the integrity and 
confidentiality of data and procedures for its destruction, thus providing sufficient guarantees against the 
risk of abuse and arbitrariness. The Court has developed the following minimum safeguards that should 
be set out in statute law in order to avoid abuses of power in the context of telephone tapping, secret 
surveillance and covert intelligence-gathering and later on extended to strategic monitoring, namely : 
a) the nature of the offences which may give rise to a surveillance measure; b) a definition of the 
categories of people liable to be subject to such surveillance; c) a limit on the duration of the surveillance; 
d) the procedure to be followed for examining, using and storing the data obtained; e) the precautions 
to be taken when communicating the data to other parties; and f) the circumstances in which recording 
may or must be erased or the tapes destroyed. The proportionality of the measures should also be 
carefully assessed. In the Marper case (2008)19, where the ECtHR had to assess the conformity of the 
collection and storage of fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA profiles for crime prevention purposes 
with article 8 ECHR, the Court recalled that ‘any State claiming a pioneer role in the development of new 
technologies bears special responsibility for striking the right balance in this regard’. The Court further 
observed that the protection afforded by Article 8 would be unacceptably weakened if the use of 
modern scientific techniques in the criminal justice system were allowed at any cost and without carefully 
balancing the potential benefits of the extensive use of such techniques against important private-life 
interests. 
17 Bowyer KW. Face recognition technology: security vs. privacy, IEEE Technology and Society Magazine; Spring, 2004 
18 WALLACH J.R. , Human Rights as an ethics of power, in Human Rights in an Age of Terror, WILSON R.A. (ed.), Cambridge, 
2005. 
19 S and Marper v United Kingdom 30562/04 [2008] ECHR 1581 (4 December 2008). 
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Another track of action should focus on the design of the technologies used by law enforcement 
authorities to fight cybercrime. These technologies should integrate, from the design phase, features that 
limit the impact on individuals’ privacy. This means that while developing a new technology, its impact 
on privacy is first assessed to be able in a second time to adopt technological or organisational measures 
as to limit this impact. This approach is being fostered by the European Commission within the FP7 Security 
calls which has given a prevalent role to “privacy-by-design” technologies.  
However, privacy cannot be fully protected nor trust fully realised if transparency mechanisms that ensure 
oversight over opaque cybercrime practices, i.e. that privacy safeguards are actually enforced. S. SIMITIS 
for instance believes that “only the greatest possible transparency under the rule of law […] ensures that 
the danger of slipping into a surveillance state can be countered”.20 This is in part because trust, intimately 
linked with transparency, is essential to a democratic society. As argued by Liberty, 
where surveillance put[s] the privacy of an individual at risk, the broader relationship between 
the citizen and state is also at stake [insofar] there would be a society where the dignity of the 
individual has been compromised; intimacy between people, confidence between people and 
trust in big institutions, whether it is the Health Service or the Government, would be lost.21  
Transparency can first be realised by ensuring an external and independent oversight. Other forms of a 
priori control over the processing, such as prior checks conducted by data protection authorities (see 
Section 3.1 above), may form a first step in making them more transparent and thus creating trust. 
However, trust can only be achieved by ensuring that the “watchers are watched”, e.g. by empowering 
trustworthy authorities to conduct investigations and to report on the findings. Data protection authorities 
are generally trusted by the public, and have proved to have sufficient independence and knowledge 
to carry out this role. 
Transparency can also be integrated to the technology, including features that will make law 
enforcement agencies accountable. This concept has been coined as ‘accountability-by-design’22 and 
comes to complement the one of ‘privacy-by-design’. Whereas the first concept seeks to limit the impact 
of the technology designed on privacy, the later one focus on the enforceability of these measures. 
Accountability by design is expected to ensure trust by enabling law enforcement agencies to 
demonstrate that they have acted in full respect with fundamental rights and by easing the detection of 
malicious or improper uses. This concept is however new and needs to be further explored. 
4. Recommendations 
 
• Approach Security and Privacy as mutually reinforcing values that should work together towards the 
same end, enabling Freedom. 
• Introduce into the best practices the need for policy makers to fully implement the criteria developed 
by the European Court of Human Right under article 8.2. Recall that these criteria are expected to 
ensure the foreseeability of law enforcement agencies and to limit abuse of power 
• Foster “privacy-by design” and “accountability-by design” methodologies for the design of new 
technologies that will be used to fight against cybercrime. Whereas “privacy-by-design” 
methodology intends to limit the impact on individuals’ privacy of this technology, “accountability-
by-design” aims to ensure a greater level of transparency in technologies which are each time more 
opaque to individuals.
20 As quoted by the Foundation for Information Policy Research, “UK Information Commissioner study project: privacy 
and law enforcement, Paper n°4: the legal framework, an analysis of the constitutional European approach to issues 
of data protection and law enforcement”, February 2004, p. 59. 
21 Liberty, Overlooked: Surveillance and Personal Privacy in Modern Britain, October 2007, available online at: 
http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/issues/3-privacy/pdfs/liberty-privacy-report.pdf. 
22 The term “accountability-by-design” has been coined by Matthias Pocs, LLM, in “Accountability-by-design. Example 
of future biometric systems for crime prevention” paper presented at the PATS, Privacy and Accountability Conference 
Berlin, 5-6 April 2011 
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Full Text Articles 
“Locating criminal investigative measures in a virtual evironment. Where do searches 
take place in cyberspace”  
C. CONINGS* 
Introduction 
The territoriality principle limits state sovereignty and its accompanying competencies to a national 
territory. Likewise, a government’s authority to investigate criminal acts is restricted to the territory falling 
under the competencies of such government. If a government wants to perform investigative acts 
abroad, it must rely on an official request for legal assistance if no international agreement for 
cooperation applies. It is often difficult, however, to establish the place where a government exercises its 
investigatory powers. Whilst few problems regarding procedural competencies arose in the past, 
digitisation has raised a number of questions relating to the meaning and the correct definition of the 
concepts of territoriality and sovereignty. What role can territoriality play in a world where physical 
boundaries are becoming increasingly blurred? Does such blurring necessarily mean that legal territorial 
boundaries are also becoming blurred? Where should investigative acts be located in a world in which 
physical distance only plays a limited role? How is sovereignty to be understood in a world that is 
increasingly becoming a global community? In short: How should we approach sovereignty and 
territoriality in the current digitised society? Can these concepts still fulfil their original functions or do we 
need new criteria to define and limit the competencies of investigating authorities in a virtual 
environment?  
I. Traditional approach to territoriality under pressure 
1. Origin: State sovereignty and its territorial delineation 
1.  LEGITIMACY OF THE STATE SOVEREIGNTY - State sovereignty was originally legitimised by the need to 
organise a community and the idea that the task of maintaining order should be vested in a higher 
authority that is able to offer its subjects protection.1 To allow the higher authority to fulfil its task of 
maintaining order and providing protection, its sovereign power has, among others, the competence to 
enact laws and enforce them.2 The idea that a higher authority is in the best position to protect the 
interests of its subordinates in their mutual relationship (internal protection) constitutes an important 
foundation for state sovereignty. 3 Sovereign authority is only possible if it is adequately recognised by the 
persons falling under the sovereign competences (bottom-up recognition). Hence, if only few subjects 
recognise the sovereign authority of the state, the state runs the risk that its sovereignty will be 
undermined. Consequently, to a certain extent, sovereignty relies on internal recognition by its subjects. 
2. ESSENTIAL (TERRITORIAL) DELINEATION - The territoriality principle restricts state sovereignty and its 
accompanying competencies to a national territory. Only by limiting sovereignty in a certain way is it 
possible to constitute inter-state recognition, i.e. external recognition. This constitutes a second form of 
recognition, which is also an essential prerequisite for state sovereignty.4 The limitation is aimed at 
* The author is PhD candidate at the Institute for Criminal Law of the University of Leuven and affiliated researcher at 
the B-CCENTRE. This contribution has already been published in Dutch in Nullum Crimen 2014, no. 1, 1-25. 
1 We can trace this idea back to Social Contract thinkers such as THOMAS HOBBES, JOHN LOCKE, JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU 
and JOHN RAWLS, for example. 
2 A. CASSESE, International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, 49-50. 
3 E. LANCKSWEERDT, “Soevereiniteit, angst en leiderschap”, TBP 2012, 472. The author thereby refers to THOMAS HOBBES, one 
of the most prominent founders of the theory of sovereignty.  
4 I. WALLERSTEIN, World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction, Durham, Duke University Press, 2004, 44: "Sovereignty is more 
than anything else a matter of legitimacy [...that] requires reciprocal recognition. Sovereignty is a hypothetical trade, 
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protecting the sovereignty as such and enabling peaceful international co-existence.5 The UN Charter 
mentions the sovereign equality of states in this context.6 The limitation comes to expression in the 
authority of a state to exclude other states from exercising sovereign powers within its territory.7 In this way, 
the sovereign state can also guarantee that the persons and goods within its territory are protected 
against unlawful interference by other sovereign states (external protection).8 Protection against 
infringements by persons who are on the territory of another state is provided by international cooperation 
between the respective sovereign states.9 This is the only way in which sovereign states can fully 
accomplish their task.  
Territoriality proved to be the most practicable and logical criterion to delineate state authority.10 State 
competence extends in the first place to the national territory, territorial waters and the airspace above 
them.11 Because of common interest, the high seas (mare liberum) and space are free of sovereignty 
claims.12 Consequently, No state has the right to exclude other states from space or the high seas. Both 
spheres may be used by any state whatsoever.13 Yet, certain "territorial" delineation can be found in 
space and in the high seas. For instance, ships sailing in high seas and objects launched into space, do 
fall under the jurisdiction of the state whose flags they bear or where they were registered.14 Although 
space and the high seas, as such, are free of individual jurisdiction, states can consequently still have 
sovereign competence over events taking place in these areas. 
3.  INTERNAL RECOGNITION OF TERRITORIAL DELINEATION – As is the case with state sovereignty, where 
(subjects’) internal recognition applies, there is also a form of internal recognition of the territorial 
delineation of such sovereignty. Legal subjects recognise the co-existence of various societies, each of 
which allocates sovereign competence to a higher body in order to organise and protect the society. 
They, therefore, also acknowledge that the sovereignty of their own state, which is aimed at providing 
them with legal protection, must necessarily be limited. This entails that subjects are aware of the 
consequences of crossing the national borders and accept these consequences. In fact, they recognise 
that they are entering the sovereign competence of another state every time they traverse the border, 
knowing that such an act implies relinquishing the protection offered by their own state. Likewise, they 
accept that the goods they take with them across the border fall under the sovereign competence of 
the state they are visiting. The visited state must fulfil its protective task in respect of all persons entering its 
territory. Such persons are, therefore, required to adhere to the local regulations.  
Every state can enforce its laws and exercise the necessary law enforcement competencies in respect 
of persons who enter its territory. Consequently, if one does not wish to subject oneself or one’s goods 
(e.g. laptop, accounting and medical file) to the competencies of a foreign state, one must stay within 
the boundaries of one's own country or leave one's goods there. The recognition of the sovereignty’s 
in which two potentially conflicting sides, respecting de facto realities of competency, exchange such recognitions as 
their least costly strategy." 
5 W.H. VON HEINEGG, “Legal implications of Territorial Sovereignty in Cyberspace”, in C. CZOSSECK, R. OTTIS, K. ZIOLKOWSKI 
(eds), 4th International Conference on Cyber Conflict, Tallinn, NATO CCD COE Publications, 2012, 8. 
6 Article 2 of the United Nations Charter. 
7 A. CASSESE, International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, 51. 
8 W.H. VON HEINEGG, “Legal implications of Territorial Sovereignty in Cyberspace”, in C. CZOSSECK, R. OTTIS, K. ZIOLKOWSKI 
(eds), 4th International Conference on Cyber Conflict, Tallinn, NATO CCD COE Publications, 2012, 8. 
9 In addition, external recognition of sovereignty is accompanied by an obligation of states not to allow their territory 
to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states. They must therefore use all the means at their disposal in order 
to avoid such use. PCIJ, 9 April 1949, The Korfu Channel Case, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/1/1645.pdf; W.H. VON 
HEINEGG, “Legal implications of Territorial Sovereignty in Cyberspace”, in C. CZOSSECK, R. OTTIS, K. ZIOLKOWSKI (eds), 4th 
International Conference on Cyber Conflict, Tallinn, NATO CCD COE Publications, 2012, 15 et seq. 
10 See extensively in this regard: A. CASSESE, International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, 81 et seq.  
11 In more specific terms, see: C. VAN DEN WYNGAERT, Strafrecht en strafprocesrecht en internationaal strafrecht, 
Antwerpen, Maklu, 2006, 1205 ff; W. DEREZE, “De grens tussen luchtvaart en ruimtevaart”, Jura Falconis 2007-08, 100-104.  
12 W. DEREZE, “De grens tussen luchtvaart en ruimtevaart”, Jura Falconis 2007-08, 102-104; M. HILDEBRANDT, “Extraterritorial 
jurisdiction to enforce in cyberspace?: Bodin, Schmitt, Grotius in cyberspace”, University of Toronto Law Journal 2013, 
afl. 63, 196-224. 
13 UN Outer Space Treaty of 27 January 1967; UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982. 
14 C. VAN DEN WYNGAERT, Strafrecht en strafprocesrecht en internationaal strafrecht, Antwerpen, Maklu, 2006, 1206 ff; W. 
DEREZE, “De grens tussen luchtvaart en ruimtevaart”, Jura Falconis 2007-08, 102-104. 
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territorial delineation creates legal certainty. The legal system applicable to a person or item is in the first 
place that of the state where that person or item is located. 
 
4.  LEGAL PROTECTION – SOVEREIGNTY – TERRITORIALITY – When considering the application of the principles of 
sovereignty and territoriality in the current digitised society, one must keep in mind the outlined interplay 
between legal protection, sovereignty and territoriality. We therefore briefly summarise the above as 
follows: (1) State sovereignty is aimed at responding to the primary need for maintaining order and 
providing protection within a community; (2) The recognition that a higher authority is in the best position 
to fulfil this original need is one of the most important foundations of state sovereignty (internal 
recognition). In its turn, sovereignty is protected by its territorial delineation. (3) Such delineation actually 
enables other states to recognise the state’s sovereignty (external recognition). (4) In addition, it ensures 
that the sovereign state can fulfil its protective function by also offering protection against actions by 
other sovereign states within its territory (external protection); (5) Finally, legal subordinates also recognise 
the necessary territorial limitation of sovereign authorities. 
 
Figure 1: Interplay between legal protection, sovereignty and territoriality. 
5. CENTRAL QUESTION - Below we first consider how the law traditionally defines the territoriality principle. We 
then outline how the modern phenomenon of “cyberspace” challenges the traditional paradigm. In this 
regard, we are focusing on Criminal Procedure Law, in particular on regulations relating to criminal law 
searches. The question we finally wish to answer is the following: Can we territorially delineate the current 
(virtual) investigative possibilities in such a way that (internal and external) sovereignty and therefore the 
(internal and external) protection of individuals’ fundamental rights are guaranteed? In other words, can 
we interpret the territoriality principle in such a way that the interplay outlined above remains intact? If 
not, the territoriality principle loses its validity in the virtual environment and a new criterion will have to be 
sought.   
2.  Determining location in traditional Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law  
6.  DETERMINING LOCATION IN SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW – Firstly, the principles of sovereignty and territoriality 
play a role in substantive criminal law. Sovereignty entails the competence to enact criminal laws and to 
impose penalties for transgressions.15 Based on the territoriality principle, these laws primarily apply to 
persons and objects within the territory of the enacting state.16 For instance, in principle, Belgian Criminal 
15 E. LANCKSWEERDT, “Soevereiniteit, angst en leiderschap”, TBP 2012, 471. 
16 With regard to Belgium, see: Article 3 of the Criminal Code: “Crimes committed by Belgians or foreign nationals on 
the territory of the Kingdom, is punished in accordance with the provisions of Belgian laws." Furthermore, states can 
also provide for an extra-territorial application of the Substantive Criminal provisions to the extent that this is not 
prohibited by International Law (PCIJ 7 September 1927, SS Lotus (France/Turkey), C.P.J.I.Rec. 1927, Series A, no. 10.). 
Possible foundations for an extra-territorial application are the principles of active and passive personality, the 
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Law applies to crimes that are committed on Belgian territory. However, it is not always easy to 
unequivocally establish the place where a crime has been committed. The act may, for instance, be 
committed in one country, while the consequence (required to constitute the crime) is situated in another 
country. Or, the crime may consist of several constitutive acts that take place on more than one territory. 
To counter this problem, several locating principles17 have been developed in jurisprudence and 
doctrine, which should allow to determine whether or not a crime was committed on national territory.18  
 
7. DETERMINING LOCATION IN FORMAL CRIMINAL LAW – Secondly, sovereignty and territoriality are key notions 
in Criminal Procedure Law as well. Law enforcement competencies and the state’s monopoly on the use 
of force stem from the state’s sovereignty.19 Again territoriality forms an important criterion in limiting these 
competencies. In principle, national investigating authorities can only perform investigative acts on 
national territory.20 In contrast to the situation in Substantive Criminal Law, the lack of legal criteria for the 
purposes of locating investigative acts was generally not experienced as problematic in the past. A 
person is detained where he is to be found; physical evidence is collected where the evidence is to be 
found. However, there may be situations in which the location of investigative acts is unclear. This would 
be the case where, For example, the location of the evidence is not the same as the location from where 
the evidence can be perceived. For instance, do we need to consider an observation to be cross-border 
when the person being observed is abroad or only when the officer performing the observation crosses 
the border? Issues regarding the precise location of an investigative act will occur more and more due 
to the fact that computer systems such as satellites21, GPS systems22 and smartphones23 will probably be 
used more frequently for investigative purposes. Another problem arises when the evidence itself is difficult 
to locate. Telecommunication is one such example. Where does one locate an intercepted conversation 
(the sought information)? At the location of the receiver or rather the location of the sender? At the 
location of both parties or at the premises of the Telecommunication provider? Consequently, which 
protection principle and the universality principle. See extensively in this regard: C. RYNGAERT, Jurisdiction in International 
Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, 85, et seq. 
17 Cf. the theory bases on the activity criterion where the place where the perpetrator's physical act took place is the 
decisive factor in determining where the crime was committed; the theory based on the criterion of the instrument of 
the crime, where the place where the instrument used is the determining element; the theory based on the criterion 
of the constitutive consequence according to which the place where the constitutive consequence occurred is the 
place of the crime; the theory based on the ubiquity criterion, according to which a crime is committed in any place 
where a constitutive element thereof occurs and the theory based on the criterion of the effect, whereby even further 
removed results can have an influence on locating a crime.  
18 P. DE HERT, “Cybercrime and Jurisdiction in Belgium and the Netherlands. Lotus in Cyberspace - Whose Sovereignty Is 
at Stake?” in X, Cybercrime and Jurisdiction. A Global Survey, Den Haag, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006, 96;  C. VAN DEN 
WYNGAERT, Strafrecht en strafprocesrecht in hoofdlijnen, Antwerpen, Maklu, 2011, 143 ff; H. WOLSWIJK, Locus delicti en 
rechtsmacht, Deventer, Gouda Quint, 1998, 353 p.; T. VANDER BEKEN, Forumkeuze in het international strafrecht, 
Antwerpen-Apeldoorn, Maklu, 1999, 486 p. 
19 E. LANCKSWEERDT, “Soevereiniteit, angst en leiderschap”, TBP 2012, 471. 
20 PCIJ 7 september 1927, SS Lotus (Frankrijk/Turkije), C.P.J.I.Rec. 1927, Serie A, no. 10, consideration 45 (“Now the first 
and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that – failing the existence of a permissive rule to 
the contrary – it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly 
territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from 
international custom or from a convention.”); P. DE HERT, “Cybercrime and Jurisdiction in Belgium and the Netherlands. 
Lotus in Cyberspace - Whose Sovereignty Is at Stake?” in X, Cybercrime and Jurisdiction. A Global Survey, Den Haag, 
T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006, 102; B.J. KOOPS, R. LEENES, P. DE HERT, S. OLISLAEGERS, Misdaad en opsporing in de wolken, 
knelpunten en kansen van cloud computing voor de Nederlandse opsporing in WODC, Tilburg, Universiteit van Tilburg, 
2012, 36; T. LAUREYS, Informaticacriminaliteit: actuele wetgeving, tekst, analyse en bronnen, Gent, Mys & Breesch, 2001, 
70; H. SPANG-HANSSEN, Cyberspace & International Law on Jurisdiction, Kopenhagen, DJØF Publishing, 2004, 267. 
21 Satellites are currently already being used to maintain law and order, e.g. for Environmental Law purposes. See M.S. 
ARANZAMENDI, R. SANDAU, K. SCHROGL, “Current Legal Issues for Satellite Earth Observation”, ESPI report 25, ESPI, Vienna, 
http://www.espi.or.at. However, technological developments provide a continual improvement of image resolution. 
Therefore, satellites may well be used in more fields in the future, if required. The issue regarding location will therefore 
become all the more relevant in the future.  
22 See, e.g. ECHR 2 September 2010, no. 35623/05, Uzun/Germany. 
23 See, e.g. explanatory memorandum to the Dutch bill to amend the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code 
regarding improvement and reinforcement of the investigation and prosecution of computer criminality (computer 
criminality law III, May 2013, 20, www.rijksoverheid.nl).  
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government has the (sovereign) competence to intercept the transborder conversation, subject to the 
conditions outlined in its national law? 
8.  LOCATING PRINCIPLES IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW: WIRETAP – The wiretap allows law enforcement 
agencies to eavesdrop on conversations. It can be applied even to persons who are conversing between 
two countries. The communication is sent from the sender to the receiver via technical intermediate 
stations (e.g. transmission masts), which can, in their turn, be situated on the territory of another state. 
National legislatures and the European Union seem to be evading the question on locating the evidence 
(the conversation). 24  In terms of Belgian law, intercepting telephone conversations is simply ordered 
regarding a person, a place or means of telecommunication. Consequently, the country where said 
person, place or means is/are located determines where the interception must be located, to whose 
territory the conversation belongs and thus which authorities are competent to intercept the 
communication. The European Union approaches this issue in the same manner in the Convention on 
Mutual Legal Assistance. Apart from the situations where foreign technical assistance is required, the 
European rules on cooperation in criminal matters only come into effect when the person whose 
telephone is to be intercepted is not (or is no longer) on the national territory of the intercepting state.25 
It seems that the future regulatory framework on the European Investigation Order will not change this.26 
Hence, under European Union rules, a conversation takes place at the location(s) where the participants 
were at the time of the conversation.27 In this way, one and the same conversation can be located in 
different territories and can fall under the sovereign competence of different governments (i.e. if those 
participating in the conversation are to be found in different countries). The governments do not need 
one another’s permission to intercept a conversation belonging to both of them. In this way, every state 
has complete authority regarding possible direct interferences in the right to respect for correspondence 
of the persons located on its territory. Every State determines independently28 when an intercepting 
measure is allowed in respect of the persons on its territory and is responsible for protecting the 
fundamental rights of those persons from unlawful interferences by foreign States (external protection).29 
Criminal Procedure Law therefore apparently also recognises locating principles, although this is less 
explicit. The focus thereby shifts from the object sought, i.e. the evidence (object-oriented approach) to 
the subject investigated, i.e. the investigated person (subject-oriented approach).  
9.  LOCATING PRINCIPLES IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW: OBSERVATION – There is no locating principle in 
supranational or international agreements relating to observation in the physical world. Neither does 
Belgian national law explicitly determine when an observation transcends a border. Is the decisive factor 
the place where the person or object observed (subject or object) is to be found, or the place where the 
24 See Article 90 ter §1, paragaph 3 of the Belgian Criminal Procedure Code; Article 126 m of the Dutch Criminal 
Procedure Code.; §100a Strafprozeβordnung (StPo); Articles 18-20 of the Convention of 29 May 2000 on Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union, www.eclan.eu (Referred to 
hereafter as the EU Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters.) 
25 See Articles 18-20 of the EU Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. See also the explanatory report to 
the Convention of 29 May 2000 on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European 
Union, Official Journal C 379 of 29 December 2000, no. 379, 20-21. The explanatory report explicitly mentions that a 
state’s interception of communication to or from its territory implies a measure on its own territory. 
26 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council regarding the European Investigation Order in 
criminal matters, CEU 9145/10, 29 April 2010. The proposal only changes the way of cooperation with regard to real 
time evidence gathering. See Articles 3 and 27 of the proposal. 
27 P. DE HERT, “Cybercrime and jurisdiction in Belgium and the Netherlands. Lotus in Cyberspace - Whose Sovereignty Is 
at Stake?” in X, Cybercrime and Jurisdiction. A Global Survey, Den Haag, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006, 82. 
28 This must however be done while duly respecting the limitations emanating from international obligations that the 
respective state has undertaken to observe, such as Article 8 of the ECHR. 
29 See Article 18 paragraph 5 a) of the EU Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and the accompanying 
explanatory report. A Member State of which only technical assistance is requested may not make the granting of the 
request to intercept communication and the direct passing on of the intercepted information dependent on the 
question whether said request is in accordance with its national legislation. This situation occurs, for example, if the 
person whose communication is to be intercepted is to be found on the territory of the state intercepting the 
communication and uses a satellite telephone. In view of Article 20, paragraph 4 b), a Member State can hinder the 
interception of the communication of a person on its territory by another Member State, for example, if the interception 
were not permissible under its own legal system or it would infringe its sovereignty, security, public order or other 
essential concerns. 
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person performing the observation is to be found? In our opinion, the location from which the observation 
is performed cannot, as such, be decisive. In this perspective, the extent to which the observed person is 
legally protected is completely dependent on the observing state's technical possibilities. At least in the 
future, it will probably be technically possible to combine infrared technology with satellite technology, 
for example, so that heat sources in houses can be detected all over the world. If the location of the 
person observing is decisive, such observation could be performed pursuant to local national legislation, 
even though the person observed is somewhere else in the world. Conversely, by focusing on the location 
of the person observed, states retain the possibility of exercising their sovereign monitoring competencies 
in respect of all actions performed on their territory in accordance with national law. This is the only 
perspective that allows for the fulfilment of their task of maintaining order and providing protection on 
their own territory. In addition, this approach enables states, by means of their right to exclusion, to protect 
persons and objects on their own territory against unlawful infringements of fundamental rights by foreign 
authorities. Moreover, focusing on the place from where the observation is performed leads to an illogical 
distinction between observance from the air (e.g. by means of drones), which forms part of the territory 
of the state located underneath it, and surveillance from space by means of satellites.30 We are therefore 
of the opinion that the location of an investigated subject (i.e. the person whose telecommunication is 
intercepted or the observed person/object) should determine the location of traditional investigative acts 
in real time, such as the wiretap and observation. In our opinion, if states wish to use satellites or other 
systems to check up on one another’s territory, they can only do so on the grounds of international 
(possible tacit) agreements.31 
3. Digitisation and the origins of cyberspace 
 
“New communities are being built today. 
 You cannot see them, except on a computer screen.  
You cannot visit them, except through your keyboard.  
Their highways are wires and optical fibers; 
 their language a series of ones and zeroes.”32 
10. DIGITISATION AND DETERMINING LOCATION – Information and communication technology (ICT) has 
developed enormously during the past decades. Digitisation is an important aspect in this regard and 
raises new questions regarding the determination of location, within both the scope of Criminal Law and 
Criminal Procedure Law.33 After giving an explanation of these developments, we will pursue the issue of 
determining location in Criminal Procedure Law in further detail.  
30 For the difficult distinction between air and space, see: W. DEREZE, “De grens tussen luchtvaart en ruimtevaart”, Jura. 
Falc. 2007-08, afl. 1, 99-129.  
31 See for example: The principles relating to remote sensing of the Earth from space, adopted by the General Assembly 
of the United Nations on 11 december 1986, http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/41/a41r065.htm: In accordance 
to those principle remote sensing activities shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries. Shared 
interests are for example the protection of the environment and the protection of mankind from natural disasters.  
32 A. GAFFIN & J. HEITKÖTTER, Big dummies guide to the internet, http://www.bsd.org/bdgtti/.  
33 See, for example: S. BRENNER, B-J KOOPS, “Approaches to Cybercrime Jurisdiction”, Journal of High Technology Law 
2004, Vol. 4, 1-46; F. CAJANI, Technologies and Business vs Law - Cloud computing transborder access and data 
retention, www.coe.int; CYBERCRIME CONVENTION COMMITTEE, “Report: Transborder access and jurisdiction: What are the 
options?”, T-CY 2012, no. 3, 69 p.; K. DE SCHEPPER, F. VERBRUGGEN, “Can the Space Invaders evade our Pac-Man? Belgian 
substantive and procedural criminal jurisdiction in the case of a criminal offence of refusal to cooperate on the part 
of electronic service providers.”, in B-CCENTRE Report 2014. M. HILDEBRANDT, M.E. KONING, “Universele 
handhavingsjurisdictie in cyberspace?”, Strafblad 2012, afl. 3, 195-203; B-J KOOPS, S. BRENNER (eds), Cybercrime and 
Jurisdiction, a global survey, Den Haag, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006,  374 p.; N. SEITZ, “Transborder search: a new perspective 
in law enforcement?”, Yale Journal of Law and Technology 2005, Vol. 7, 23 ff; J. SPOENLE, Discussion paper: Cloud 
computing and cybercrime investigations: Territoriality vs. the power of disposal?, Project on Cybercrime Council of 
Europe, 2010, http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/ 
economiccrime/cybercrime/documents/internationalcooperation/2079_Cloud_Computing_power_disposal_31Aug1
0a.pdf ; P. VAN LINTHOUT, “Territoriale bevoegdheid in cyberspace”, T. Strafr. 2009, afl. 2, 113-114. 
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11.  DIGITISATION - Digitisation is the translation of information into a language containing only noughts 
and ones, or what is called the language of bits and bytes, and which is the (universal) computer 
language.34 Almost everything can be translated into this binary language. Not only texts and figures, but 
also sound, still and moving images are increasingly translated into series of noughts and ones (cf. digital 
cameras).35 The digitisation of information is accompanied by a number of benefits, one of which is that 
it is easy to archive large amounts of digital information. Moreover, digital information is easier to work 
with, copy and move around.36  
12. THE INFORMATION HIGHWAY - Digital information is transported by means of what is called the “the 
information highway”.37 The world is currently crisscrossed by an immense network of copper cables, 
fibreglass, radio waves and satellite signals. These “roads” make it possible to transport information all over 
the world by means of telephone, fax and internet traffic.38 Digital information “travels” on the roads, 
provided for this purpose, from the sender to the receiver, so to speak. So far, there is no additional 
problem in locating internet traffic as compared to telephone traffic.  
13.  CYBERSPACE: A GLOBAL COMMUNITY - However, the metaphor of the information highway falls short in 
light of the possibilities currently offered by the worldwide digital network. The network does not only 
consist of paths along which users can send and receive information. In addition, users can personally 
access information (data) that has been stored at certain points along the road (computers and servers) 
and process that data at any time. The flexible and global network actually makes it possible to use one’s 
computer to access and work with other IT systems.39 The Internet further makes it possible to transport 
and keep one’s data somewhere else, and access services that are offered at a distance. In all this, 
neither the Internet user nor the service provider need to travel.  
The roads along which digital information is transported have evolved into a place of its own. It has 
become a platform where information can be offered, fetched and archived. It is now a place where 
people can contact one another in various virtual ways, look up information (in all possible forms) in cyber 
libraries, keep information in virtual archives, hold discussions in chat groups, openly voice their opinions 
on virtual Speakers' Corners, do shopping in cybershops, visit lavishly equipped cyber theme parks and 
even start living a second life. As such, the roads form part of a larger entity, a second world, a virtual 
world, which has found its way into homes, schools and offices. It, so to speak, completely encompasses 
the real world.40 This is what is called cyberspace. 
4. A new procedural locating issue 
14. LINK WITH DIFFERENT PHYSICAL LOCATIONS – Everything that happens in cyberspace can be linked to the 
physical world in several ways. In contrast to traditional telephone communication, conversations and 
acts in cyberspace (such as emails send by means of webmail applications, remarks and discussions on 
social media and images and documents stored in the cloud) leave behind traces that are stored with a 
third person (mostly an Internet service provider). Consequently, information about a person is no longer 
only to be found in paper files, boxes or hard disks in a person's home or office but also, and increasingly, 
on servers and computers of these third parties. 
34 F. MARAIN & J. MORTELMANS, Wie doet wat op de informatiesnelweg?, Groot-Bijgaarden, Scoop, 1995, 15. 
35 J. DUMORTIER (ed.), Recente ontwikkelingen in media- en telecommunicatierecht, Brugge, Die Keure, 1996, 25; G.L. 
HERRERA, “Cyberspace and Sovereignty: Thoughts on Physical Space and Digital Space”, 2005, kms2.isn.ethz.ch, 4. 
36 See: F. MARAIN & J. MORTELMANS, Wie doet wat op de informatiesnelweg?, Groot-Bijgaarden, Scoop, 1995, 15-17. 
37 D. DE GROOF, Encyclomedia: wegwijs op de informatiesnelweg, Leuven, Davidsfonds, 1995, 442 p.; J. DUMORTIER (ed.), 
Recente ontwikkelingen in media- en telecommunicatierecht, Brugge, Die Keure, 1996, 25. 
38 The internet is a network of networks, by means of which, by using a computer system, a user has access to an 
enormous number of other computer networks or connections all over the world.  C. UYTTENDAELE, Openbare informatie. 
(Public information) Het juridisch statuut in een convergerende mediaomgeving, Antwerpen, Maklu, 2002, 128; F. 
MARAIN & J. MORTELMANS, Wie doet wat op de informatiesnelweg?, Groot-Bijgaarden, Scoop, 1995, 52. 
39 J. GULDENTOPS, Geschiedenis en het internet: een historische, methodologische en heuristische benadering van de 
informatiesnelweg, Leuven, Acco, 1996, 2. 
40 For more information, see: A. GAFFIN & J. HEITKÖTTER, Big dummies guide to the internet, http://www.bsd.org/bdgtti/.  
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Furthermore, such third persons can also manage their servers at a distance. This entails that the location 
of the service provider and the place where the data are stored may differ. For example, Facebook is an 
American service provider, but it can store its data on servers that are located anywhere in the world. To 
make matters worse, when information is sent to, or requested from, a server, it randomly travels between 
the user and the storage place. This means that it can also be located at technical intermediate stops 
(e.g. an Internet Exchange Point (IXP)), albeit only for a limited period of time.41  
The Internet reality separates the location of the data (which can be searched within the scope of a 
Criminal Law investigation) from the location of the persons (whose fundamental rights may be affected 
by such investigation) in a way never before encountered. The location where data are stored, the 
location of the consulted service and the location where those data and such service can be used may 
differ.  During the course of an investigation, law enforcement agencies are not necessarily on the territory 
where the sought information is to be found, neither are they necessarily to be found on the territory 
where the investigated person or consulted service provider is to be found. As is the case with the users, 
the law enforcement agencies are also no longer dependent on a specific location.42  
 
Figure 2: Simplified illustration of the link between online communication (between X and Y) 
and various physical locations 
15. DETERMINING LOCATION? - Consequently, when law enforcement agencies collect evidence in the virtual 
world (e.g. through looking at a Facebook account, Google calendar, Dropbox account or a YaHoo! 
webmail account), one of the questions that arises, pertains to the location of their investigative actions. 
In such a case, is the investigative act located in the territory where the sought data are stored, or is it 
located in the territory where the investigated person can be found? Is the investigating authority 
operating in the territory from where they performed the investigative act? Does the location of the 
service provider play a role in this matter? Each criterion represents a different link between the digital 
evidence sought and the physical reality. Consequently, each criterion can locate the investigative act 
on a certain territory. However, the question is: which criterion must be the decisive one? 
II. Locating investigative acts in cyberspace  
16.  TYPES OF SEARCHES – A distinction can be made between two types of searches for evidence in 
cyberspace. The first involves law enforcement agencies keeping a “virtual eye” on a person in real time 
(hereafter: virtual search in real time), whilst the second involves a search for stored data, independent 
of a simultaneous action by the investigated subject (hereafter: search for stored data). Virtual search in 
41 See no. 23, below. 
42 M. HILDEBRANDT, “Extraterritorial jurisdiction to enforce in cyberspace?: Bodin, Schmitt, Grotius in cyberspace”, 
University of Toronto Law Journal, 2013, afl. 63, 220-221. 
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real time refers to observing virtual actions such as opening websites, communications or files while those 
actions are being performed by the investigated subject.43 Looking into the opened websites, 
communications and files as such also constitutes investigating in real time. This can also apply to 
communications from the past, for instance, when the investigated person is looking at them again. Using 
key loggers44, which register keyboard keystrokes and mouse movements, is an example of virtual search 
in real time, as is viewing or listening to communication at the moment at which it is being performed by 
the investigated subject (e.g. Skype or chat conversation, typing and sending emails). In contrast, the 
search for stored data is independent of the investigated subject’s simultaneous actions regarding the 
data being investigated. This concerns an (open or covert) search within profiles on social media or 
accounts providing access to cloud services (e.g. Dropbox or iCloud) or webmail services (e.g. Yahoo!, 
Hotmail or Gmail). The distinction between the two types of investigative measures is determined by 
answering the following question: Do law enforcement officers perceive what the investigated person is 
doing at the moment at which the search is being performed (viewing what is being opened, viewed or 
listened to, or intercepting a live conversation) or do they look into data independent of a simultaneous 
action by the subject? In this way, we do not follow the technical distinction currently being applied in 
Belgium, i.e. the question as to whether or not the data investigated are in transmission. The technical 
criterion is extremely difficult to use in a digital environment.45  Furthermore we are of the opinion that it is 
not a pertinent criterion, not only regarding the distinction between types of searches,46 but also 
regarding the issue of locating the investigative acts. (see no. 30, below)    
17.  Below we consider where each type of search is currently located, and we examine whether 
such determination of location sustains the outlined interplay between legal protection, sovereignty and 
territoriality (see no. 4, above). Where it seems that this is not the case, we look for alternative criteria to 
locate virtual investigative acts. In this way, we attempt to find the main criterion for locating the 
investigation, both for virtual search in real time and for the search for stored data. We subsequently pose 
the question whether, within the scope of virtual searches in general, the territorial competence on the 
grounds of the desired main criterion must be supplemented with the competencies of other states that 
also show a link with the sought data. Finally, we examine whether the proposed approach can also be 
used in practice. After all, having a beautiful theory serves no purpose whatsoever if it does not work in 
practice. 
1. Virtual search in real time 
A. Current contradictory approach 
18.  EU CONVENTION ON MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS – The subject-oriented approach of the EU 
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, which we discussed within the scope of the 
traditional competence to intercept communication (see no. 8, above), also applies to intercepting new 
types of telecommunication. The explanatory report to the Convention explicitly refers to the intention to 
apply the provisions of the Convention to the interception of current and future technologies. 47  It also 
refers to the obtainment of both traffic data (who communicates with whom, at what time, for how long, 
43 This can technically be done by using spyware, for example. 
44 We do not deal with the question whether or not the investigative institutions are allowed to use key loggers. We only 
consider the question of where investigative actions should be located.   
45 See extensively in this regard: P. VAN LINTHOUT, J. KERKHOFS, “Internetrecherche: informaticatap en netwerkzoeking, 
licht aan het eind van de tunnel”, T. Strafr. 2008, 79-94. 
46 In Belgium, there is a strict legal regime for investigating communication "during the transmission stage” (Article 90 
ter, et seq. of the Criminal Procedure Code). This was a logical legislative choice, in view of the fact that at the moment 
when the legislation on communication interception was created in 1994, the focus was aimed at telephone 
conversations, whereby one could only obtain knowledge of the content of communication while it was in 
transmission. One could only constitute the existence of communication before or after the transmission. Taking due 
note of the content of the communication obviously constitutes major interference with the right to privacy and 
therefore needed to be linked to stricter requirements.However, this logic is no longer valid in the digital world.One 
can also learn about communication content before and after the transmission. 
47 Explanatory report to the EU Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters no. 379, 20 and 22. 
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etc.) and content data.48 Therefore, according to the Convention, such interception is to be performed 
in the territory where the person whose communication is to be intercepted is located.  
19. CONVENTION ON CYBERCRIME – Articles 20 and 21 of the Convention on Cybercrime49 oblige signatory 
states to adopt legislative and other measures to empower their competent authorities to collect or 
record traffic data50 and content data relating to specified communications in their respective territories 
that is transmitted by means of a computer system. On the one hand, the states must provide a possibility 
for competent officials to collect or intercept the data through the application of technical means on 
their territory.51 On the other hand, the Convention requires the member states to provide an obligation 
on service providers to cooperate with those competent authorities. This implies an obligation for service 
providers to intercept data by technical means on the territory of such state or to assist the authority to 
do so. According to the explanatory report to the Cybercrime Convention, the obligation to cooperate 
can, “in practical terms”, “generally” be applied to service providers who have a physical infrastructure 
or equipment at their disposal on the territory of the state giving the order that enables them to enforce 
the measure.52 As is the case for telephone interception, it seems that international rules regarding mutual 
legal assistance are therefore required when (technical) assistance from abroad is necessary.53 Articles 
20 and 21 only refer to competences relating to communications occurring on the territories of the states. 
According to the explanatory report, a communication occurs on the territory of a Member State if one 
of the communicating parties is located on its territory or if the computer system or telecommunication 
equipment through which the communication is conducted, is located there.54 Communicating parties 
can be both persons and computers.55 This is indicative of the vast meaning of the concept of 
“communication” in the Cybercrime Convention, which also includes, for instance, opening a website.56  
20.  DISCREPANCY BETWEEN COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND EU - We therefore also find a locating principle in the 
Convention on Cybercrime, which, in fact, partially corresponds with the locating principle we found in 
the EU Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. The Convention on Cybercrime confirms the 
subject-oriented approach of the EU Convention by referring to the location of the communicating 
parties.  There is, however, an important difference between the two. Without additional explanation, the 
Convention on Cybercrime seems to require that competence to intercept communication must also be 
48 Explanatory report to the EU Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters no. 379, 22.  
49 Convention of Budapest of 23 November 2001 on cybercrime, European Treaty Series No. 185, 
http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm (hereafter: Convention on Cybercrime); Belgium 
ratified the Convention on 20 August 2012 (date of entry into force: 1 December 2012). See the law of 3 August 2012 
on the agreement with the Convention on Cybercrime, done at Budapest on 23 November 2001, Belgian Official 
Gazette of 21 November 2012. 
50 In accordance with Article 1 d of the Convention on Cybercrime, "traffic data" means any computer data relating 
to a communication by means of a computer system, generated by a computer system that formed a part in the 
chain of communication, indicating the communication’s origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or type 
of underlying service.” 
51 If the established principles of the national legal system do not allow this, real-time interception of traffic data and 
content data must be secured by other means (Articles 20.2 and 21.2 of the Convention on Cybercrime).  
52Explanatory report to the Convention on Cybercrime of 23 november 2001, 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/html/185.htm, § 222 en 230 (hereafter: explanatory report to the 
Convention on Cybercrime). 
53 However, the Convention on Cybercrime as such does not provide a solid answer to this, in view of the vague 
wording and the fact that the Convention is only aimed at harmonising minimum competencies relating to 
investigation in a digital environment (See Article 39 of the Convention on Cybercrime and the Explanatory to the 
Convention on Cybercrime, §131.) Moreover, it seems that the Convention now for once sets the location of the person 
obliged to provide cooperation as the criterion to locate investigative actions (see Article 18, a of the Convention on 
Cybercrime regarding the Production order) and then again the location of the data (see Article 16 in conjunction 
with Article 29 of the Convention on Cybercrime, regarding the expeditious preservation order). With regard to 
obtaining subscriber information, suddenly reference is made to the place where an internet service is offered (Article 
18 b of the Convention on Cybercrime). Therefore, there are different views to be found in doctrine regarding the 
location of orders for cooperation. See extensively in this regard: K. DE SCHEPPER, F. VERBRUGGEN, “Can the Space Invaders 
evade our Pac-Man? Belgian substantive and procedural criminal jurisdiction in the case of a criminal offence of 
refusal to cooperate on the part of electronic service providers.”, in B-CCENTRE Report 2014. 
54 Explanatory report to the Convention on Cybercrime, § 222 and § 230. 
55 Explanatory report to the Convention on Cybercrime, § 222 and 230. 
56 M. GERCKE, Understanding cybercrime: Phenomena, challenges and legal response, Genève, International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU), 2012, 260. 
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provided regarding the computer system or the telecommunication equipment transmitting the 
communication. In this way, the Convention combines the subject- and object-oriented approaches to 
locating real-time investigative acts. When a state intercepts communication at an intermediate station 
on its territory that is only used for transmitting communication, then, according to the Convention on 
Cybercrime, such interception occurs on the territory of the intercepting state. The fact that the 
communicating parties are located somewhere else is irrelevant. This is in sharp contrast to the view in the 
European Union. Article 20 of the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters provides for the 
possibility of intercepting communication of persons who are abroad without requiring mutual legal 
assistance. Although no judicial assistance is required, the Article does actually require notification to57 
and consent from58 the state where the persons whose communication is to be intercepted is located. 
With a view to legal certainty, it is recommended that the location method of the Council of Europe and 
the location method of the European Union be harmonised. 
21.  NATIONAL REGULATIONS – As is the case in several other legal systems59, for instance in Belgium, the 
legal framework regarding telephone interceptions also apply to interceptions of computer data (art. 90 
ter Belgian CPC). Consequently, the law of the country where the person is located applies to the 
interception of his or her communication. This is also evident in Article 90 ter §6 of the Belgian Criminal 
Procedure Code, which outlines the conditions subject to which a foreign authority can apply an 
interception measure to a person who is located in Belgium, without requiring technical assistance from 
Belgium. The foreign authority can only use the data that have been obtained by means of such 
interception on condition that the competent Belgian legal authority agrees with the measure.    
B. Towards a uniform locating principle: Focus on the subject 
22.  SUBJECT: ACCEPTED – Both the Convention on Cybercrime and the EU Convention on Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters apply a subject-oriented principle: the state on whose territory the subject 
is located is territorially competent to perform investigative measures in real time in regard to the said 
subject. This seems logical from the perspective of the principle of sovereignty and the intended legal 
protection. The sovereign authority of the state where the subject is located (hereafter: subject state) 
includes the competence of controlling actions performed on and communications conducted from or 
to its territory. This is subject to the conditions outlined in its national law and the rights and freedoms to 
which it has committed itself at an international level. In this way, the subject state has control over what 
happens on its territory. Moreover, a completely subject-oriented approach clearly delineates a territorial 
border with regard to sovereign competence. When the subject crosses the border, the possibility to 
unilaterally continue the real-time search also lapses. As a matter of fact, international cooperation is 
required every time the subject to be intercepted is located abroad, even if no technical assistance is 
needed from abroad. This approach provides sufficient legal certainty. Legal protection, in particular 
protection of the right to privacy60, is provided in accordance with the law of the country in which the 
legal subject is located, and from where he performs actions and communicates. The state where the 
subject is located is entitled to exclude other states and can in this way offer its subjects external 
protection against any foreign interference with their fundamental rights that is unlawful according to 
national law. Consequently, the interplay outlined above (see no. 4, above) is maintained. 
23. SUPPLEMENTED61 BY OBJECT (CONVENTION ON CYBERCRIME)? – We are of the opinion that it is not advisable 
to supplement the subject-oriented authority with an object-oriented authority, whereby the location of 
57 If it is known that the person is located on the territory of another Member State before the interception order is given, 
such notification must be sent before the interception takes place. In other cases, the notification must be made 
immediately after it has become known that the person is located on the territory of the Member State to be notified.  
58 The investigating state can continue the interception as long as the consent has not yet been given but, in principle, 
it may not as yet use the data intercepted. See Article 20.4 b. of the EU Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
Matters. (See footnote no. 29, above). 
59 See, for example: art. 126 m Dutch Criminal Procedure Code; §100a Strafprozeβordnung (StPo). 
60 Art. 8 ECHR. 
61 An exclusive object-oriented approach would be possibile as well. However, we do not look into this possibility here. 
Reasons why such an approach is not desirable are comparable to those elaborated in the part concerning virtual 
remote searches. (see below, no. 34-37.) 
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the data is per se decisive.  In the Convention on Cybercrime, we find a criterion that is based solely on 
the technical presence of the data. According to this approach, the moment data are technically 
present on a state’s territory, that state can investigate the data in real time in accordance with its 
national regulations. We are however of the opinion that this technical criterion is wrong. At the very least, 
the use of this criterion is not formulated as carefully as needed. The investigative method could in fact 
be used to deliberately search for data relating to communication conducted between persons who are 
abroad, without any form of international cooperation and without there being a demonstrable link 
between the data investigated and the investigating state (e.g. by monitoring an Internet Exchange 
Point62). After all, the IT systems (routers) through which the data pass are, to a certain extent, determined 
randomly.63 In the situation illustrated in Figure 2, Germany would, theoretically, be able to unilaterally 
intercept the conversation between Belgian X and Dutch person Y in accordance with German 
regulations. This hardly seems to be consistent with the sovereignty in its external dimension of the country 
where the investigated person is located. Even if both communicating parties and the communication 
service provider are located on its territory, it is possible that other states can access the communication 
under their national regulations, merely because of the technical construction and operation of the 
Internet. In this approach, the territoriality plays a limited role. In our opinion, the Internet infrastructure 
completely erodes the exclusion right of the state where the communication is conducted or virtual 
actions are performed. As a result, each state loses control of the external legal protection of persons 
who are located on its territory and who perform actions there or communicate from there. In this way, 
there is no longer any legal certainty for the legal subjects. We are therefore of the opinion that if a 
country wishes to intercept data that are by chance present on its territory at a certain moment, state 
sovereignty and mutual respect between states require more precise rules regarding international 
cooperation.64   
2. The search for stored data  
A. Current object-oriented approach 
24. CURRENT PRINCIPLE: LOCATION DATA – When investigating authorities look for physical proof, logically 
speaking, they do so where the evidence is to be found. If the evidence is to be found abroad, they can 
only access it by means of international cooperation in line with state sovereignty and the territoriality 
principle.65 Consequently, we could state that the remote search for virtual evidence66, which is stored 
on an IT system abroad, can also only be obtained by means of international cooperation. This point of 
62 i.e. a type of internet hub to which various services providers’ networks are connected and through which they 
mutually exchange their communication. With regard to the possibility of monitoring an Internet Exchange Point, see: 
F. BHATTI, J. SOUTER, “ExSERT: Enabling Distributed Monitoring at Internet Exchange Points”, 2005, http://saleem.host.cs.st-
andrews.ac.uk/publications/2005/lcs2005/lcs2005-hbs2005.pdf; see as well: G.L. HERRERA, “Cyberspace and 
Sovereignty: Thoughts on Physical Space and Digital Space”, 2005, kms2.isn.ethz.ch, 21-23. 
63 J. GULDENTOPS, Geschiedenis en het internet: een historische, methodologische en heuristische benadering van de 
informatiesnelweg, Leuven, Acco, 1996, 9; G.L. HERRERA, “Cyberspace and Sovereignty: Thoughts on Physical Space 
and Digital Space”, 2005, kms2.isn.ethz.ch, 4; See as well: Verslag namens de commissie, Parl. St. Senaat 1999-2000, no. 
2-392/3, 22.  
64 By way of comparison: B. DE SMET, “Registratie en lokalisatie van telecommunicatie” in A. VANDEPLAS, P. ARNOU, S. VAN 
OVERBEKE, Strafrecht en strafvordering. Artikelsgewijze commentaar met overzicht van rechtspraak en rechtsleer., 
Mechelen, Kluwer, 2008, 29. 
65 See, for example: European Convention of 20 April 1959 on mutual assistance in criminal matters, Belgian Official 
Gazette 23 October 1975, err. Belgian Official Gazette 6 November 1975 (hereafter: CoE Convention on Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters); Convention of 28 January 1988 between the Kingdom of Belgium and the United States 
of America on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, Belgian Official Gazette 8 December 1999; EU Convention 
on mutual legal assistance in ciminal matters; Council Framework Decision of 18 December 2008 on the European 
evidence warrant for the purpose of obtaining objects, documents and data for use in proceedings in criminal matters, 
Pb. L. 18 December 2008, vol. 350, 72 ff.; Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council regarding 
the European Investigation Order in criminal matters, CEU 9145/10, 29 April 2010; F. THOMAS, Internationale rechtshulp in 
strafzaken in APR, Deurne, Kluwer, 1998, 290 p.  
66 E.g. the network search, for example (the extension of the search in an IT system to an IT system connected to it, 
which is located at a distance) or the secret variant thereof, which we like to call the “online investigation”. See C. 
CONINGS, J.J. OERLEMANS, “Van een netwerkzoeking naar online doorzoeking: grenzeloos of grensverleggend”, 
Computerrecht 2013, afl. 1, 23-32. In more practical terms, one can think of searching a Dropbox account, an account 
on social media or a webmail account.  
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view is not only to be found in doctrine.67 The Council of Europe and the Belgian national legislator seem 
to use this as point of departure as well. Article 31 of the Convention on Cybercrime actually deals with 
mutual legal assistance to access data stored on the territory of another signatory state. Article 32 of the 
Convention on Cybercrime additionally provides for a few exceptions in which it is possible to have direct 
transborder access (see no. 25, below). The Belgian legislation regarding network search provides a far-
reaching unilateral authority, which is not prohibited by the Convention on Cybercrime as such.68 Article 
88 ter §3, paragraph 2 of the Belgian Criminal Procedure Code in fact provides the following: “If it 
becomes apparent that these data are not to be found on the territory of the Kingdom, they will only be 
copied. In that case, the investigating judge communicates this without delay, via the Public Prosecutions 
Service, to the Ministry of Justice, which notifies the competent authority of the respective State if this 
state can be reasonably determined.” The preparatory documents explain that, in this way, the legislator 
wanted to enable the unilateral transborder network search, subject to strict conditions, in order to be 
able to counter the risk of losing evidence. The legislator adds, however, that if there is enough time69 and 
knowledge, the path of the traditional rogatory commission must be followed.70 Thus, to the Belgian 
legislator, the location of the data seems to be decisive to determine the location of the investigative 
measure. He does still however provide a unilateral possibility to perform transborder searches. Yet, in a 
data-oriented point of view, such as the current one of the legislator, this is, in principle, contrary to the 
prohibition of unilaterally providing for extra-territorial investigative acts.71  
25.  INEFFICIENT CRITERION – As the Belgian pragmatic approach indicates, on a practical level, the 
current object-oriented approach is confronted with a substantial number of problems. An increasingly 
larger part of human life is moving to the digital environment. Communication is increasingly taking place 
through virtual channels such as email, Skype, whatsApp and social media. At the same time, all types of 
data such as photographs and videos are being stored by using Dropbox or similar cloud services to make 
it easier to exchange them, secure their sustainability or improve their accessibility. This means that law 
enforcement agencies, in more and more cases, must search for digital evidence. However, the services 
that are offered and used through the Internet are not linked to territorial boundaries. Resultantly, 
investigating authorities are increasingly confronted with the fact that the sought after data are stored 
abroad. Data are not necessarily located on the territory of the investigating authorities, even if they are 
linked to a national IT-service. As a consequence, an increasing number of cases  are suddenly acquiring 
an international dimension solely because of the place where the sought after data are stored. 
International judicial assistance is essential whenever the sought data are located on servers abroad. 
Therefore, an object-oriented approach requires a disproportional need for international cooperation, 
which is usually characterised by delays. With such delays, there is always a risk that the volatile evidence 
may be lost. Further, with the object-oriented approach, states that have many service providers and a 
large storage capacity are confronted with an overload of requests for legal assistance, which will 
probably become increasingly difficult for them to process.  
Article 32 of the Convention on Cybercrime provides only two limited exceptions for the signatory States. 
Under the first exception, direct transborder access is possible if the data are accessible to everyone (the 
internet as open source). This is in line with existing international practice and, consequently, also applies 
to countries that did not sign the Convention on Cybercrime.72 The second exception is that direct 
67 See: N. SEITZ, “Transborder search: a new perspective in law enforcement?”, Yale Journal of Law and Technology 
2005, Vol. 7, 22 ff; J. SPOENLE, Discussion paper: Cloud computing and cybercrime investigations: Territoriality vs. the 
power of disposal?, Project on Cybercrime Council of Europe, 2010,  
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/documents/internationalcooperation/2079_Cl
oud_Computing_power_disposal_31Aug10a.pdf  
68 Explanatory report to the Convention on Cybercrime, § 294. 
69 In view of the volatile nature of data, the exception is more likely to become the rule, because time will often be 
lacking. 
70 Memorie van Toelichting, , Parl. St. Kamer 1999-2000, 213/1, 24. 
71 PCIJ 7 september 1927, SS Lotus (Frankrijk/Turkije), C.P.J.I.Rec. 1927, Serie A, no. 10, consideration 45; See as well on 
this subject: C. CONINGS, J.J. OERLEMANS, “Van een netwerkzoeking naar online doorzoeking: grenzeloos of 
grensverleggend”, Computerrecht 2013, afl. 1, 27 ff. 
72 N. SEITZ, “Transborder search: a new perspective in law enforcement?”, Yale Journal of Law and Technology 2005, 
Vol. 7, 38.  
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transborder access is allowed if a person who has the authority to disclose the sought data grants access 
to the investigating authorities.73 This exception only applies within the territorial scope of the Convention 
on Cybercrime. Therefore, if the location of storage is unknown (see no. 26, below), the investigating 
authorities cannot know whether the exception applies or not.74 Further, it is also possible that the data 
are located in the territory of a state that has not ratified the Convention. And, since this exception 
requires the specific permission of the person, chances are that the investigating authorities may not 
succeed in obtaining the required permission in a specific case. Therefore both exceptions contribute 
little towards solving the problem. This is why vehement debates regarding more far-reaching possibilities 
for unilateral transborder searches are taking place in the Convention Committee on Cybercrime.75 In 
addition, the Convention on Cybercrime is attempting to speed up the cooperation in different ways.76 
However, translating theory into practice is proving to be a laborious task.77  
26. LOSS OF OBJECT-LOCATION – Lack of time is not the only problem impairing the efficiency of the current 
system. Lack of knowledge is another serious stumbling block.  It is difficult or impossible to pinpoint the 
precise location of data. Cloud computing is a major contributing factor to this.78 The “cloud” consists of 
various servers connected to one another through the internet. Data stored in the cloud are continually 
moved for financial reasons and in order to render optimum use of the storage capacity.79 Therefore, 
locating data at a given moment appears to be practically impossible. Moreover, files in a cloud can be 
split up into small parts, which can be stored at different locations.80 In this regard, the Belgian legislator, 
for example, puts forward a limited solution by enabling a transborder network search when investigators 
do not reasonably succeed in identifying the state to cooperate with.81 However, the increasing use of 
cloud computing is threatening to make the exception the rule. In order to make a criterion for procedural 
jurisdiction practicable, it is extremely important that investigating authorities can easily estimate in 
advance how they can apply it in the case they are working on.82 Furthermore, the criterion may also not 
be subjected to too much change. That is why the location of data does not seem to be a good criterion. 
27.  PROVISIONAL POINT OF VIEW? – The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe stated in 
recommendation R(95)13 as far back as 1995 that a unilateral search for data abroad possibly entailed 
73 This is, for example, a legal user of data being investigated or a services provider who has specified the controlling 
power in his general terms and conditions. See CYBERCRIME CONVENTION COMMITTEE, “Guidance Note # 3, Transborder 
access to data (article 32)”, 2013, www.coe.int/TCY. 
74 CYBERCRIME CONVENTION COMMITTEE, “Report: Transborder access and jurisdiction: What are the options?”, T-CY 2012, 
no. 3, 21. 
75 Zie CYBERCRIME CONVENTION COMMITTEE, “Report: Transborder access and jurisdiction: What are the options?”, T-CY 2012, 
no. 3, 69 p. 
76 In this way, Article 25 of the Convention on Cybercrime provides the possibility of using  “expedited means of 
communication, including fax or e-mail” to request mutual legal assistance; Article  29 of the Convention on 
Cybercrime outlines the possibility of requesting a state to order the freezing of data stored by means of an IT system 
on its territory. Such a request has very few formalities and is used pending a more well-grounded request to provide 
data (in this regard, see also Article 30 of the Convention); Article 35 of the Convention on Cybercrime provides that 
24/7 points of contact be established. 
77 M. GERCKE, Understanding cybercrime: Phenomena, challenges and legal response, Genève, International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU), 2012, 280 (regarding the establishment and use of 24/7 points of contact). 
78 J.J. SCHWERHA, Law Enforcement Challenges in Transborder Acquisition of Electronic Evidence from “Cloud 
Computing Providers”, Project on Cybercrime Council of Europe, 2010, 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/cy_octopus2012/presentations, 9.  
79 B.J. KOOPS, R. LEENES, P. DE HERT, S. OLISLAEGERS, Misdaad en opsporing in de wolken, knelpunten en kansen van cloud 
computing voor de Nederlandse opsporing in WODC, Tilburg, Universiteit van Tilburg, 2012, 12; J. SPOENLE, Discussion 
paper: Cloud computing and cybercrime investigations: Territoriality vs. the power of disposal?, Project on Cybercrime 
Council of Europe, 2010, 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/documents/internationalcooperation/2079_Cl
oud_Computing_power_disposal_31Aug10a.pdf  
80 B.J. KOOPS, R. LEENES, P. DE HERT, S. OLISLAEGERS, Misdaad en opsporing in de wolken, knelpunten en kansen van cloud 
computing voor de Nederlandse opsporing in WODC, Tilburg, Universiteit van Tilburg, 2012, 36. 
81 Memorie van toelichting, Parl. St. Kamer 1999-2000, 213/1, 24-25. 
82 J. SPOENLE, Discussion paper: Cloud computing and cybercrime investigations: Territoriality vs. the power of disposal?, 
Project on Cybercrime Council of Europe, 2010, 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/documents/internationalcooperation/2079_Cl
oud_Computing_power_disposal_31Aug10a.pdf  
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an infringement of the sovereignty of the country where the data are stored.83 While the Convention on 
Cybercrime was being drafted, it seemed that it was impossible to reach consensus regarding the 
question as to whether or not searching a foreign computer system results in an infringement of 
sovereignty.84 Having regard to the extremely limited possibilities for transborder searches under 
International Public Law, the states found practical agreements for such a search to be essential.85 
Therefore, the Council of Europe did not provide a final answer on the sovereignty issue. In addition, it 
appears from the explanatory report to the Convention on Cybercrime that its drafters decided only to 
include in its Article 32 situations that all countries had agreed to. They agreed not to regulate other 
situations until such time as further experience has been gathered. 86  The Article does not allow far-
reaching competencies, but neither does it exclude them.87 At the time of its adoption, digital 
investigation was not sufficiently advanced to be able to definitively settle the issue. However, 
unfortunately, the question regarding the determination of the location of the search, which is closely 
connected to the issue on sovereignty, was not explicitly mentioned. As is the case for the obligations 
regarding cooperation (see footnote no. 53, above), hardly any attention is given to the criterion for 
locating the investigative acts. In this regard, the Convention on Cybercrime labels a search for data 
stored abroad as a transborder search, without giving much explanation.  
28.  NEED FOR SUBSTANTIATED CHOICE - The Criminal Procedural locating issue is not explicitly raised 
anywhere at international level, save in the Convention on Cybercrime and the EU regulations regarding 
intercepting telecommunication. International Public Law does not offer us any clear solution. However, 
in our opinion, the traditional logic that the search for physical proof takes place where the evidence is 
to be found cannot always be extended to a search for digital proof. This logic only applies to direct 
searches of a computer system (computer search), such as looking into the information stored on a 
directly accessible computer or a mobile phone. This situation can actually be compared to other 
searches, such as a search of premises or other places. The place where the proof is to be found and the 
place where the proof is accessible (to the user and the law enforcement agencies) coincide, which 
means that the traditional way of locating searches for physical proof can be applied. However, there is 
an important difference in searches for data stored at a distance, such as a network search, and the 
online search of an online account (e.g. Dropbox, webmail and social media) (see footnote no. 66, 
above). The place where the evidence is to be found and the place(s) of access to the evidence no 
longer coincide. A person can store data across borders but access them and use them where and when 
he pleases. Consequently, a new situation has arisen, which is not at all comparable to the searches for 
physical proof in the real world. For this reason, we will consider a few other possibilities to locate remote 
searches for stored data in order to subsequently compare the current object-oriented point of view with 
what we regard as the most suitable alternatives. 
  
83 Recommendation R(95)13 concerning Problems of Criminal Procedure Law connected with Information Technology, 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/Doc/CM/Rec%281995%29013_en.asp; see also:  MvT, Parl. St. 
Kamer 1999-2000, 213/1, 45-46. 
84 CYBERCRIME CONVENTION COMMITTEE, “Report: Transborder access and jurisdiction: What are the options?”, T-CY, 2012, 
no. 3, 27; H.W.K. KASPERSEN, “Jurisdiction in the Cybercrime Convention”, in B.J. KOOPS, S.W. BRENNER (eds.), Cybercrime 
and Jurisdiction, A Global Survey, Den Haag, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006, 20; See as well: W.H. VON HEINEGG, “Legal 
implications of Territorial Sovereignty in Cyberspace”, in C. CZOSSECK, R. OTTIS, K. ZIOLKOWSKI (eds), 4th International 
Conference on Cyber Conflict, Tallinn, NATO CCD COE Publications, 2012, 11-12. 
85 H.W.K. KASPERSEN, “Jurisdiction in the Cybercrime Convention”, in B.J. KOOPS, S.W. BRENNER (eds.), Cybercrime and 
Jurisdiction, A Global Survey, Den Haag, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006, 20. 
86Explanatory report to the Convention on Cybercrime, § 293. 
87Explanatory report to the Convention on Cybercrime, § 293. 
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B. Remote search for stored data territorially reconsidered 
a. Possible alternatives 
29.  LOCATION OF THE INVESTIGATING AUTHORITIES – The first possible criterion to locate the remote search for 
stored data is the location of the investigating authorities. According to this view, the place where the 
investigating official is physically located and where he reaches out to the data is also the place where 
the search takes place. It is only when one physically cross borders, such as to search premises, that 
international rules on cooperation become essential. However, we find this view far-reaching. An 
extremely large amount of information, whether encrypted or not, is directly available through the 
internet. Such information may often relate to foreign matters, persons and objects. To choose the 
location of investigating authorities as a decisive criterion would therefore clearly cause an impairment 
of the sovereignty of other states because persons and occurrences on their territory could be cut off 
from their external legal protection, merely and solely due to a presence in the virtual landscape. 
Moreover, this view impairs legal subordinates’ legal certainty. In this case, they have no idea whatsoever 
as to when information regarding them, which can be accessed at a distance, can be viewed and 
controlled by foreign authorities. For example, law enforcement agencies having hacking authorisation 
at their disposal in accordance with their national law would be able to use this unilaterally to access the 
secured Dropbox account of a legal subordinate abroad. In our view, the comparison of the computers 
of the authorities to virtual windows that enable them to perform searches abroad from their own territory 
is therefore going too far. 
30. LOCATION OF THE INVESTIGATED PERSON – We could similarly qualify remote searches for stored data as 
an investigative act in respect of a person, as is the case in telephone and data interception. Searching 
for existing digital evidence can be compared to searching for (an aspect of) someone's virtual past. The 
emphasis is then placed on the person being investigated, rather than on the data being searched. In 
that case, if an investigated person is on national territory, there is no question of an extra-territorial 
investigation. In this way, each person’s legal virtual environment (i.e. all the digital data to which the 
respective person has remote access, such as online profiles on all types of websites, with the exception 
of profiles hacked by the respective person (see no. 48, below) is within the spheres of competence of 
the state on whose territory that person is located.  
However, merely extending the application of the locating principle as it applies to real time searches is 
over-simplifying matters. Searches in real time look at the investigated person's comings and goings at 
the moment that the search is taking place. By locating such investigative acts in the place where the 
investigated person is to be found, states are able to control in real time the communication and actions 
conducted or performed on their territory (see no. 22, above). By contrast, using the location of the 
investigated person as a criterion to locate the remote search for stored data would imply the following: 
entering a territory for a holiday, business trip or stopover would make the virtual past of the concerned 
person, which is stored by means of all types of online accounts, visible to the local authority purely in 
accordance with national regulations. According to this view, a person would therefore necessarily 
always take all his digital belongings with him, in so far as these are accessible from a distance, every time 
he personally transcends the border. Leaving a virtual past at home would then no longer be an option. 
In our view, this would involve a grave impairment of the free movement of persons and subordinates' 
self-determination not to submit matters to the direct competence of a foreign authority (see no. 3, 
above). Having regard to the territorial delineation of sovereignty, an individual exposes himself to the 
legal competence of a foreign authority every time he transcends the border. His comings and goings 
fall under the control of the foreign authority, as do the objects he takes with him. If the person does not 
wish to subject objects, which may contain proof of communication or actions from the past (such as 
letters, documents, photographs, a laptop or smartphone), to such sovereign authority, then he should 
not take them along when transcending the border and should leave them at home. We find that 
depriving persons of such a choice, purely because of the virtual accessibility thereof, displays a lack of 
subtlety and is undesirable. 
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31. HABITUAL RESIDENCE – An investigated subject’s habitual residence is another possible criterion to 
determine the location of the remote search for stored data. This approach locates a person's virtual 
living environment at his habitual residence. It combines the focal point of someone's virtual life with that 
of his physical life. For example, when law enforcement agencies wish to access a suspect’s Dropbox 
account, there would be no problem in terms of International Law if the suspect's habitual residence is 
located on the national territory of those law enforcement agencies. Moving one’s habitual residence 
also entails moving one’s virtual living environment. A person is assumed to leave his virtual past at home 
when he physically transcends borders. Having regard to the locating principle in the case of searches in 
real time, the foreign authority can in fact access the respective person's present-day virtual life (see no. 
22 et seq., above), e.g. observing which data the respective person consults during his stay). Furthermore, 
the foreign authority can unilaterally access the data which the respective person actually takes with him 
across the border (e.g. data stored on the Smartphone that he carries with him). By contrast, access to 
the virtual past, independent from the investigated person’s simultaneous use of data, such as online 
search of a Hotmail or Dropbox account or a Google Calendar, is in principle only possible by means of 
cooperation with the country where the investigated person has his habitual residence (however, see no. 
40 et seq., below).  As in Tax Law, we could work with presumptions as to the habitual residence of the 
concerned person.88 The habitual residence is then presumably the place where the respective person is 
registered with the national registry. That presumption is refutable, however. In the case of a married or 
legally cohabiting person, there is an irrefutable presumption that the habitual residence is the place 
where the family is settled.  
32. EXPLANATION: APPLYING THIS TO BELGIUM IN PRACTICAL TERMS – Regulations regarding the various forms of 
remote searches for stored data could then be along the following lines: If, in the process of investigating 
a matter, it appears that it is necessary, and less far-reaching measures cannot produce any comparable 
result, the Public Prosecutor/ Investigating Judge can order a virtual search in respect of a person who 
[…formulation of further conditions…],89 and whose habitual residence is on national territory.  The search 
may relate to the entire legal virtual environment relating to the person in respect of whom the 
investigative act was ordered (see nos. 39 and 48, below). However, the order must also clearly delineate 
the part of the respective person’s virtual living environment that is to be investigated.90 The approach is 
valid in respect of public as well as secret virtual searches, on condition that the legislator imposes stricter 
conditions to the more serious privacy interferences, in accordance with the jurisprudence of the ECHR.91  
33. LOCATION OF SERVICE PROVIDER CONSULTED – Finally, the investigative act could also be located by means 
of the location of the service provider through whose services the searched data are stored. Under this 
approach, it is possible for the United States to examine data on Facebook, irrespective of where 
Facebook has stored the data searched and the location or nationality of the person to whom such data 
belongs. This would in any event be more practical than the current criterion because investigation is no 
longer hindered by the loss of object location (see no. 26, above). Consequently, we also consider this 
criterion in deciding which main criterion must be taken into account to determine territorial procedural 
competence.  
  
88 See art. 2§1, 1° Code of Income Revenu Taxes, Belgian Official Gazette 30 juli 1992.  
89 The concrete conditions will depend on the extent of interference with privacy. The following are some of the 
elements worth to consider in this regard: whether or not the virtual search is secret and the object of the search.  
90 By way of comparison ECHR 3 July 2012, no. 30457/06, Robathin/ Austria. 
91 ECHR 24 April 1990, Kruslin/France , Publ. Eur. Court. H.R., 1990, serie A, no. 176-A; ECHR 25 March 1998, 
Kopp/Switserland, Journ. Procès 1998, no. 347. 
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b. Comparison   
I. EXTERNAL STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND LEGAL PROTECTION92 
34. OBJECT/SERVICE CRITERION: INFRINGEMENT OF THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE STATE OF RESIDENCE? - During the 
preparatory works of the Convention on Cybercrime, it became apparent that it was not clear whether 
a direct search for data stored abroad constituted an infringement of the sovereignty of the state where 
the data are stored (hereafter: state of storage) (see no. 27, above). The question whether a more 
subject-oriented power would therefore infringe the sovereignty of the state of storage remains 
unanswered. In contrast, the following question does not arise in the preparatory documents, although it 
is just as important: does the current object-oriented approach not constitute an infringement of the 
sovereignty of the state where the investigated person is normally to be found (state of residence)? 
According to the object-oriented approach, the states with the largest storage capacity assume 
sovereign power over data of persons regardless of where they are located in the world. They further 
enjoy the right to exclusion in relation to those data. The data constitute a form of externalisation of 
activities performed on the territory of another state. The place where a virtual life is actually lived is 
irrelevant in the object-oriented approach. The same applies when the search is to be located in the 
service provider's state. The state from which the virtual actions are normally performed or the virtual 
communication is normally conducted (i.e. the state of residence) does not have any competence to 
autonomously control such actions and communication, apart from real-time search. That state does not 
have an autonomous access competence to the data, whereas the respective person can consult and 
use the data on his territory. In order to make control possible, the state of habitual residence would 
always have to cooperate with the state where the data are stored or the state from which the service is 
provided. Consequently, it seems to us that, in an object- or service-oriented approach, an infringement 
of the sovereignty of the state of residence is more likely to occur than an infringement of the sovereignty 
of the state of storage in a subject-oriented approach. Moreover, the place where the data are stored is 
most certainly not always the same as the place where the consulted service provider is located. In that 
case, the object-oriented approach allocates the sovereign competence regarding the data to a state 
which shows very little connection with the investigated activity or person. In this way, the legal framework 
is completely alienated from the reality that it aims to regulate. For example, when a Belgian Examining 
Magistrate wishes to take a look at a resident’s Google Calendar during a premises search, he would be 
required to cooperate with the state on whose territory the Calendar data are stored. Although Google-
Inc. is an American company, it does not necessarily store its data in the United States. As a matter of 
fact, Google-Inc. has various data centres in North and South America, Asia and Europe.93 They form the 
“Google cloud”, so to speak. The Examining Magistrate would only be able to access the data which is 
sought under the terms of the national regulations, if they are coincidentally stored in the Belgian data 
centre. If not, he must procure cooperation from the state of storage.  However, to do so, he would first 
need to know where the data are stored, which is certainly not a simple task. 
35. OBJECT CRITERION OF THE CONVENTION ON CYBERCRIME: RIGHT TO EXCLUSION? – In view of the fact that the 
signatories to the Convention on Cybercrime were of the opinion that a unilateral search for data stored 
abroad could infringe the sovereignty of the storage state, the Convention applies an object-oriented 
approach. Article 32 of the Convention on Cybercrime provides two possibilities for performing direct 
transborder searches. Apparently, states reached sufficient consensus regarding the possibility of direct 
transborder search if the person who has the legal authority to disclose the sought after data consents 
(Article 32, b of the Convention on Cybercrime).94 This concerns, for example, the permission a person 
gives investigating institutions to access his email or other data which he stored across the borders. The 
92 Just as a reminder: In its external dimension, the state sovereignty relates to its (horizontal) inter-functioning with other 
states. States must recognise one another’s sovereignty (external recognition). This enables sovereign equal states to 
peacefully coexist. The external sovereignty of a state entails a right to exclude other states from the former's own 
territory, which enables the state to protect its own subjects against unlawful interference by foreign authorities 
(external protection) (see no. 2, above).  
93 http://www.google.com/about/datacenters/inside/locations/index.html  
94 See CYBERCRIME CONVENTION COMMITTEE, “Guidance Note # 3, Transborder access to data (article 32)”, 2013, 
www.coe.int/TCY. See supra no. 27. 
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ISP can also grant such permission if the contract conditions provide this. Permission by the state of storage 
is then no longer necessary. Certain private (legal) persons can therefore currently influence sovereignty 
claims of the state of storage. This is strange because of the fact that national sovereignty does not only 
guarantee a certain protection to individuals, but it also affects the state's interests.95 More precisely, an 
individual is hereby offered the opportunity of overriding the storage state’s exclusion right96. In this way, 
an email account owner’s permission to the local investigating institutions to access such account 
sidelines the (possible) interests of the state on whose territory the emails are stored. This seems to indicate, 
in our opinion, that the signatory states to the Convention are not insisting on the object state’s right to 
exclude the subject state or the service provider’s state.  
36. SUBJECT CRITERION: INFRINGEMENT OF THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE STORAGE STATE – In an exclusively subject-oriented 
approach, the state where the subject has his habitual residence would be able to exclude the state 
where the object is located (i.e. the state of storage). The state of storage may experience the limitation 
of its competence regarding data that are stored on its territory as an infringement of its sovereignty. 
Then, in fact, such state no longer has autonomous competencies regarding all objects located on its 
territory.   
II. INTERNAL STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND LEGAL PROTECTION97 
37. OBJECT/SERVICE CRITERION: CRIMINAL FORUM SHOPPING – Under the current object-oriented approach, 
authorities can only obtain data stored abroad through the slow international cooperation channels. 
Criminals can easily abuse this system by shrewdly using cloud services or by storing their data in countries 
that are known to be difficult in providing international cooperation.98 To some extent, they can also 
circumvent the law of their countries by storing illegal content on servers located in countries where such 
content is not prohibited. Pseudo-child pornography comes to mind here: such material does not involve 
actual children, and it is not currently punishable in the same way in all countries.99 Due to the fact that 
dual criminality can be a determining factor in the willingness of states to offer each other legal 
assistance, the criminal can manipulate this so as to seriously hamper criminal investigations.100 In our 
view, the object-oriented approach in this way prejudices the internal functioning of state sovereignty.101 
One subjects oneself to the competence of a state by entering its territory. The objects the person has in 
his possession and the actions that he performs on that territory also fall under that authority. He withdraws 
95 M. GERCKE, Understanding cybercrime: Phenomena, challenges and legal response, Genève, International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU), 2012, 277-278. 
96 I.e. the right to exclude other states from one’s own territory. 
97 Just as a reminder: In its internal dimension, the state sovereignty relates to its (vertical) inter-functioning with its legal 
subordinates. State sovereignty can only be maintained if it is supported by sufficient recognition by those who are 
subjected to it (internal recognition). Such recognition is pursuant to a primary need of order and protection in respect 
of one's fellow man (internal protection). The state's competence to prescribe and enforce conduct is aimed at 
satisfying those needs.  
98 G. VACIAGO, “Remote forensics and cloud computing: an Italian and European legal overview”, Digital Evidence 
and Electronic Signature Law Review, 2011, vol. 8, 124.  
99 For example, in the United States, virtual child pornography is only punishable to the extent that it cannot be 
distinguished from real child pornography. See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Child 
Pornography Today Act (PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003); M.J. HENZEY, “Going on the offensive: a 
comprehensive overview of internet child pornography distribution and aggressive legal action”, Appalachian Journal 
of Law 2011-12, vol. 11, 23-24. Far-reaching punishment of virtual child pornography has in the past already been 
labelled as unconstitutional in the United States. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002); Art. 383 bis 
of the Belgian Criminal Code, in contrast, makes pseudo-child pornography punishable by using more general 
terminology: “[...] symbols, objects, films, photographs, slides or other image carriers depicting positions or sexual acts 
of a pornographic nature, in which minors are involved or are depicted […]”. Also merely accessing child pornography, 
without possessing it, is punishable in accordance with Article 383 bis § 2 of the Criminal Code. 
100 For example, Article 5 of the CoE Convention on mutual assistance in criminal matters provides: “Any Contracting 
Party may […] reserve the right to make the execution of letters rogatory for search or seizure of property dependent on 
one or more of the following conditions: (a) that the offence motivating the letters rogatory is punishable under both the 
law of the requesting Party and the law of the requested Party […] ”; see also Art. 14 Council Framework Decision of 18 
December 2008 on the European evidence warrant for the purpose of obtaining objects, documents and data for use 
in proceedings in criminal matters. 
101 See also: P. DE HERT, “Cybercrime and Jurisdiction in Belgium and the Netherlands. Lotus in Cyberspace - Whose 
Sovereignty Is at Stake?” in X, Cybercrime and Jurisdiction. A Global Survey, Den Haag, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006, 109. 
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data from the competence of his authority by storing data abroad. For the person concerned, however, 
such data do, in principle, remain perfectly accessible at any moment in time and from any place 
whatsoever. Whilst the person enjoys full access and use of that data, he is given the choice to decide 
whether or not he wishes to withdraw certain objects/information from the state sovereignty of the local 
authority. This prejudices one of the sovereignty’s most important prerequisites, namely internal 
recognition. Allocating the territorial competence for search exclusively to the state from which the 
service consulted by the subject is provided would involve a similar problem. 
38. SUBJECT CRITERION: RESTORING INTERNAL RECOGNITION – In our view, the subject-oriented approach could 
restore the balance between the individual and the authority in this regard. Focusing on habitual 
residence ensures that the most important competencies of control of both the virtual and the physical 
life are vested in one and the same state. Individuals can no longer escape from the local legal system 
by storing data abroad, whilst enjoying full access and use of that data. It is only in this manner that the 
essential internal recognition of the sovereignty of the respective state is restored and that the authority 
can efficiently fulfil its entrusted task of controlling and protecting.  
c. Comparing results 
39. STATE OF RESIDENCE: PREFERENCE – It appears from the above comparison that the state where the 
investigated subject has his habitual residence should be given an autonomous investigative 
competence with regard to remote search for stored data. The autonomous investigative competence 
relates to the investigated subject’s legal virtual environment. Making this competence dependent on 
the will of the state of storage or the service provider's state should, in our opinion, be excluded. As is the 
case with investigations in real time, the focus should be on the subject. However, it is the location of his 
place of residence, and not his personal location, that is decisive. Moreover, in a subject-oriented 
approach, legal subjects are given the protection they expect.102 Regardless of where the data are to 
be found, the human rights of a person are protected on the basis of the law of the country where he 
has habitual residence and, in general, where he habitually consults his data. In this way, every virtual 
action falls within the scope of a coherent and, for the person concerned, familiar system of protection 
of privacy and other human rights. This also ensures that there is legal certainty. 
3. Virtual searches in general: supplementary to the principle criterion? 
40.  OTHER STATES WITH WELL-FOUNDED LINK – We can conclude from Titles 1 and 2 that the location of the 
subject and his habitual residence must apply as principle criteria in locating virtual searches. The question 
still remains whether the competence of the subject state or residential state must be further 
supplemented by a territorial competence of other states. As is the case with traditional telephone 
interception, various states may have sovereign competence regarding the same virtual communication 
or act. In view of the fact that virtual acts display more links with the physical territory than traditional 
telephone conversations (see no. 14, above), we must verify whether those additional links lead to 
competencies for the states concerned. In a completely subject-oriented approach (where the focus is 
on the investigated subject or on his place of residence), no autonomous investigative competence is 
vested in the state of the service provider consulted by the subject (service provider’s state), through 
whose services the data to be investigated are for example sent or received, (such as Facebook, Yahoo! 
and Microsoft (Hotmail and Skype)). However, such a foreign service provider does have at its disposal a 
substantial amount of data, such as traffic and subscribers’ data. In contrast to other states, the state 
where the service provider is to be found does not display a random, technical link (see no. 23, above) 
but, rather, a well-founded link with these data. This well-founded link can justify a territorial competence 
on the part of the service provider’s state. The same applies to the state where the subject or the service 
provider consulted by the subject stores his/its data.  
102 See also the following regarding the question on a shifting of the focus from the place where the data are stored to 
the place where there is an interference in fundamental rights and freedoms: F. CAJANI, Technologies and Business vs 
Law - Cloud computing transborder access and data retention, 2012, 16-17, www.coe.int.  
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A. Service provider’s state 
41.  SOVEREIGNTY - We are of the opinion that to deny the service provider’s state the competence to 
autonomously investigate the data linked to that service could infringe its sovereignty. If the data sought 
are accessible to the service provider and are linked to its service, which is consulted by the subject, the 
service provider’s state displays a well-founded link with the data sought and its claim to sovereignty 
cannot merely be brushed aside. However, data passing through the infrastructure of a service provider 
do not, in itself, displays a well-founded link with the service provider’s state. In our opinion, there must 
also be clear indications that the service was consulted by the investigated subject and that the sought 
data are related to the subject’s use of the service. 
42.  LEGAL PROTECTION AND LEGAL CERTAINTY - If a legal subject uses services offered by a foreign service 
provider, he could also expect that his data can be investigated under the service provider’s state’s law. 
By using a service provided from abroad, the legal subject virtually transcends the borders of the territory 
where he is physically present. The investigated subject is not only physically present in one state, but also 
virtually enters the territory of another state from where he consults services. He must accept the 
consequences of transcending borders (see no. 3, above). He personally subjects his data to the 
sovereign competence of the state (e.g. the United States) from where the service (e.g. Facebook) is 
provided. Consequently, legal certainty does not present any obstacle for this autonomous investigative 
competence. We therefore propose that the subject-oriented approach be supplemented with a 
competence that is based on the place from where the service consulted by the investigated subject is 
provided. The practical criteria to determine this place must reflect the focus on the subject. Which 
territory can the subject be presumed to have entered? This must in any event be a place known to the 
subject. 
B. State of storage  
43. SOVEREIGNTY - We have already seen that a lack of autonomous competence on the part of the 
state of storage can constitute an infringement of its sovereignty (see no. 36, above). Here, too, we 
continue to approach the issue from the perspectives of legal protection and legal certainty. A distinction 
is needed here regarding to who stores the data abroad.  
44. STORAGE BY THE SERVICE PROVIDER - Under the first scenario, the service provider stores data in a foreign 
country without the express and clear permission or consent of the owner of that data. The state where 
the service provider stores a subject’s data should not be allowed to derive any autonomous 
competence from such storage with regard to the subject’s data. In such a case, matters begin to 
become distorted at the level of the internal recognition of the territorial limitation of the sovereignty (see 
no. 3, above). A person must recognise that the sovereignty of his own state is limited and that there are 
other sovereign states that also have autonomous competencies to be able to fulfil their task of 
maintaining order and protecting their own territory. Consequently, the legal subject must recognise that 
when he decides to transcend his own state’s borders, he thereby accepts the sovereignty of the state 
of the territory on which he decides to stay. However, the decision to transcend the borders and to subject 
himself to a foreign sovereign institution must, in the first place, lie with him personally. If the service 
provider (e.g. Google) has control over this by storing the legal subordinate’s data in a place that is 
financially more viable, it becomes difficult to the subject to know which state has competence over his 
data and legal certainty in a virtual environment is therefore eroded. If a legal subordinate chooses only 
to consult national service providers (e.g. Telenet and Netlog for a Belgian legal subject) so that he does 
not subject himself to the sovereign competence of a foreign state, the service provider could prejudice 
that choice by storing the data outside its own national borders. Moreover, the extent of the protection 
of human rights is then made to fully depend on the place where the service provider chooses to store 
the data. Cloud computing would only exacerbate this problem, because this involves storing data in 
different places and constantly moving them around (see no. 26, above). In view of legal certainty and 
the protection of human rights, the competence of the state of storage must in this case be made to 
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depend on the cooperation of the subject state / state of habitual residence (depending on the type of 
investigation) or the state from where the service consulted by the subject is provided.  
45. STORAGE BY INVESTIGATED SUBJECT - Under the second scenario, the investigated person himself stores 
the data in the foreign territory. Every time a legal subject personally stores his data on a specific server 
across the borders, such storage subsequently involves the competence of the state of storage. This is the 
case, for example, when a person who has his habitual residence in Belgium, but works in the Netherlands, 
stores his data remotely on the servers in his office in the Netherlands. In this example, both Belgium and 
the Netherlands have autonomous investigative competence regarding the data stored in the 
Netherlands. Belgium has the competencies to perform a virtual search on the grounds of the principle 
criterion (habitual residence) and the Netherlands has the same competencies on the grounds of the 
supplementary criterion (the place where the subject stores his data). In all cases, the focus is on the 
investigated subject and on the question as to whether he transcends virtual borders and thereby 
subjects himself to the competence of a foreign state. This approach guarantees that the autonomous 
investigating state always displays a well-founded link with the investigated subject to whom the data 
relate or to whom they actually belong. 
46. NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT - This, however, seems to be an idealistic approach. In practice, 
it will be difficult, if not impossible, to forbid states, within the scope of a Criminal Law investigation, to 
access data on their own territory, which, in fact, belong to a legal subject with whom they do not have 
any clear well-founded link. Moreover, this applies to every state for which the data are technically 
accessible from its territory.103 It is only by means of international agreements that countries can effectively 
restrict one another to a certain extent regarding the possibility of access to data that can be located 
on their own territory.104 As long as this does not take place, states can attempt as much as possible to 
provide protection by restricting the possibilities of their own service providers to perform transborder data 
storage. Such an approach is currently to be found in the EU Directive on Data Protection. 105  Concerning 
the transfer of personal data to third countries, the Directive outlines a graduated system, which depends 
on the protection level offered by the third country regarding the privacy, fundamental rights and 
freedoms. Where a suitable protection level is lacking,106 transfer is only allowed under the strict conditions 
referred to in Article 26 of the Directive. Unconditional agreement by the respective person to whom the 
personal data relate can then make transfer possible.107 In the event of such permission, in our 
perspective, one can also speak of a personal virtual border transcendence by the user of the service. 
An additional possibility is to shield off domestic data traffic by restricting or excluding intervention by 
foreign Internet Exchange Points 108 If we wish to counteract such fragmentation of the worldwide 
internet,109 we must urgently reach international consensus on how we can restore state sovereignty and 
the territoriality principle to their original functions.  
  
103 States can indeed indicate that they feel that their sovereignty is infringed when other states investigate data to 
which they are only technically linked. However, it is doubtful whether this yields any result.  
104 Cf. Art. 20 EU Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. 
105 See Articles 25 and 26 of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of private individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, which somewhat restrict the free choice of storage,  Pb.L. of 23 November 1995, no. 281, 31-50. See also Articles 
40, et seq. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of private 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (Proposal General 
Data Protection Regulation), COM 2012/0011. See also in this regard US-EU Safe Harbor Framework: 
http://export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018365.asp. ; See for example Russia: 
http://www.ibls.com/internet_law_news_portal_view.aspx?s=latestnews&id=2609.   
106 The Commission can determine whether or not the protection level is suitable. 
107 See also Article 44 of the Proposal for a General Regulation on Data Protection. 
108 See, for example http://tweakers.net/nieuws/92198/deutsche-telekom-wil-binnenlands-internetverkeer-gaan-
afschermen.html 
109 See in this regard “The NSA and the risk to the internet. The US must give Assurances to stop Balkanisation of the 
web.”, The Financial Times Limites 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e1643694-4619-11e3-9487-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2kQ1Shqum  
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4. Cyberspace as virtual territory  
47.  VIRTUAL TERRITORY - We are of the opinion that we can conclude from the above that the focus on 
the subject and his virtual transcendence of borders should enjoy preference if we want to maintain 
territorially delineated sovereignty and the legal protection that is intended by it. This is why we propose 
that various authorities may have at their disposal autonomous competence to investigate the same 
virtual data, each on the grounds of a well-founded link between its physical territory and the investigated 
subject and his data. Consequently, we find that the territoriality principle is still feasible. A symbolic 
representation can explain what we are proposing. We can take the Internet as what it is:  a network of 
networks,110as a res communis, like the high seas.111 Everyone is allowed to use it, but is required to have 
due regard to the general interests that it serves. However, everything that happens there bears one or 
more flags.112 Such a flag is indicative of an adequately well-founded link between the data and the 
physical territory of a certain state. All data bearing the flag of a certain state jointly form the virtual 
territory of that state. The metaphor of virtual territory clearly reflects how we wish to delineate the 
sovereign competence of a state in cyberspace. Although, at first sight, this wording seems to be a 
contradiction in terms, it may help to visualise the proposed approach. The virtual territory is an extension 
of the physical territory and is inextricably linked to it. Consequently, not only does every state have 
sovereign competencies within its physical territory, but it also has sovereign, albeit often shared, 
competencies within its virtual territory. In this way, investigative acts performed on a state’s virtual territory 
fall within its territorial spheres of competence. Just as states must recognise one another’s sovereignty 
regarding physical territory, in the same way, they must also recognise one another’s sovereignty 
regarding virtual territory (external recognition). Five elements (cf. five types of virtual flags) determine the 
virtual territory of a state. 
48.  HABITUAL RESIDENCE REGARDING VIRTUAL PAST - The changeable borders of the virtual territory are firstly 
drawn by the competence to access the virtual environment of the persons having habitual residence 
on the physical territory. Their entire virtual past belongs to the respective state's virtual territory. However, 
illegal access (e.g. hacking) cannot extend the territorial competence of the respective state due to the 
fact that this causes illegal entrance in another person’s virtual environment. An authority which wants to 
access this must do so by means of international cooperation with the authority having the sovereign 
competence over the hacked system. This also applies, for example, to obtaining traffic data, which are 
stored with a service provider, to which the subject does not have any access. In our view, a national 
authority to hack the IT system of a foreign service provider in order to thus obtain access to those traffic 
data is out of the question.  
49.  LOCATION OF SUBJECT REGARDING VIRTUAL PRESENT - On the other hand, the virtual territory of a state also 
consists of data related to the virtual real-time activities of persons who can be located on the respective 
state’s physical territory. Those activities can therefore also be intercepted or observed under the 
conditions referred to in national legislation. Here, too, only the data accessible to the subject are also 
accessible to the state. 
50.  LOCATION OF SERVICE PROVIDER – A third component of a state’s virtual territory consists of data linked 
to service providers present in its territory. The state not only has an autonomous investigative 
competence in respect of its service providers as such, based on the first component of the virtual territory 
("habitual residence”. Cf. the service provider as investigated subject). The investigating institutions of that 
state can also unilaterally access data that are linked to the use of the services of the service provider by 
the investigated subject. It is important that the subject must have consulted the service. The sought data 
may not be merely passing through the service provider's infrastructure purely for technical reasons. The 
110 G.L. HERRERA, “Cyberspace and Sovereignty: Thoughts on Physical Space and Digital Space”, 2005, kms2.isn.ethz.ch, 
23. 
111M. HILDEBRANDT, “Extraterritorial jurisdiction to enforce in cyberspace?: Bodin, Schmitt, Grotius in cyberspace”, 
University of Toronto Law Journal 2013,vol. 63, 211. 
112 By way of comparison: W.H. VON HEINEGG, “Legal implications of Territorial Sovereignty in Cyberspace”, in C. CZOSSECK, 
R. OTTIS, K. ZIOLKOWSKI (eds.), 4th International Conference on Cyber Conflict, Tallinn, NATO CCD COE Publications, 2012, 
9. 
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data must be accessible to the service provider. Data regarding an investigated subject, which are 
accessible only to the service provider, only fall under the sovereign competence of the state from where 
the services are provided.  The subject state or state of habitual residence does not have direct access 
to this because the subject neither has access to those data. 
51.  LOCATION OF SUBJECT’S STORAGE – Furthermore, data stored on a state's territory also constitute a part 
of its virtual territory. However, this is only true for data that the investigated subject stores on the state's 
territory. It is only in that case that the subject enters the respective state's virtual territory. By contrast, if 
the data were stored by a service provider that was consulted by the subject (e.g. provider of a cloud 
service) and the subject did not agree to the particular place where the data are stored, then, only the 
service provider, and not the subject, enters the respective state’s virtual territory. The state then only has 
access to the data stored on its territory, which directly concern the service provider. 
52.  INTERNET AS OPEN SOURCE – Finally, data that are accessible to everyone, whether or not this is under 
restricted conditions, such as registration or payment, also constitute part of the state’s virtual territory. 
There is currently already an international agreement in this regard (see no. 25, above.) There would 
therefore be almost no change in this respect. According to the new approach, the open part of the 
internet forms part of every individual’s virtual environment. In principle, this part of the internet therefore 
also forms part of the various states’ virtual territory. This part of cyberspace therefore constitutes a prime 
example of shared territory where different states have autonomous competencies at their disposal. 
5. Applicability of the new approach 
A. Practical steps forward 
53.  ACCELERATION OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION – At a theoretical level, we have come to the conclusion that 
a subject-oriented approach to locating investigative acts in cyberspace comes closest to the traditional 
concept of territorial state sovereignty. Below we examine whether this focus on the subject (and his 
virtual border transcendence) is also applicable in investigative practice. We have already seen that the 
current object-oriented approach is particularly problematic because it necessitates a disproportionate 
reliance on slow international cooperation. The idea of a virtual territory would solve this problem and the 
criminal investigation could be substantially accelerated. In view of the fleeting nature of digital data, 
speed is of primary importance to secure proof.  
54. COHERENT APPROACH TO THE LOCATING ISSUE – In our opinion, the subject-oriented approach coherently 
resolves the issue concerning the determination of the location of investigative measures. Traditional 
investigative competencies always require physical crossing of borders so that they can be performed 
abroad. However, with regard to criminal investigation, territorial limitation of state sovereignty excludes 
unilateral physical border crossing by law enforcement agencies. Wiretapping formed the first challenge 
to thinking in terms of territoriality. The physical crossing of borders was no longer essential to intercept a 
conversation of a person abroad. It is difficult to determine where the data sought (the communication) 
are to be found. The national and European legislators did not explicitly address the locating issue but 
quietly shifted focus from the location of the evidence sought to the location of the investigated subject. 
In this way, a state only has autonomous competence if the investigated person is on its territory. The 
Council of Europe later confirmed this approach partly in the Convention on Cybercrime for virtual search 
in real time. The proposed focus on the subject for virtual searches provides a coherent approach 
regarding investigation where there is no need to physically cross territorial borders because the evidence 
is directly available from the investigating state's territory. The location of the investigated person or his 
habitual residence determines in the first place where the investigative competence is located. What is 
important in this respect is that the user also does not need to personally transcend the borders to consult 
the data. This competence must be further supplemented by the competence of the state whose territory 
the investigated subject enters virtually. There, too, the focus is on the subject. For example, a 
competence belongs to the state from where the internet services, consulted by the subject, are 
provided or the state where the subject stores his data. A technical coincidental presence of data (cf. 
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Article 20 of the EU Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters) or transborder storage by a 
service provider is insufficient to establish investigative competence for the respective state in relation to 
the data due to the lack of a well-founded link with the investigated subject. 
B. Problematic issues  
a. Dependence on cooperation of the service providers’ state 
55. IDENTIFICATION AND DETERMINATION OF LOCATION THROUGH ISP - We take the following situation as our point 
of departure: The subject to be investigated is suspected of having incited an underage girl to committing 
indecent acts. To do so, he created a fictitious identity and used an online communication service 
provided by, for instance, Facebook. If investigating institutions want to perform any kind of virtual search 
in respect of the suspect, the following must be considered: firstly, the subject-oriented principle vests 
sovereign competence in the state where the investigated subject (in this case, the suspect) is to be 
found or where his habitual residence is located (in this case, both unknown). That competence is 
supplemented by the sovereign competence of the state from where the service consulted by the 
subject (in this case, Facebook) is provided (in this case, the United States). The digital environment often 
makes it extremely difficult to locate the individual behind the virtual action or communication in the 
physical world. In this regard, Internet Service Providers (ISP) and Internet Access Providers (IAP) are an 
important source of assistance for investigation institutions.113 In principle, ISPs (in this case: Facebook) can 
check which IP address accessed their services at which moment in time (if they store such data). In the 
example, Facebook could check which IP address was used to connect to the investigated fictitious 
profile at the moment at which the illicit sexual acts were incited. The IP address shows which IAP (e.g. 
Belgacom or Telenet) granted access to the internet and, therefore, from which country the action or 
communication took place.114 In its turn, the IAP can provide more concrete information on the identity 
of the person using its services (e.g. the number of the modem consulted or the subscriber’s particulars).115 
It is therefore extremely important that the obtaining of their cooperation for location and identification 
takes place as efficiently as possible. This can be problematic in an international context. The service 
providers will often be foreign nationals. There are diverse views on the question as to whether enforcing 
a national legal obligation to cooperate on a foreign-national service provider is in accordance with 
International Law.116 It therefore seems to us that it is advisable to cooperate with the state where the 
service provider is to be found. However, the investigation then strongly depends on the extent to which 
the state from where the services consulted by the subject are provided is prepared to cooperate. In 
principle, as long as investigating institutions do not know whether the investigated person is to be found 
on the territory of the investigating state or has his habitual residence there at the time of the investigation, 
no virtual searches can be performed autonomously regarding the suspect. In the first place, it will 
therefore need to find out where the investigated person is to be found or where he has his habitual 
residence. 
56. LACK OF COOPERATION - However, over-dependence on the cooperation of the state where the 
service provider is to be found is problematic. The investigation may become deadlocked when there is 
no cooperation. This enables the criminal to make use of services that are provided from states that are 
113 C. CONINGS, P. VAN LINTHOUT, “Sociale media: een nieuwe uitdaging voor politie en justitie.”, Panopticon 2012, afl. 3, 
208-209.  
114 For Belgium, see, for example: http://www.nirsoft.net/countryip/be.html. Depending on the circumstances, these 
data can contain serious indications of the location of the subject or his habitual residence. 
115 C. CONINGS, P. VAN LINTHOUT, “Sociale media: een nieuwe uitdaging voor politie en justitie.”, Panopticon 2012, afl. 3, 
208-209. 
116See P. DE HERT, G. BOULET, “De Yahoo-saga: de keuze tussen nationale tracingsmethoden en internationale 
rechtshulpinstrumenten”, Computerr. 2012, afl. 5, 324-330; K. DE SCHEPPER, “Medewerking in een virtuele context? Ya! 
Hoo echter afdwingen?”, AM 2012, afl. 2-3, 239-243; K. DE SCHEPPER, F. VERBRUGGEN, “Can the Space Invaders evade our 
Pac-Man? Belgian substantive and procedural criminal jurisdiction in the case of a criminal offence of refusal to 
cooperate on the part of electronic service providers.”, in B-CCENTRE Report 2014; J. VANDENDRIESSCHE, “The effect of 
‘virtual presence’ in Belgium on the duty to cooperate with criminal investigations: some prudence may be required 
when confronted with a request from a Belgian public prosecutor”, DEASLR 2011, afl. 8, 194; with regard to vagueness 
in this respect, see the Convention on Cybercrime: footnote no. 53, above. 
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known to be difficult in providing international cooperation. In this way a criminal can personally 
contribute to the obstruction of a local criminal investigation. Resultantly, internal recognition of the 
sovereignty, which constitutes a substantial prerequisite for such sovereignty, is eroded (cf. no. 37, above). 
This problem can be solved only when the service provider’s state is prepared to come to certain 
agreements. When the location or habitual residence of the investigated person is unknown, investigating 
institutions will feel compelled, in cases of anonymity and lack of international judicial assistance, to 
assume competence as subject state or state of residence.117 As soon as there are serious indications at 
hand that the subject is to be found in a third state or has his habitual residence there (depending on the 
type of investigation), international rules regarding cooperation will be required once again.  
57. SLOW COOPERATION – When the state of the service provider is indeed prepared to cooperate, such 
cooperation often takes too long. This is why efforts must be made to accelerate international 
cooperation in investigating a virtual environment. The already existing possibility of requesting a freezing 
order can offer a solution. However, in our opinion such request should be addressed to the state where 
the service provider is established.118 When the requested state discovers that a service provider from a 
third state or from the requesting state was also consulted regarding the data sought (e.g. IAP (Telenet)), 
that state can immediately communicate the necessary traffic data to the requesting state so that the 
latter can be afforded the opportunity of securing all the data sought from all the service providers 
involved.119 Both forms of cooperation can be refused when (1) the crime leading to the request for 
judicial assistance constitutes a political crime or is linked to such a crime, or (2) the requested state 
regards the freezing or communication as being contrary to its sovereignty, security, public order or other 
essential interests. However, it would be more efficient if service providers were to be directly 
approachable. The protection of human rights may however not be made subordinate to the efficiency 
of the criminal investigation. Yet, in our view, it should be possible and is advisable to impose on states by 
means of a Convention on Cybercrime II the obligation to instruct their ISPs to directly answer to certain 
orders by certain foreign authorities. 
58.  DIRECT COOPERATION BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONAL STATES – Possible direct orders could firstly concern location. 
The ISP would be able to indicate to which country the IP address used refers without communicating the 
IP address as such. When it becomes apparent that the investigated subject acts on the territory of the 
investigating state or when the ISP has information that indicates that the investigated subject has his 
habitual residence on the territory of the investigating state, the ISP's direct approachability could be 
maintained. They could then directly communicate the IP address or assist the respective authority in its 
search for data. A direct freezing order could also be issued pending a more well-founded request to 
provide data. The states concluding the Convention would have to designate a national institution that 
could be authorised to directly address the ISPs. The other signatory states to the Convention would be 
notified of such a decision. In this way, abuse through a lack op authority can be avoided.  However, we 
are of the opinion that direct responses to such requests for information must be subjected to the 
requesting state’s respect for fundamental rights. The Council of Europe could draw up a list of countries 
117 As long as the investigating institutions do not know which state is the subject or residence state, it will not be known 
whose sovereignty is infringed. In our opinion, such an assumption of competence is also necessary when both the 
place from where the services are provided and the place where the investigated person is to be found or where he 
has his habitual residence is unknown. Example: an investigation into a criminal service provider through which a 
suspect establishes an illegal trading business. In our opinion, if only the place from where the service is provided is 
unknown, a state could also assume competence as a service provider’s state if the cooperation of a state that has 
the competence on the grounds of another criterion is unworkable. In all cases, the investigation must firstly be aimed 
at determining the unknown factors.  
118 Cf. Article 29 of the Convention on Cybercrime, which provides the possibility of addressing a request for judicial 
assistance, requiring few formalities, to the state of storage for the freezing of the sought data, pending a more well-
founded request to provide the data sought. (Explanatory report to the Convention on Cybercrime, no. 283). We are 
of the opinion that it is difficult to make a request to the state of storage practicable. As a matter of fact, investigating 
institutions will usually need the service provider's technical assistance to freeze data. Moreover, the state of storage is 
often unknown or the service provider's assistance is required to identify such state of storage. It therefore seems to us 
that a request to the state where the service provider is established is necessary.   
119 By way of comparison: Art. 30 Covention on Cybercrime. 
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which satisfy this requirement.120 With regard to the parties to the ECHR or equivalent legal instrument (in 
respect of both the content and the control system),121 a refutable assumption of respect for fundamental 
rights could apply. This could be an important incentive for states to provide efficient legal protection. 
Furthermore, a standard form could be provided that must be used by the designated investigating 
institutions in the requesting states to make their request, in which inter alia the suspected crime, the 
reason why the person is suspected and the necessity for the search should be indicated. The required 
information would be more limited for the freezing order than for the order to provide data.122 
59.  SUBSIDIARITY PRINCIPLE – Good accessibility on the part of an ISP is more important than it may seem 
on first sight. The subsidiarity principle, according to which the least drastic measure appropriate for the 
intended purpose has preference is, in our view, inherent to a system effectively protecting fundamental 
rights123 Having regard to this principle, preference should be given to direct consultation of the ISP or to 
international cooperation above, for example, a national competence to hack into computer systems124 
(e.g. mailbox of a subject having his habitual residence in the investigating state) if the same result can 
be achieved in this manner. However, that preference only applies if the direct consultation or 
international cooperation also works effectively. If direct access (such as hacking) is the only way to attain 
a satisfactory result, the investigating state shall feel compelled to use that competence if the conditions 
in accordance with the national law are satisfied. 
b. Loss of subject-location  
60.  ANONIMISING TOOLS – Anonimising tools pose an additional problem. Even if investigating institutions 
succeed in procuring the necessary IP address by means of the cooperation of an ISP, it is still not certain 
whether they can actually locate and identify the investigated subject. All types of publically available 
tools, such as proxy servers125 or The Onion Router (TOR)126in fact enable internet users to conceal their 
identity. It is then difficult, if not impossible, to trace not only the identity, but also the location of the 
respective person. Investigating institutions will therefore only be able to continue to operate in 
cooperation with the country where the service provider consulted by the investigated subject is to be 
found or the country where the subject is seemingly (but not actually) to be found. 
61. SERIOUS SIGNS OF ANONIMISING TOOL - In any event, we argue that states must be able to act unilaterally if 
there are serious indications that the subject is using anonimising tools. This should only be possible if the 
120 By way of comparison: art. 25 and 26 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data. See also art. 40 proposal General Data Protection Regulation. 
121 By way of comparison ECHR 30 June 2005, no. 45036/98, Bosphorus/Ireland, no. 155.   
122 With regard to the freezing order: art. 29, 2 Convention on Cybercrime. 
123 See in the framework of art. 8 ECHR: P. DE HERT, Art. 8 EVRM en het Belgische recht, Gent, Mys & Breesch, 1998, 42. 
124 With regard to hacking competence, see: Dutch legislative proposal to amend the Criminal Code and the Criminal 
Procedure Code on improving and reinforcing the tracing and prosecution of computer criminality (Act on computer 
criminality III), http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2013/05/02/wetsvoorstel-
aanpak-computercriminaliteit.html. National hacking competence can also present problems, however, if the state 
where the hacked system is to be found regards this as criminal access to the computer system. See C. CONINGS, J.J. 
OERLEMANS, “Van een netwerkzoeking naar online doorzoeking: grenzeloos of grensverleggend”, Computerrecht 2013, 
afl. 1, 30.) This problem arises because of the difference between the proposed locating principles in Criminal 
Procedure and the current locating principles in substantial Criminal Law (see footnote no. 17, above). However, the 
reciprocity principal can lead to states tolerating such action. Clear international agreements are advisable, however.  
125 See, for example www.proxy4free.com. By using a proxy offered here, a user can create the impression that he is 
accessing the internet from a country other than the country where he is in fact to be found. Various users exchange 
IP addresses through such websites.  
126 The TOR network uses the Onion Routing technique. This technique repeatedly encrypts a message and sends it 
from the sender to the receiver via so-called onion routers. Each onion router removes an encryption layer and in this 
way learns to which subsequent router the message must be sent. These intermediaries conceal in this way the origin, 
destination and content of the message. This makes it practically impossible for investigating institutions to reconstruct 
the path between sender and receiver. The message leaves the TOR network by means of an exit node and reaches 
the desired final destination. Investigative institutions can only see the IP address of the exit node. Therefore, keeping 
an exit node entails a substantial number of risks.  See D. GOLDSCHLAG, M. REED, P. SYVERSON, Onion Routing for 
Anonymous and Private Internet Connections, Communications of the ACM, February 1999, vol.42 No. 2, 39-41; See 
also the article “HTG explains: Is Tor really Anonymous and Secure”, http.//www.howtogeek.com. 
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cooperation of the state of the service provider consulted by the investigated subject cannot provide a 
solution. It will not be possible to know which sovereignty is infringed by the continued performance of 
the investigation as long as the investigating institutions do not know which state is the state of residence 
or the subject state. That is why investigating institutions should be able to assume competence. However, 
they should make every effort to firstly discover the location of the subject or his place of residence 
(depending on the type of investigation). As soon as there are serious indications that the subject is to be 
found on the territory of a third state or has his habitual residence there, said state’s sovereignty must be 
respected and its cooperation must be obtained to continue the investigation or the investigation must 
be continued by that state. Making any other assessment would profoundly disrupt the balance between 
individuals and the state. In this way the individual would in fact have too much power to hinder a criminal 
investigation.  
C. Summary 
62. DETERMINING COMPETENCE: HOW THIS WOULD WORK IN PRACTICE – The diagram below helps to determine 
whether, based on our proposal, a state’s investigating institutions are territorially competent and, 
therefore, can conduct a criminal investigation in accordance with their national laws. It also indicates 
when it must/can obtain cooperation from another state, and what that state may be. Some explanation 
is necessary here:  
The questions in the diagram must always be answered on the basis of serious indications (reasonable 
cause).  
• Definitions: 
o The subject is the (legal) person in respect of (which) whom the investigative act is 
performed. This is not necessarily the suspect. 
o The notion “data” always refers to the data sought by the investigating institutions.  
o The service provider (SP) must always be a SP that is consulted by the subject. Merely 
transmitting data through the SP's channels is insufficient. 
o The concept “accessible” refers to legal access.  
• All options must always be pursued. State X, Y and Z must be identifiable states. As long as this is 
not the case, the answer to the question is “unknown”. Therefore, there may be various final 
solutions (e.g. various possibilities for cooperation). 
• If, after having pursued the various possibilities, “competent” is reached, one can unilaterally start 
searching for the data for which purpose the diagram was applied.   
• If one of the possibilities is “assuming competence”, all other results must first be considered. 
Competence can only be assumed if these other results are not practicable (e.g. cooperation). 
When competence is assumed on the basis of an unknown factor, the investigation must primarily 
be aimed at identifying the unknown factor. The diagram must be gone through again as soon 
as there are serious indications that allow the unknown factor to be filled in.  
• When there are serious indications that anonimising tools are being used, the questions can also 
be answered as they seemingly appear to be, in addition to the option provided. 
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Figure 3: Diagram of territorial competence/need for cooperation for virtual search. 
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Conclusion 
The territorial limitation of state sovereignty restricts the competence of investigating institutions to their 
own territories. The question regarding how we must locate investigative acts territorially has not yet been 
explicitly and unequivocally answered in international and national law. The place where the 
investigative acts take place is often self-evident. However, it is more difficult to answer that question 
when the location of the sought evidence is unclear or the place where the evidence is to be found is 
not the same as the place of access to the evidence. Digitisation of the world and, therefore, also of 
possible evidence, presents us with serious challenges. 
If we want to sustain the territorially limited sovereignty and the legal protection intended by it, then we 
must put the focus on the investigated subject in order to locate virtual investigative acts. That approach 
is particularly innovative for searches relating to data stored at a distance. In this regard, national and 
international legislators (provisionally) opt for a focus on the place where the sought data are stored. 
However, we are of the opinion that this focus is based on a logical error. The object-oriented approach, 
with which we are currently working, is a further development of the locating principle applied to 
searches for physical evidence. However, this approach may not and cannot be blindly applied to the 
virtual remote search. Not only does the object-oriented approach infringe the sovereignty of the state 
where the data are being consulted by the subject, it also undermines the interaction between legal 
protection, state sovereignty and territoriality, which is fundamental to our legal way of thinking. 
Moreover, the current approach appears to be unworkable in practice.  
We are of the opinion that the subject-oriented approach is imperative to secure state sovereignty, legal 
certainty and protection of fundamental freedoms and human rights. Focusing on the subject also 
benefits the efficiency of the criminal investigation, although this entails particular problems that states 
will be required to face primarily by means of practical international agreements. Depending on the type 
of investigation, the place where the subject is to be found or the place where he has his habitual 
residence determines competence. In addition, the investigated subject’s virtual crossing of borders also 
entails competence. Such crossing is involved when the investigated subject consults foreign services or 
stores data on particular servers abroad. The extremely large need for legal assistance is in this way 
replaced by direct access for investigative institutions to their sovereign state’s virtual territory. However, 
one question still remains unanswered: Are we finally ready for thinking in terms of virtuality in our legal 
system?  
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 Belgian substantive and formal criminal jurisdiction in the case of prosecution of 
foreign electronic service providers for failure to cooperate.  
Can Alien Space Invaders evade the Belgian Pac-Man?1 
 
De Schepper, K. and Verbruggen, F.  
 
“Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach.” (J. STALIN) 
 
 
I.  The Weak Bite of Belgian Pac-Men? 
 
1. CYBERSPACE: THE FINAL FRONTIER? - “Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, 
I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future I ask you of the past to leave 
us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather.” This is how internet 
activist John Perry Barlow begins his “Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace”.2 This quote, 
reminiscent of Star Trek, gets to the core of the problem with which we are confronted nowadays: how 
can our traditional legal standards be transposed into the new digital world? For instance, how do we 
locate behaviour in a world where the dimensions of time, space and movement are blurring? More 
specifically, how do we construe the concept of jurisdiction in cyberspace? The (Belgian3) Yahoo case 
forces us to seek an answer to this question. The Belgian prosecution service initiated criminal prosecution 
of a US dotcom for failure to respond to production orders (or requests, infra) for user identification data 
issued by a Belgian prosecutor. The prosecution is based on the assumption that American company 
Yahoo! Inc. (hereinafter “Yahoo”) fell under Belgian territorial jurisdiction and therefore no mutual legal 
assistance from the US authorities is required. 
 
2. IS THE BARK WORSE THAN THE BITE? - Everyone agrees that this Yahoo case is a clash of principle. It revolves 
around the territorial scope of a duty imposed upon private operators to cooperate with law 
enforcement authorities during a criminal investigation. The Belgian Criminal Procedure Code (Belgian 
CPC) imposes a duty to disclose the identity of the user of an ICT-application to law enforcement, when 
ordered to do so by a prosecutor or judge. Failure to comply is punishable with a criminal fine. But how 
does, or how should, Belgium exercise this enforcement mechanism in a cross-border IT context? And 
who exactly is to be punished? This has enormous practical importance, and not just in criminal 
investigations. The increased electronic communication tools available to the public, create a 
corresponding need for investigators to obtain rapid access to information related to such 
communication. It is also of importance to the interrelation of substantive criminal law (creation of certain 
offences) with procedural criminal law (the legal obligation to cooperate with a criminal investigation). 
This interrelation complicates the answer to the difficult question of which State can claim jurisdiction over 
the internet, its players and its users. Traditionally, international public law, which regulates or limits the 
jurisdictional claims of individual States, has appeared less opposed to an extensive application by States 
of their substantive criminal law (“substantive criminal jurisdiction”), as long as they do not effectively press 
these criminal jurisdiction claims home through the cross-border coercive law enforcement measures or 
through cross-border imposition of criminal law sanctions (“formal criminal jurisdiction”).4 Do the criteria 
of international law, which originate from the real world of physical national borders, still apply in the 
“virtual world” of the internet? 
 
3. COOPERATION ORDER. - Criminal investigation is the organised gathering of information with a view to 
establish offences, to identify their perpetrators and to find evidence. It is thus a specific, targeted and 
1 Note that “Pakkeman” is Antwerp slang for police or ‘cops’, when used as a kind of bogeyman. 
2 John Perry Barlow co-founded the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), an NGO that fights for free digital citizen rights 
and against State intervention in the internet (“cyberlibertarianism”). See https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-
Final.html. 
3 Not to be confused with the French Yahoo case on the offer of French prohibited Nazi memorabilia over the Internet 
(Tribunal de Grande Instance Paris (Superior Court in Paris), 22 May 2000, UEJF and Licra/Yahoo! Inc. and Yahoo France, 
http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis20000522.htm).  
4 Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), 7 September 1927, SS Lotus (France/Turkey), PCIJ Collection of 
Judgements 1927, Series A, no. 10, 19; International Court of Justice, 14 February 2002, Case concerning the arrest 
warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic Congo/Belgium), International Court of Justice Reports 2002, 3; C. 
RYNGAERT, Jurisdiction in International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, 23. 
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proportional collection of information. Typically, in the course of a criminal investigation, i.e. an exercise 
of State power, investigators can obtain, by compulsion, information which the holder does not want to 
disclose. Orders can be used in addition to requests. These days, much of the information which is of 
interest to the criminal investigation is not held by the government, but by private entities with relevant 
technical knowhow and access to the information. This is why the Belgian parliament established in article 
46 bis Belgian CPC the possibility to an order cooperation. Under such an order, an operator of an 
electronic communication network or a provider of an electronic communication service is compelled 
to cooperate in identifying ‘the habitual user’ of the service or the ‘subscriber’. Anyone who refuses or 
offers inadequate cooperation faces a criminal fine from 26 to 10,000 euros. 
 
Art.46bis-orders should help investigators to link telephone numbers, email-addresses and IP addresses to 
specific users. Indeed, the internet offers users more possibilities to protect their real identity than many 
other channels of communication do. Such a protection is not always a bad thing. It preserves privacy 
and freedom of speech. People are more likely, for example, to post their controversial or unpopular 
opinions on forums if they can do so without disclosing their identities. Anonymity also protects people 
from unwanted or unwarranted control by public or private entities, from screening of social networking 
sites by marketing companies, from fraudsters and would-be intruders and from censorship by 
authoritarian regimes. 
 
In cyberspace, therefore, anonymity is a means to safeguard freedom of speech, as well as privacy and 
private communication. But neither of these two fundamental rights is an absolute one. In some situations 
and under some conditions, states may intervene (Article 8.2 and 10.2 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights [ECHR]). This is definitely justified to detect crime, to collect evidence or to identify and 
prosecute the perpetrators. States can therefore, within the limits set by their national legislations and by 
the texts protecting fundamental rights and freedoms, uncover the identity of criminal suspects on the 
internet. Indeed, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has condemned Finland for prioritising an 
internet user’s privacy over the rights of a child that had been the victim of “an abuse of identity”.5 The 
order to produce user data under article 46bis Belgian CPC therefore offers investigators a means to find 
perpetrators or to gather evidence. 
 
Needless to say, this is not a purely Belgian problem. Information on the internet is immaterial, volatile, and 
processed and stored across national borders. One State’s detection and prosecution of crime might 
very well clash with another State’s sovereignty. The search for a compromise to stop the World Wide Web 
from becoming (or remaining?) a World Wild West is well underway. This Yahoo (test) case, which has 
turned into an exciting legal saga, certainly helps steer a course.6 
 
II.  Pac-Man versus the Space Invaders 
 
1.  The cause: “virtual” availability and presence 
 
4. PREVIOUSLY ON… 7 - The Public Prosecutor in the Belgian town of Dendermonde established that Yahoo 
email addresses had been used in an attempt to defraud a Belgian company. These email addresses 
5 ECHR, 2 December 2008, K.U./Finland, no. 2872/02. This was a case of abuse of identity. Someone had created a false 
profile on a social networking site for an existing 12 year old, and had contacted others in a sexually enticing way. 
Under the Finnish legislation of the time, “representing oneself falsely as someone else” was not an offence that allowed 
the government to force internet companies to disclose the identity of the user. Therefore, the ECHR found that Finland 
had failed in its positive duty under Article 8 ECHR to protect the victim's private life.  
6 This Article contains an analysis of the various judgements to date in the sensational case against Yahoo. At the time 
of editing, the case was pending before the Antwerp Court of Appeal after the Court of Cassation had quashed the 
decision for a second time. 
7 For the exact facts, see the original request issued by the Prosecutor, cited as part of the judgement. See Criminal 
Court of Dendermonde, 2 March 2009, Tijdschrift voor strafrecht (T. Strafr.) 2009, issue 2, 117-120. See also P. DE HERT 
and G. BOULET, “De Yahoo-saga: de keuze tussen nationale opsporingsmethoden en internationale 
rechtshulpinstrumenten”, Computerrecht 2012, issue 5, 324-330; P. DE HERT and G. BOULET, “Yahoo! moet meewerken 
met Belgische prosecutor”, De Juristenkrant 2012, issue 253, 8; K. DE SCHEPPER, “Medewerking in een virtuele context? 
Ya!Hoo echter afdwingen?”, Auteurs en media 2012, issue 2-3, 239-243; N. VANDEZANDE “Yahoo! als operator of 
verstrekker”, Auteurs en media 2011, issue 2, 220-223; L. KERZMANN, “L’affaire Yahoo! ou à qui s’ adresse l’obligation 
de collaboration instaurée par l’Article 46bis du Code d’instruction criminelle?”, Revue du Droit des Technologies de 
l’Informatique 2011, issue 44, 116-123; J. VAN DENDRIESSCHE, “The effect of ‘virtual presence’ in Belgium on the duty to 
cooperate with criminal investigations: some prudence may be required when confronted with a request from a Belgian 
public prosecutor”, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 2011, issue 8, 194; P. VAN LINTHOUT, “Yahoo is 
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were the only link to the perpetrators, but consisted, as they so often do, of false names or non-identifiable 
pseudonyms. 
Therefore, the Public Prosecutor decided to order Yahoo, on the basis of Article 46 bis Belgian CPC, to 
disclose the identification and registration details of the users, including the IP addresses used when the 
email accounts were set up.8 
The Prosecutor noted that the Yahoo portal site listed several email addresses and URLs for users to report 
abuse or to ask questions about security. He took this to be a sign that Yahoo “is present on Belgian 
territory, being reachable and available in Belgium”.9 He then sent his request to these digital contact 
points. The company subsequently responded by asking that the request be sent to its registered office 
(in California). The Public Prosecutor sent his request to that address by fax and ordinary post. Yahoo 
answered that the data were subject to the laws of the United States of America and that it could only 
disclose the information if asked to do so by an American judicial authority. In response, the Public 
Prosecutor summoned the company to appear before the Belgian criminal court. He based the summons 
on a breach of the duty to cooperate set out in Article 46 bis, §2 Belgian CPC. The Prosecutor argued 
that Yahoo offers its services in Belgium, over the internet and, as a consequence, the company may not 
be present in Belgium physically, but it is present virtually, and hence subject to the Belgian duty to 
cooperate. In sum, the Prosecutor was seeking the required cooperation from a “US subject encountered 
and operating in Belgium, albeit virtually”.10 Yahoo was therefore obliged to carry out the prosecutor’s 
order to provide the data and hand them over to the authorities in Belgium. In sum, anyone who “is 
present” in Belgium (be it only ‘virtually’) is required to comply with a Belgian prosecutor’s orders to 
produce data, even if this entails “going home to America to retrieve them”.11 
 
2. Twists and turns of a protracted legal battle 
 
5. DENDERMONDE: “VIRTUAL” PRESENCE. - The criminal court of first instance judged that the duty to cooperate 
applies to any operator/ISP who is present on Belgian territory in a physical or virtual sense and who 
provides services in Belgium.12 If this operator/ISP is economically present and available to the Belgian 
consumer, it is also present and available from a legal point of view. As a consequence, the Public 
Prosecutor had merely requested “something in Belgium from a US subject encountered in Belgium where 
it does business and provides services”. The latter must abide by the laws of Belgium, as does anyone else 
who “is in Belgium”. 
The Dendermonde court found that in the case at hand a request for international legal assistance was 
unnecessary because the order related to a disclosure of information relating to the registration of 
electronic traffic on Belgian territory. According to the court, a request only had to be made through 
international legal assistance channels, if it related to the transfer or seizure in the US of data with no 
territorial link to Belgium and if the holder of that data was not present in Belgium (“neither physically nor 
virtually”). In sum, the Public Prosecutor’s view prevailed. 
 
6. GHENT APPEAL: NOT A PROVIDER, BUT A USER. - The court of appeal in Ghent took a different view. It found that 
the cooperation duty did not apply to Yahoo, because the company was not the provider of an 
electronic communication service.13 In the court of appeal’s view, Yahoo does not provide a service that 
geen verstrekker van elektronische communicatie”, De Juristenkrant 2010, issue 216, 4-5, err., De Juristenkrant 2010, 
issue 217, 9; F. VAN LEEUW, “Criminalité informatique: entre objectif et objection d’ubiquité. Quelques pistes de la 
procedure pénale belge face aux acteurs du ‘Cyberworld’” in Convegno di Studi, OLAF, Bruylant, 2010, 391-418. 
8 An IP address is the number of a computer that is used to log into the internet. Every computer has a unique IP address 
and is identifiable by it. Comparable to a telephone number or, better still, a unique, numbered “token” that grants 
(temporary) access, but can be issued to successive users. When someone creates a false email account, he or she 
uses an IP address, by which it is possible to trace him or her. 
9 The prosecutor equates accessibility by users who are in Belgium with presence in Belgium. We do not think this is right, 
see infra no 17. 
10 Quote from the case report (procès-verbal), from the Dendermonde judgement. See Criminal Court of 
Dendermonde, 2 March 2009, T. Strafr. 2009, issue 2, 119. 
11 In this, he rests on two Court of Cassation judgements on the compulsory identification of registration plates in road 
traffic offences (see infra, no. 31): Court of Cassation, 27 April 2010, P.09.1625.N, Pasicrisie Belge 2010, issue 4, 1283; 
Nullum Crimen 2011, issue 6 , 371 note V. FRANSSEN and S. VAN DYCK; Court of Cassation, 22 April 2008, P.08.0250.N, 
Pasicrisie Belge 2008, issue 4, 986; Rechtskundig weekblad 2008-09, issue 33, 1383 note P. ARNOU; Verkeer, 
aansprakelijkheid, verzekering 2008, issue 5, 463; Nullum Crimen 2009, issue 2, 123. 
12 Criminal Court of Dendermonde, 2 March 2009, De Juristenkrant 2009 (report by E. DE BUSSER), issue 186, 3, T. Strafr. 
2009, issue 2, 116, note. 
13 Ghent, 30 June 2010, Computerrecht (NL) 2010, issue 6, 351, De Juristenkrant 2010 (report by P. VAN LINTHOUT), issue 
216, 4, T. Strafr. 2011, issue 2, 132, note P. VAN LINTHOUT. 
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consists of the whole or partial transmission of signals via electronic communication networks (Article 2, 5° 
of the Act on Electronic Communication (ECA)14). 15 
Yahoo’s webmail system is located in American territory and is available via the different internet 
networks. However, Yahoo itself does not play a part in the transmission of data from Belgium to Yahoo’s 
portal site. That site is only accessible through the intervention of Belgian network operators and electronic 
communication service providers. They make it possible for internet users to consult the American website 
from Belgium (“i.e. made virtually visible on a screen in Belgium”) and are therefore responsible for 
transmitting the electronic communication. Yahoo merely uses the existing infrastructure and 
communication services. It is not, therefore, the provider of an electronic communication service, but is 
itself a user of these services and networks.16 Nor does this sort of “virtual visibility” allow the suggestion 
that Yahoo might be present in Belgium in another way and transact business here under the scope of 
Article 46 bis Belgian CPC. The court therefore thought that despite its “virtual visibility” in Belgium, Yahoo 
did not have the legal status required to fall within the ratione personae scope of the co-operation 
offence in Article 46 bis, §2 Belgian CPC. 
The court merely looked at whether the defendant satisfied one of the subjective requirements of Article 
46 bis, §2 Belgian CPC. Having answered in the negative, it remained silent about the geographical ambit 
of the Belgian rules in cross-border situations (application ratione loci).17 The prosecutor appealed to the 
Court of Cassation because he found that this narrow interpretation was a breach of Article 46 bis Belgian 
CPC and the general legal principle of the autonomy of criminal law. 
 
7. FIRST QUASHING: BOTH USER AND PROVIDER. - The Court of Cassation quashed the Ghent court’s judgement in 
early 2011.18 It judged that the duty to cooperate applies to anyone who offers electronic 
communication services, regardless of whether they are a Belgian operator in the sense of the ECA. Also, 
anyone who enables one’s customers to receive, obtain or disseminate information through an electronic 
network can be a provider of an electronic communication service. The Court of Cassation therefore 
viewed Article 46 bis Belgian CPC as applicable not only to companies that administrate networks and/or 
provide routing services, but to anyone who offers a service that allows an information exchange via an 
electronic communication network. It follows then that Yahoo is not merely a user, but a provider of 
electronic communication services, at least in the sense of Article 46 bis Belgian CPC. 
The judgement was ground-breaking because the Court of Cassation interpreted the law in plain contrast 
with the intention expressed by Parliament in the preparatory works (see infra, no. 20 et seq.). However, 
the Court of Cassation’s review was limited to issues addressed by the contested Ghent judgement. Since 
the Ghent court did not cover the jurisdiction issues, the Court of Cassation did not elaborate on that 
subject either. It quashed the Ghent acquittal and send the case to the Court of Appeal in Brussels for 
retrial.19 
14 Act of 13 June 2005 on electronic communication, Belgian Official Journal 20 June 2005 (hereinafter “ECA”). 
15 For example Belgacom, Telenet, Scarlet, Evonet, Toledo Telecom, edpnet, etc. See the statement of Solicitor General 
De Swaef, Nullum Crimen 2011, issue 1, 79 et seq. (specifically no. 10); N. VANDEZANDE, “Yahoo! als operator of 
verstrekker”, Auteurs en media 2011, issue 2, 222. 
16 Comparable with classic mail. Yahoo supplies mail addresses only, in a manner of speaking, and makes post boxes 
available, but does not provide delivery or courier services. In other words, it does not carry the mail. For that, it has to 
make use of postal services. 
17 This we deduce from the Court of Cassation judgement of 18 January 2011. The Court of Cassation stated that the 
appeal judges had not accounted for the jurisdiction of Belgian courts of law in their assessment of the personal 
operating sphere. Nonetheless, we wonder whether the appeal judges should first decide this question before moving 
on to the personal operating sphere. In other words, by addressing whether the Belgian offence related to the person 
at hand, it had implicitly decided that Belgian criminal law did indeed apply to the situation at hand. 
18 Court of Cassation, 18 January 2011, General Cause List P.10.1347.N, Auteurs en media 2011, issue 2, 218, note N. 
VANDEZANDE, Nullum Crimen 2011, issue 1, 76, statement De Swaef, Revue du Droit des Technologies de l’Informatique 
2011, issue 44, 113, note L. KERZMANN, T. Strafr. 2011, issue 2, 120, note P. VAN LINTHOUT. 
19 The principle is full reversal, the exception limited reversal. The quashing relates to the non-differentiated operative 
provisions of the contested judgement. The parties can, within the limits of that quashing, use all of the arguments they 
brought before the first judge. However, the court of a different geographical area of Belgium to whom a case is send 
upon quashing cannot deny it has jurisdiction over the case sent to it by the Court of Cassation (Articles 23 and 139 of 
Belgian CPC). Logically, this rule departs from the general (internal legal) procedural rules of territorial jurisdiction. This 
would not, in our opinion, apply to the rules of jurisdiction as a result of the territorial operating sphere of Belgian criminal 
procedure, which is assessed on the basis of Article 3 and Article 4 Belgian CC in conjunction with Articles 6 to 12 bis of 
the First Title of the Belgian CPC. In other words, the court that receives a case from the Court of Cassation can still 
decide that it does not have jurisdiction on the grounds of Article 3 or Article 4 of the Belgian Criminal Code in 
conjunction with 6 to 12 bis of the First Title of the Belgian CPC. The (internal) jurisdiction rules describing the sphere of 
competence of the different Belgian courts are not mentioned in the latter. See Court of Cassation, 8 October 1986, 
Court of Cassation judgement 1986-87, 162, no. 72; R. DECLERCQ, Beginselen van strafrechtspleging, Mechelen, 
Kluwer, 2010, 659 and 1734-1736; T. DECAIGNY, “De territoriale bevoegdheid na cassatie”, T. Strafr. 2007, issue 4, 264; 
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8. BRUSSELS APPEAL: NO PROCEDURAL JURISDICTION. - The Brussels Court of Appeal acquitted Yahoo with a 
reasoning condensed in a mere five sentences. It stated that, as a matter of principle, a Belgian 
prosecutor had no power to investigate outside of the Belgian territory.20 According to the court, Yahoo 
had not been faced on the Belgian territory with a valid request in the sense of Article 46 bis, §2 Belgian 
CPC . The fact that Yahoo is virtually present in Belgium makes no difference. “The mere fact that it is 
technically possible, for parties such as the Public Prosecutor, to reach the defendant from Belgian 
territory by electronic or other means of communication does not constitute sufficient grounds to issue a 
valid request.” Even though the Brussels court did not state it in so many words, one can infer from its 
judgement that the prosecutor should have sought international legal assistance from the US.21 
The judgement dismissed the position of the Dendermonde court of first instance quite radically. The latter 
had found that virtual presence and availability of services to Belgian residents were a sufficient territorial 
link to justify the jurisdiction of the Belgian State. The appeal judges, on the contrary, drew an implicit 
distinction between substantive and procedural jurisdiction. Since they decided on the merits of the case, 
they evidently had did not question their own jurisdiction on the basis of Article 3 of the Belgian Criminal 
Code (Belgian CC). This means they qualified the facts of the case as a Belgian territorial22 offence (see 
infra, no. 17). They made it clear, however, that the Belgian prosecutor had no procedural jurisdiction to 
issue an order to produce the data to the foreign company. And so, between the lines of the decision, 
we can read that a constitutive element of the offense was missing (i.e. the existence of a valid request 
in the sense of Article 46 bis, §2 Belgian CPC). 
 
9. SECOND QUASHING: NOT AN INVALID REQUEST. - The Public Prosecutor lodged a new appeal to the Court of 
Cassation, which pronounced itself once more on the case on 4 September 2012. The prosecutor had 
contested the Brussels Appeal court’s view that there was no evidence “of a valid request by the Public 
Prosecutor in the territory of Belgium obliging the defendant to disclose information within the meaning 
of Article 46 bis, §2 of the Criminal Procedure Code”. He argued that the Brussels court misrepresented 
the legal value of the document in the case file which contained the request. The judgement was also 
said to violate Article 46 bis Belgian CPC because the request in the case file satisfied the formal and 
substantial requirements of the law. The way in which the request was sent abroad did not affect its 
legality.  
The Court of Cassation quashed the appeal judgement on this point and cryptically held: “The 
circumstance that the Public Prosecutor send his written request, under Article 46 bis of the Criminal 
Procedure Code, by which cooperation was requested from an electronic communications network 
operator or electronic communications service provider based outside the territory of Belgium, from 
Belgium to an address in a foreign country, does not invalidate that request23.” The Brussels Appeals court 
had given insufficient reasons to vindicate its conclusion that Yahoo had not breached the duty to 
cooperate.24 
The case is now pending before yet another Court of Appeal (Antwerp) and thus the question concerning 
substantive jurisdiction has not yet received a final answer.25 In our opinion, the Court of Cassation 
judgement did not contain a definitive ruling as to the scope of the Belgian procedural jurisdiction.26 It 
did not state on whether the request entails a binding obligation to cooperate on someone who is 
located outside Belgium; or, to put it another way, whether the request gives rise to a criminal, punishable 
duty to cooperate on the part of Yahoo, whether it is actually an order to them (see infra, no. 27 et seq.). 
The Court of Appeal in Antwerp will have to clarify this point. 
 
10. LEGAL ISSUES. - What makes the Yahoo case so fascinating is how each of the parties has its own vision 
on the role of the internet in the establishment of jurisdiction, more particularly with regard to the 
electronic communication services provided by Yahoo and their availability over the internet. According 
R. DECLERCQ, “De rechtsmacht van de straf rechter na cassatie”, recent Court of Cassation judgement 2000, 255; G. 
STESSENS, “Locus delicti van drughandel”, Rechtskundig weekblad 1998-99, 1254. 
20 Brussels, 12 October 2011, Auteurs en media 2012, issue 2-3, 238, note K. DE SCHEPPER. 
21 See also E. DE BUSSER, “Yahoo weigert IP-adressen door te spelen aan Belgisch gerecht”, De Juristenkrant 2009, issue 
186, 3. 
22 Because if they had considered it to be an extraterritorial offence, they would have had no jurisdiction in the absence 
of an explicit legal provision establishing such jurisdiction (Article 4 Belgian CC in conjunction with Article 6 to 12 bis of 
the First Title of the CPC). 
23 This is our own underlining. 
24 Note that with this, the Court of Cassation says nothing about the actual (in)validity of the request in question. The 
Court leaves it in the middle. 
25 See supra, footnote 19. 
26 See in this sense, too, O. LEROUX, “Arnaques, frauds et escroqueries sur internet: moyens concrets d’investigation. 
Point sur l’affaire Yahoo! à la suite du second arrêt de la Cour de cassation”, Journal des tribunaux 2012, 842. 
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to the prosecutor, Yahoo has a duty to cooperate with him because it provides services in Belgium over 
the internet. He terms this as a “virtual” presence in Belgium, from which he then deduces a “virtual” 
availability of Yahoo data to the Belgian authorities: the duty to cooperate can be located in Belgium, 
therefore Yahoo is obliged to disclose the information. The Public Prosecutor frames the situation in strictly 
territorial terms: Yahoo is present and available in Belgium over the internet. Hence, the request a 
handover of data from a US subject present in Belgium. Yahoo, stresses the extraterritorial feature of the 
situation: the US corporation is not based in Belgium and therefore does not have a duty to cooperate 
with Belgian authorities. The request was sent to the US, where a Belgian prosecutor lacks authority. 
Yahoo’s position is that the prosecutor has requested something in the US from a US subject who is based 
there. 
 
We believe that the answer lies somewhere between both positions. The Yahoo-case is complex, as we 
have said, because it intertwines issues of substantive and procedural criminal jurisdiction. Indeed, 
Belgium enforces the criminal procedure duty to cooperate by rendering failure to oblige a criminal 
offence (albeit one punished with a fine). On top of that, there is the issue of the geographical scope 
ratione personae, i.e. the question of whether foreign providers of webmail are also subject to this duty. 
We believe that the confusion of substantive and procedural criminal jurisdiction flows from the incorrect 
use of “virtual” presence by the prosecutor to establish that the duty to cooperate existed and that the 
offense was committed in Belgium. As a result, it seems that the both parties have at times lost sight of the 
basic principles of substantive and procedural jurisdiction. 
 
The criminal behaviour is insufficient cooperation or complete absence of cooperation, i.e. a punishable 
“failure to act”, a punishable omission. The exact location of an omission is harder to determine than that 
of a physical action, precisely because that which was supposed to happen did not. This is why Belgian 
jurisprudence and legal doctrine ‘geolocate’ offences of omission at the location where a person should 
have fulfilled the duty to act. One must first determine who was under the duty and where this person 
had to comply with that duty.27 These two matters relate to criminal liability for the Belgian punishable 
duty to cooperate (substantive criminal jurisdiction ratione personae and ratione loci). But we should add 
that between the questions of who and where, there is third question that has not as yet received 
adequate consideration in the Yahoo-case: at what point does that duty to act come into being? We 
would say that the answer depends on where the person on whom the duty rests is located (in Belgium 
or abroad) and on how that duty comes about in a trans-border context. This relates to the trans-border 
enforcement or compulsory execution of this duty of cooperation (procedural criminal jurisdiction ratione 
loci). 
In our opinion, the internet does play a role in this case, in justifying a foreign company’s liability for a 
Belgian failure to cooperate which punishable with a criminal fine (broad interpretation of substantive 
jurisdiction, see chapter 3). On the other hand, in our opinion, this would not (yet?) lead to direct 
enforceability of this Belgian procedural obligation. We think that extraterritorial addressees are not 
obliged to comply with a request sent to them by a Belgian prosecutor, unless their own authorities 
endorse this request (narrow interpretation of procedural jurisdiction, see chapter 4). 
 
III.  Location of offenses and their perpetrators on Belgian territory 
 
1.  The territoriality principle as ground for criminal jurisdiction 
 
11. FORMS OF JURISDICTION. - It is not easy to define the concept of legal authority or jurisdiction. The term 
originates from the Latin ius dicere, or the right to lay down the law. Jurisdiction is historically inseparable 
from the concept of sovereignty.28 Through his prerogatives (imperium), the sovereign imposed his will 
and laws on his subjects. The sovereignty was expressed by the promulgation of laws, by their application 
and by the adoption of measures to ensure that these laws are obeyed and court decisions were 
respected. We might therefore define jurisdiction as the power to affect people’s legal interest either 
through legislation, through an enforceable order or a court decision.29 
 
27 This also makes the Yahoo case particularly difficult: the duty to act rests with a foreign company and not a natural 
person and it is difficult to determine whether the company is “present” in a given territory or not. 
28 A. CASSESE, International Criminal Law, New York, Oxford University Press, 2008, 49. 
29 C. RYNGAERT, Jurisdiction in International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, 5 and especially footnote 15. 
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This definition gives rise to three distinct forms of jurisdiction.30 The first is jurisdiction to prescribe, or the 
power to issue general laws. This relates to the (geographical) scope of criminal law. Subsequently, 
jurisdiction to adjudicate is the power to judge legal subjects and to subject them to the powers of legal 
institutions which enforce the law in a specific case. According to Article 3 Belgian CC, jurisdiction resides 
with the Belgian criminal courts when a crime is committed within the Belgian territory. Any exception to 
this principle, i.e. extraterritorial jurisdiction, must be set out by the law (Article 4 Belgian CC in conjunction 
with Articles 6 to 14 of the Preliminary Title of the Belgian CPC). Finally, jurisdiction to enforce means the 
right to ensure that the behavioural norms it issued can indeed be enforced through the use of public 
force. This means that a Belgian judgement can have cross border effects (e.g. confiscation of a property 
located abroad). Where there is no extraterritorial jurisdiction to enforce, Belgium will have to rely on the 
jurisdiction of foreign authorities. Below, we will confine ourselves to jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction 
to adjudicate. The principles of jurisdiction to enforce are covered in chapter 4. 
 
12. TERRITORIALITY PRINCIPLE. - Territoriality is one of the four bases for jurisdiction recognised under international 
law, and undeniably the most obvious.31 If a State is to claim jurisdiction over a crime, there must be an 
objective link between the State and the crime.32 The territoriality principle assigns jurisdiction (to 
adjudicate) to the State in which the crime, or an element of it, was committed. 
The territoriality principle also grants a state the power to render behaviour criminal if it physically takes 
place within its territorial borders, regardless of whether the victim is in the country or not. Belgium can, for 
example, criminalise fraud or the laundering on its territory of money illegally gained outside of Belgium. 
For offences consisting of illegal actions, the focus lies on where the action begun.33 It also allows a state 
to criminalise acts when the consequences of those acts are felt within its territorial borders, even if the 
perpetrator is acting from abroad.34 A territorial crime can, in other words, have an extraterritorial 
perpetrator. Here, jurisdiction is claimed because the goal or the result of the criminal behaviour is situated 
on the territory. The transfer of illegal money to a Belgian account using internet banking, for example, 
will be punishable under the Belgian law on money laundering, even if the money launderer was sitting 
behind a computer screen outside of the Belgian territory. 
 
13. RATIONALE. - Territoriality is the most traditional criterion of jurisdiction and still the prime basis for criminal 
jurisdiction under international law. The reason for this is also symbolic: whenever its laws have been 
broken, the State has to reassert its sovereignty.35 It wishes to signal that it does not tolerate reprehensible 
acts on its territory and that it will protect its citizens and the rule of (its) law. Enforcement of the laws 
confirms the authority of the State (a matter of legitimacy) and acts as a deterrent.36 The territoriality 
principle is also a logical choice from the viewpoint of legal certainty for individuals: we can expect the 
people of a given country to know and abide by its laws. On the other hand, the courts of the state in 
which the crime took place may be best placed to see it in its correct context. The territoriality principle 
also has a practical slant. The locus of perpetration is often also the place where the evidence and 
perpetrator can be found (forum conveniens).37 Finally, many States try, if possible, to avoid the potential 
30 See Restatement (Third) of US Foreign Relations Law (1987), §401; C. RYNGAERT, Jurisdiction in International Law, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, 9; B.J. KOOPS and S.W. BRENNER, “Cybercrime jurisdiction–an introduction” in 
Cybercrime and Jurisdiction. A Global Survey, The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006, 3. 
31 Other (extraterritorial) grounds are: 1) the personality principle: this considers the nationality of the perpetrator (active 
personality principle) and the nationality of the victim (passive personality principle); 2) the protective principle: a State 
may demand jurisdiction if its national interests have come under threat as the result of a crime; 3) the universality 
principle: it is accepted that a State can claim jurisdiction over a number of crimes recognised by the international 
community as being of universal importance. 
32 R. AUGUST, “International cyber-jurisdiction: a comparative analysis”, American Business Law Journal 2002, 534. 
33 In English legal doctrine this rather confusingly termed as “the subjective variant of the territorial principle” because 
this is the place where the perpetrator was at the time of the act. M. HIRST, Jurisdiction and the ambit of the criminal 
law, New York, Oxford University Press, 2003, 113; V. LOWE  and C. STAKER, “Jurisdiction” in M.D. EVANS (ed.), 
International Law, New York, Oxford University Press, 2010, 321-322. See also T. VANDER BEKEN, Forumkeuze in het 
internationaal strafrecht. Verdeling van misdrijven met aanknopingspunten in verschillende staten, Antwerp-
Apeldoorn, Maklu, 1999, 50. 
34 The same legal commentary calls this “the objective variant”, T. VANDER BEKEN, Forumkeuze in het internationaal 
strafrecht. Verdeling van misdrijven met aanknopingspunten in verschillende staten, Antwerp-Apeldoorn, Maklu, 1999, 
50. See also C. RYNGAERT, Jurisdiction in International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, 30 and 76. 
35 Y. CARTUYVELS, “Justitie en genocide: bedenkingen voor een discussie”, Orde van de dag 2002, issue 17, 8; T. 
VANDER BEKEN, Forumkeuze in het internationaal strafrecht. Verdeling van misdrijven met aanknopingspunten in 
verschillende staten, Antwerp-Apeldoorn, Maklu, 1999, 41. 
36 A. CASSESE, International Criminal Law, New York, Oxford University Press, 2008,336. 
37 A. CASSESE, International Criminal Law, New York, Oxford University Press, 2008, 451; P. DE HERT, “Cybercrime and 
Jurisdiction in Belgium and the Netherlands. Lotus in Cyberspace - Whose Sovereignty is at Stake?” in Cybercrime and 
Jurisdiction. A Global Survey, The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006, 93. 
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legal complications of extraterritorial jurisdiction. International law compels States to respect each other’s 
sovereignty and forbids them from intervening in each other’s sovereign affairs.38 In this sense, territoriality 
is a consequence of the sovereign equality of States. Going beyond their own borders often implies a 
violation of the sovereignty of other States, which does little to foster peaceful coexistence. Extra-territorial 
jurisdiction can lead to intervention in the legal system of another country, to a potential clash with the 
legislation of the territorially competent State and to positive conflicts of jurisdiction, where several 
countries claim jurisdiction. 
 
14. FROM ‘UNI-TERRITORIAL’ TO PARTLY TERRITORIAL. - The original logic underpinning the territoriality principle was 
that crime was a local phenomenon and had to be handled locally.39 The territory in which the 
perpetrators had committed the crime had the strongest link with the crime and therefore took 
preference. This viewpoint slowly eroded over the years.40 
In 1935, several members of the Harvard Law School made a study of the grounds for criminal jurisdiction.41 
One of their observations, already in those days, was that crime, as the result of improved travel and 
communications, was no longer a local phenomenon. They therefore accepted that a State could claim 
territorial jurisdiction over multi-territorial acts, if some aspect could be located in their own territory. The 
concept of territoriality is therefore gradually expanded as the basis for criminal jurisdiction.42 It also allows 
States to regulate extraterritorial acts with territorial effects (supra, no. 12). As we will see below, this 
expanded concept of territoriality can result in problems, especially in the context of the internet.43 
 
15. OBJECTIVE UBIQUITY. - The Belgian theory of objective ubiquity is an example of this type of application of 
the expanded territoriality principle to multi-territorial acts.44 If a criminal offence is committed on the 
territories of several States (multi-territorial crime), Belgium will have jurisdiction if one of the objective 
elements (parts of the actus reus or other objective elements of the offence) of an offence as defined by 
Belgium, can be located in Belgium.45 The effect or the result of the offence will only lead to territorial 
jurisdiction if that effect is also a constitutive element of the crime (a constitutive effect). This will, of course, 
depend on the specific provisions of the criminal statute. The classic example is a murder, since the death 
of the victim is a constitutive element of the crime. On the other hand, the discharge of waste into a 
French river, leading to harmful effects in Belgium, is not a Belgian environmental offence because the 
effects are not part of the definition elements of offence. The environmental offence is an inchoate 
offence which focuses on the risk generated by the illegal disposal of waste and it is thus immaterial 
whether (and where) the consequences of the illegal discharge are felt.46 
 
Belgian courts also claim territorial jurisdiction when they find that an offence committed abroad and 
one located in Belgium are indivisible.47 They consider themselves competent (read: they assume they 
have jurisdiction) with regard to foreign participants to a Belgian crime or when foreign criminal acts form 
an indivisible unity with criminal acts committed in Belgium. They use typical continental dogmatic 
constructions like a “continuous” and - less obviously48 “continued offence” to link extraterritorial events 
38 A.M. SACHVEDA, “International jurisdiction in cyberspace: a comparative perspective”, Computer and 
Telecommunications Law Review 2007, 246. 
39 R. AUGUST, “International cyber-jurisdiction: a comparative analysis”, American Business Law Journal 2002, 536. 
40 T. VANDER BEKEN, Forumkeuze in het internationaal strafrecht. Verdeling van misdrijven met aanknopingspunten in 
verschillende staten, Antwerp-Apeldoorn, Maklu, 1999, 362 et seq. 
41 HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, Research in International Law: II. Jurisdiction with respect to crime, American Journal of 
International Law 1935, 435; see R. AUGUST, “International cyber-jurisdiction: a comparative analysis”, American 
Business Law Journal 2002, 536. 
42 Y. CARTUYVELS, “Justitie en genocide: bedenkingen voor een discussie”, Orde van de dag 2002, issue 17, 8. 
43 P.L. BELLIA, “Chasing Bits across Borders”, The University of Chicago Legal Forum 2001, 65-70 and the interesting 
discussion in the American literature between the supporters of “cyberlibertarianism” and those of “cyber-
conservatism” on whether the internet can be regulated. See, among others, J.L. GOLDSMITH, “Against Cyberanarchy” 
in University of Chicago. The law school. Occasional papers, Chicago, University of Chicago. Law school, 1999, 40, p. 
1-37; D.R. JOHNSON and D.G. POST, “Law and Borders - The Rise of Law in Cyberspace”, Stanford Law Review 1995-96, 
issue 48, 1367-1402; L. LESSIG, “The Zones of Cyberspace”, Stanford Law Review 1995-96, issue 48, 1403-1411. 
44 Other location theories are: 1) the doctrine of physical action, being the place where the action physically took 
place, 2) the doctrine of the instrument, i.e. the place where the instrument had its effect, and 3) the doctrine of effect, 
where a crime is located where the effects were felt. 
45 Court of Cassation, 7 June 2011, P.11.0172.N., Nullum Crimen 2012, 68, note S. DEWULF. The Court uses this doctrine 
when interpreting “committed on the territory of the Kingdom (…)” in Article 3 Belgian CC. 
46 Article 16.6.2 of the Decree of 5 April 1995 on general provisions of environmental policy, Belgian Official Journal 3 
June 1995; C. VAN DEN WYNGAERT, Strafrecht, Strafprocesrecht en Internationaal Strafrecht in hoofdlijnen, Antwerp, 
Maklu, 2006, 1210. 
47 Court of Cassation, 24 January 2001, Revue de droit pénal 2001, 721. 
48 A continued offence contains a series of criminal acts which relate to the same perpetrator through a unity of 
objective (unity of purpose). The doctrine of continuing crime, however, relates to the sentencing rules (Article 65 
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to Belgium. They claim territorial jurisdiction when an inseparable aspect or element of a crime is manifest 
within the territory of Belgium, even if this relates to effects that manifest themselves after the criminal act 
is committed, but that form an indivisible whole with them nonetheless.49 STESSENS calls this “concealed” 
extraterritorial applications of Belgian criminal law.50 Belgian criminal law is applied to acts committed 
abroad under the veil of a territorial application of criminal law. Therefore, its ambit ratione loci stretches 
beyond the territory of Belgium and some acts are treated as if they were committed in Belgium while 
they actually were not. 
The combination of objective ubiquity theory with the doctrine of indivisibility in Belgian jurisprudence can 
lead to an application as a matter of fact of what is known as the ‘effects’ doctrine.51 Here, the criminal 
court takes account not only of the constitutive effects of the crime, but the further removed effects. A 
classic example was the so-called the Teheran cheque judgement of 1979.52 In 2008, the criminal court 
of Dendermonde applied this doctrine in a (domestic) cybercrime case.53 The perpetrator was 
prosecuted for the offences of computer forgery (Article 210 bis Belgian CC) and hacking (Article 550 bis, 
§1 and §3, 3° Belgian CC). He had hacked a Hotmail account and changed the logins, so that the victim 
was no longer able to access his account. The perpetrator also had gained access to accounts on various 
job websites, where he had changed the victim’s profile. The court in Dendermonde established its 
jurisdiction on the basis of the indivisibility doctrine. It found that the place where the victim had noticed 
that he was no longer able to login and that his profile had been changed were jurisdictional aspects 
that formed an indivisible whole with the crime. 
This case demonstrates that a de facto application of the effects doctrine in cybercrime cases can give 
the criminal court an extremely broad competence. The question arises whether such a development is 
actually desirable. The ubiquitous nature of the internet means that the effects of cybercrime can be felt 
anywhere, often across borders. Too wide an application of the effects doctrine can therefore have the 
same detrimental consequences as extraterritorial jurisdiction; the very consequences that States seek to 
avoid by prioritising the territoriality principle, such as legal uncertainty and conflicts of legislation (see 
supra, no. 13).54 The place where the effect was felt often also depends on purely coincidental 
circumstances. For example, had the victim checked his email while on holiday in New York, would it be 
a court in New York that had jurisdiction? We might, for that matter, ask ourselves whether the judge went 
a step too far in this case. This is because the effects doctrine requires that the effect can be qualified as 
a constitutive element of the offence.55 Noticing that your email account has been hacked hardly 
qualifies as one of the actus reus elements of hacking.56 In our opinion, the court would have done better 
Belgian CC). To assess the issue of guilt and therefore, by definition, the jurisdiction check, criminal acts may only be 
connected. This raises the question of whether that connection can give Belgian courts jurisdiction over acts 
committed abroad. See J.J. HAUS, Principes généraux du droit pénal belge, 1879, I, 249. See also the statement of 
Advocate General R. Declercq in the Court of Cassation, 16 May 1989, Court of Cassation judgement 1988-89, p. 1079. 
Use of the criterion of (unity of) purpose is also inconsistent with the scope of objective ubiquity theory. This is because 
only an actus reus can be used as a territorial condition in Belgium. B. SPRIET, “(Extra)territoriale werking van de 
Belgische strafwet” in BELGISCH-LUXEMBURGSE UNIE VOOR STRAFRECHT (ed.), Strafprocesrecht en extraterritorialiteit, 
Bruges, die Keure, 2002, 8 et seq. 
49 Consider, for example, aggravating circumstances. 
50 G. STESSENS, “Locus delicti van drughandel”, Rechtskundig weekblad 1998-99, 1252. 
51 P. VAN LINTHOUT, “Territoriale bevoegdheid in cyberspace”, T. Strafr. 2009, issue 2, 113. C. VAN DEN WYNGAERT, 
Strafrecht, Strafprocesrecht en Internationaal Strafrecht in hoofdlijnen, Antwerp, Maklu, 2006, 1212; T. VANDER BEKEN, 
Forumkeuze in het internationaal strafrecht. Verdeling van misdrijven met aanknopingspunten in verschillende staten, 
Antwerp-Apeldoorn, Maklu, 1999, 55. 
52 Court of Cassation, 23 January 1979, Court of Cassation judgement 1978-79, 575. In this case, it was decided that 
the issue of a cheque without covering funds can be located in Belgium if it is drawn against a Belgian bank. However, 
the offence is committed at the time of issue, so that drawing a cheque cannot be a constituent element of that 
offence. C. VAN DEN WYNGAERT, Strafrecht, Strafprocesrecht en Internationaal Strafrecht in hoofdlijnen, Antwerp, 
Maklu, 2006, 1212: J.P. SPREUTELS, “Escroquerie, cheque sans provision et competence territoriale”, Revue de droit 
pénal 1981, 237-258. 
53 Criminal Court of Dendermonde, 29 September 2008, T. Strafr. 2009, 111-112, note P. VAN LINTHOUT. According to 
the internal rules of procedure on jurisdiction (Articles 23 and 139 of the CPC), the court at the place of the crime can 
have jurisdiction. Judges also apply the objective ubiquity theory to locate the crime. 
54 For a detailed discussion of this problem and potential solutions, see H.W.K. KASPERSEN, “Cybercrime and Internet 
jurisdiction (Draft discussion paper of 5 March 2009 prepared in the framework of the Project on Cybercrime of the 
Council of Europe)”, 19 et seq., www.coe.int/cybercrime; S.W. BRENNER, “The Next Step: Prioritising Jurisdiction” in 
Cybercrime and Jurisdiction. A Global Survey, The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006, 327-349; S.W. BRENNER and B.J. 
KOOPS, “Approaches to Cybercrime Jurisdiction”, Journal of High Technology Law 2004, issue 1, 1-46. 
55 H.W.K. KASPERSEN, “Cybercrime and Internet jurisdiction (Draft discussion paper of 5 March 2009 prepared in the 
framework of the Project on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe)”, 9, www.coe.int/cybercrime. 
56 See Article 550 bis Belgian CC. In this case, the perpetrator was prosecuted for hacking with the aggravating 
circumstance of damaging the IT system or data (Article 550 bis, §3, 3° Belgian CC). Strictly speaking, this constitutive 
effect took place on the servers on which the data were stored. 
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basing its competence on the constitutive effect of the offence of computer forgery, the disadvantage 
caused.57 It could have rested on the argument that the victim experienced this disadvantage at the 
location of his centre of interest, which is generally the place where he normally resides.58 
 
16. NEED FOR SEPARATE ‘CYBER JURISDICTION’? - The days when a crime was a local event are gone for good. 
The internet, the worldwide network of computer networks, has linked places, people and machinery 
around the world together in an unprecedented way. It is an unparalleled means of communication. It 
challenges the accepted territorial grounds for jurisdiction and this peculiarity complicates the location 
of offences and offenders. When victims or prosecuting authorities already have a lead, such as an email 
address or an IP address, this is often irrelevant in pinpointing the location of the perpetrator or the crime, 
and sometimes it can even be misleading. An IP address or a URL does not necessarily, for example, 
match a physical location. A “.be” website can be operated perfectly well from a server in Belarus. 
Software such as TOR59 reinforces this lack of borders. It makes it extremely difficult to pinpoint the physical 
location of the person behind the computer screen. This makes some territorial jurisdiction theories, such 
as the doctrine of territorially located criminal behaviour, difficult to apply. This locates the crime where 
the perpetrator physically performed the criminal conduct, and this is what makes it so difficult to discover 
in the context of cyberspace. 
On the other hand, we have seen States such as Belgium claim jurisdiction on the basis of the effects of 
the crime. A criminal act can take place in cyberspace in many countries at the same time, and in the 
same way, and create damage in all these countries, for example the spread of viruses, hate mail or 
racist statements on an internet forum. The ease with which these crimes spread around the world is 
hitherto unknown. 
 
Must we adapt our rules of jurisdiction to suit these future technologies or even create new rules of 
jurisdiction for cybercrime? We are of the opinion that a separate system of jurisdiction for cybercrime 
would not be feasible because we should not lose sight of the fact that the overwhelming majority of 
cybercrime is ultimately just “old” crime in a new guise. Online fraud is and always will be fraud. 
Transferring money from the black market via e-banking is and always will be money laundering. The legal 
interests to be protected are the same, whether the context is online or offline: property, integrity, trust, 
morality, security, etc. Intrusion into someone else’s computer breaches the integrity of that system, just 
as intrusion into someone else’s house breaches the integrity of the home. Increasing digitisation will mean 
that, in the future, the majority of crimes will be committed with the help of/directed towards an 
information system: this is because we are gradually exchanging the old metal key for the digital access 
code. Rather than set up a separate system for this, we are opting to “update” the existing principles to 
make them workable in a cyber-context.60 
This is also the vision that underlies the Convention on Cybercrime, which deliberately does not provide 
for a separate system of jurisdiction for cybercrime. Its authors found that the Member States had to retain 
their choice because then they could opt not to criminalise some cybercrimes specifically, but “in the 
form of a technology-independent provision, such as could happen in the case of the implementation 
of Articles 7, 8, 9 and 10. A Party may wish not to apply all the principles of Article 22 to traditional crimes 
and their variants.”61 It would seem better, in our opinion, to look at the constitutive objective effects or 
objective elements (actus reus) of the crime to ascertain whether or not they exhibit a substantial link with 
a given territory (see infra, no. 24).62 
57 Criminal Court of Liège, 17 September 2003, Revue de jurisprudence de Liège, Mons et Bruxelles 2003, issue 35, 1542. 
As is the case with ‘classic’ forgery of written documents, a potential disadvantage is sufficient in the case of computer 
fraud. The Belgian criminal courts cannot, however, use the potential disadvantage to locate an offence because of 
its nature. Court of Cassation, 7 June 2011, P.11.0172.N, Nullum Crimen 2012, 68, note S. DEWULF, “Grenzen aan 
(extra)territoriale rechtsmacht van België”. 
58 See Court of Justice, 25 October 2011, C-509/09, eDate Advertising GmbH/X and Court of Justice, 25 October 2011, 
C-161/10, Olivier Martinez and Robert Martinez/MGN Limited. These were not criminal cases, but they did relate to an 
action that caused damage (an unlawful act). When damage is a constitutive effect of an offence, the same 
reasoning can, in our opinion, be applied. 
59 The Onion Router. This software allows entirely anonymous internet surfing and communication. 
60 See also H.W.K. KASPERSEN, “Cybercrime and Internet jurisdiction (Draft discussion paper prepared in the framework 
of the Project on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe)”, www.coe.int/cybercrime. 
61 H.W.K. KASPERSEN, “Cybercrime and Internet jurisdiction (Draft discussion paper of 5 March 2009 prepared in the 
framework of the Project on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe)”, 15, www.coe.int/cybercrime; H.W.K. KASPERSEN, 
“Jurisdiction in the cybercrime convention” in Cybercrime and Jurisdiction. A Global Survey, The Hague, T.M.C. Asser 
Press, 2006, 17. 
62 If this means that many offences cannot be located in Belgium, the legislator should consider establishing 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over cybercrime in the First Title of the Criminal Procedure Code. He could do so, for example, 
on the basis of the passive personality principle (Belgian victim) or protective principle. The question would then remain 
as to what should be done with the condition in Article 12 of the First Title of the CPC (encounter with the suspect in 
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2. Where is the omission offence in Article 46 bis, §2 of the CPC committed? 
 
17. ‘VIRTUAL’ PRESENCE AS A TERRITORIAL LINK? - The first point for discussion in the Yahoo case is that of whether 
the company committed the offence on Belgian territory (Article 3 Belgian CC). When we use the 
objective ubiquity theory to see if this is the case, which is presumably the idea, we have to ask: “Where 
did Yahoo omit to cooperate with the Belgian judicial authorities?” 
Yahoo itself said that it was not present on Belgian territory and that it could not, therefore, have 
committed a crime on said Belgian territory (Article 3 Belgian CC). From its absence in Belgium, the 
company therefore deduces that one cannot speak of a Belgian offence. According to the prosecutor, 
Yahoo was indeed present in Belgium and this is one of the reasons why the crime was committed in 
Belgium (see supra, no. 4). 
The prosecutor, followed by the criminal court, sees Yahoo as a foreigner that “is present” in Belgium. In 
his eyes, Yahoo is like the foreigner who drives on Belgian roads and commits a speeding offence. He 
deduces the “virtual presence” of Yahoo from the fact that it “provides services” in Belgium: because 
Yahoo has an “economic-virtual” presence in Belgium, it also has a “judicial-virtual” presence. He then 
equates this so-called “virtual” presence to an actual “physical” presence. Through the virtual world of 
“cyberspace”, he brings Yahoo to Belgium and, in his eyes, the company commits an offence here. 
On this point, our view of the internet differs from the prosecutor’s. The internet is and remains a means of 
communication between real people in the real world, who find themselves in a given (possibly different) 
jurisdiction.63 Providing communication services over the internet in Belgium from abroad is not the same 
as having an actual “presence” here. One could compare the situation to that of internet banking: 
Belgians can have an account with a foreign internet bank. In that case, the bank is providing services in 
Belgium, but this does not mean that it is actually present in the country. 
This focus of the discussion on Yahoo’s presence or absence in Belgium is surprising, now that, in our 
opinion, it is not particularly relevant to the ‘geolocation’ of the omission offence, as a (legal) person 
need not necessarily “be” in Belgium to commit a crime on Belgian territory (see supra, no. 12). To 
determine whether or not Yahoo committed an offence that can be located in Belgium, it must be 
possible to locate one of the objective elements in Belgium (see supra, the objective ubiquity theory): if 
someone in Belize transfers illegal money from a Swiss bank account to an account in Belgium, he is 
committing a Belgian money laundering offence (Article 505 Belgian CC). If a Chinese person in 
Singapore deliberately manipulates the computer system of a Belgian hospital to kill a patient, he 
commits a murder in Belgium. Everything depends on the location of the objective elements of the crime. 
 
18. LOCATION OF THE DUTY TO COOPERATE. - A ‘duty to cooperate’ seems to imply a sort of obligation actively to 
act on the part of the person involved.64 This obligation on the part of the operator or provider to disclose 
information does not, however, come into being until after the Public Prosecutor has issued a request. If 
the operator or provider refuses to cooperate, he commits an offence. Failure to disclose the information 
within the stipulated period also implies refusal. A failure to meet this obligation is punishable. Article 46 
bis, §2 Belgian CPC is therefore a ‘criminal omission: the operator or provider omits to fulfil a punishable 
duty to act under the criminal law. 
 
Since by definition there is no active behaviour, no action, it is of course difficult to locate omission 
offences. Is the place where the person should have acted the place where she became aware of her 
duty to act or the place where she decided not to act? 
According to Belgian law and case-law, the defaulter commits the offence at the place where he is 
required to fulfil the duty.65 We see this, for example, in the duty of identification in Article 67 ter of the 
Belgium). See also U. SIEBER, “Cybercrime and Jurisdiction in Germany. The present situation and the need for new 
solutions” in Cybercrime and Jurisdiction. A Global Survey, The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006, 207. 
63 See in this regard the interesting discussion in the American literature of the late 1990s on “cyberspace” as a separate 
space that is not open to regulation. As the Yahoo case shows, this discussion is still relevant today and the various 
standpoints lead to different interpretations of the application (or applicability) of law in internet (criminal) law cases. 
See, among others, J.L. GOLDSMITH, “Against Cyberanarchy” in University of Chicago. The law school. Occasional 
papers, Chicago, University of Chicago. Law school, 1999, 40, p. 1-37; D.R. JOHNSON and D.G. POST, “Law and Borders 
- The Rise of Law in Cyberspace”, Stanford Law Review 1995-96, issue 48, 1367-1402; L. LESSIG, “The Zones of 
Cyberspace”, Stanford Law Review 1995-96, issue 48, 1403-1411; T.S. WU, “Cyberspace sovereignty?” Harvard Journal 
of Law and Technology 1997, issue 3, 647-666; D. GOLDSTONE and B.-E. SHAVE, “International dimensions of crimes in 
cyberspace”, Fordham International Law Journal 1998, issue 5, 1924-1971. 
64 T. INCALZA, “Strafonderzoek in het digitale tijdperk: zoeking en beslagneming”, Jura Falconis 2010-11, issue 2, 372. 
65 R. DECLERCQ, “Bevoegdheid” in Strafrecht en strafvordering. Artikelsgewijze commentaar met overzicht van 
rechtspraak, 77. See also in relation to omission to report a birth (Article 361, 2° Belgian CC): Court of Cassation, 31 
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Road Traffic Act, to which the prosecutor also referred. This provision has much in common with the duty 
to cooperate in Article 46 bis Belgian CPC. The two offences turn a failure to comply with procedural 
obligations into an offence in its own right (they are a sort of “procedural obstruction offence”, a 
contempt of public authority). Article 67 ter of the Road Traffic Act obliges natural persons who represent 
a legal person in law to disclose the identity of the driver who committed a road traffic offence in Belgium 
in a vehicle registered to that legal person. The Court of Cassation has confirmed on several occasions 
that the offence is committed when the offender has not been identified. The place at which the 
identification is to be received is the place of the offence, not the place where the legal person is 
based.66 
 
The same reasoning applies here. As soon as the operator or provider learns of a compulsory request to 
disclose information there arises an obligation to comply with it. We can assume that he it? has fulfilled 
this obligation when he discloses the information to the prosecutor. The duty to act therefore applies at 
the place where the prosecutor is to receive the information.67 As a consequence, the duty to cooperate 
can indeed be located in Belgium, even if the person charged with that duty of cooperation is located 
abroad. Omitting to fulfil this duty is a Belgian territorial offence and it can be committed by Belgians and 
foreigners alike. But that doesn’t solve all of the problems. The next question concerns the party upon 
whom the duty rests and, in this case, whether Yahoo falls within the scope of this duty (point 3.3.) and, if 
so, whether Yahoo’s duty in this specific case was indeed “activated” (point 4). 
 
3. The ratione personae scope of the Belgian duty to cooperate 
 
19. WHO?  - This question relates to the personal scope of Article 46 bis Belgian CPC: who can receive the 
Belgian prosecutor order to cooperate on the basis of Article 46 bis Belgian CPC and who is then, as a 
consequence, punishable in case of a failure to comply? There are two sub-questions: 
- who is an operator of an electronic communication network or a provider of an electronic 
communications service in the sense of Article 46 bis Belgian CPC (point 3.3.1.)? 
- are foreign companies that provide electronic communications services over the internet also 
subject to the Belgian duty of cooperation (point 3.3.2.)? 
 
A. The concepts “operator of an electronic communication network” and 
“provider of an electronic communications service” 
 
20. ONLY TRANSMISSION OF COMMUNICATION? - Article 46 bis Belgian CPC states that the Public Prosecutor can 
order the cooperation of “the operator of an electronic communication network or the provider of an 
electronic communication service”. The refusal to cooperate (the “obstruction by omission offence”) is 
therefore a ‘status-related offence’: a person who does not enjoy that status cannot be an offender. In 
this article, the legislator made deliberate use of the same terminology as Article 2 of the ECA. This is 
because the intention was to harmonise the various provisions on electronic communication.68 
When applying the ECA, the court looks at whether the service is (chiefly) designed to transmit signals.69 
Measuring the duty to cooperate in Article 46 bis Belgian CPC against this yardstick would seriously limit 
its scope. An internet user generally requires three things - aside from, that is, a device (phone, computer, 
etc.) - in order to send email: 
- an infrastructure over which email is sent (a network)70; 
- an electronic communication service to transmit the signals71; 
October 2001, P.01.1162 F, Court of Cassation judgement 2001, 589; Court of Cassation, 2 October 2002, P.02.635.F, 
Court of Cassation judgement 2002, 497, Revue de jurisprudence de Liège, Mons et Bruxelles 2003, 62. 
66 Court of Cassation, 27 April 2010, P.09.1625.N, Pasicrisie Belge 2010, issue 4, 1283; Nullum Crimen 2011, issue 6, 371, 
note V. FRANSSEN and S. VAN DYCK; Court of Cassation, 22 April 2008, P.08.0250.N, Pasicrisie Belge 2008, issue 4, 986; 
Rechtskundig weekblad 2008-09, issue 33, 1383 note P. ARNOU; Verkeer, aansprakelijkheid, verzekering 2008, issue 5, 
463; Nullum Crimen 2009, issue 2, 123. 
67 P. ARNOU, “De plaats waar de identiteit moet worden meegedeeld van de bestuurder die een overtreding heeft 
begaan met een motorvoertuig dat toebehoort aan een rechtspersoon”, Rechtskundig weekblad 2008-09, issue 33, 
1384. 
68 On this, see the detailed statement of Solicitor General De Swaef, Nullum Crimen 2011, issue 1, 84, 79-84. See also 
Parliamentary Documents Senate 2005-2006, 3-1824/2; P. DE HERT and G. BOULET, “Yahoo! moet meewerken met 
Belgische prosecutor”, De Juristenkrant 2012, issue 253, 8. 
69 N. VANDEZANDE, “Yahoo! als operator of verstrekker”, Auteurs en media 2011, issue 2, 222. 
70 In Belgium, these are Belgacom and Telenet for the internet (see the statement of Solicitor General De Swaef, Nullum 
Crimen 2011, issue 1, 84, no. 10). 
71 E.g. Scarlet, Belgacom, Telenet, Evonet, Toledo Telecom, edpnet, Belnet, etc. 
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- an application or program to send, receive and store email.72 
Only the first two are services in the strict sense, designed principally to transmit signals. Yahoo’s free 
webmail system belongs to the third category. This webmail is a software application that enables users 
to send and receive email via a web browser or Internet Access Provider73 without having to use a 
separate email program (e.g. Outlook, Eudora, etc.). They use HTML, so that it works in the same way as 
a website does. The beauty of this is that you can use it to send and receive email anywhere in the world. 
The email account in question is (probably)74 located, in the case of Yahoo, on its servers in the United 
States. For example, you can use your own computer (with its own IP address) in Turkmenistan to log into 
the Yahoo website (mail account) in the US, and send email to anywhere in the world from there. 
Yahoo only provides its customers with an application. In the process, it makes use of the existing network 
and does not transmit the signals itself. Were we to limit the scope of Article 46 bis Belgian CPC to the 
party responsible for transmitting the signals (Belgacom, Telenet, etc.), companies like Yahoo, Hotmail 
and Google would not have a duty to cooperate. For that matter, these companies also record 
information that could be extremely helpful in detecting (the perpetrators of) a crime, such as the IP 
address that someone used when he or she “created” the email account. When an offence is committed 
using fictive email addresses, the webmail (banksecurity@yahoo.com, littlepervert@hotmail.com, 
teleromeo@telenet.be, etc.) is often the only lead the investigators have to start with. If they know the IP 
address, they can then link it to an internet access provider. It too has a duty to cooperate (see supra, 
no. 3) and can hopefully identify the subscriber with that IP address. The cooperation of the webmail 
provider is therefore a necessary prior step to obtain the cooperation of the internet access provider and 
is crucial to the efficiency of the cyber-investigation. 
 
21. WEBMAIL PROVIDERS TOO. – Opinion on the geographical scope of the duty to cooperate was deeply 
divided. Yahoo adopted the strict interpretation and was followed in this by the Ghent Court of Appeal 
and Advocate General DE SWAEF. In his written conclusions, the Advocate General gave an in-depth 
analysis of the legal framework of investigative practice in relation to electronic communication and 
developments in the law.75 He discussed the arguments for and against a narrow interpretation of the 
notion of “provider of an electronic communication service”. In the end, he concluded that the legislator 
had in mind only those service providers that transmit communication data. The Public Prosecutor argued 
instead in favour of a broad interpretation and the Court of Cassation agreed. Providers of an electronic 
communication service in the sense of Article 46 bis Belgian CPC are, according to the Court: 
- the operators of electronic communications networks in the sense of the ECA; 
- anyone who provides a service consisting fully or partially in the transmission of signals via 
electronic communication networks; 
- anyone who allows its customers to obtain or disseminate information through an electronic 
network. 
The interpretation of the Court of Cassation is therefore much broader than the scope of Article 2 of the 
ECA. This means that webmail providers such as Yahoo also fall within the personal scope of the duty to 
cooperate. The company is not itself able to transmit communication, but it allows its users to obtain and 
disseminate information. In this sense, it is an electronic communications provider. 
 
22. JUSTIFIED CRITICISM? - This judgement met with criticism from legal commentators. According to 
VANDEZANDE, it came down to a forbidden analogical interpretation that also went against legislative 
intent.76 We are of the opinion, however, that the Court’s interpretation is certainly defensible in the light 
of the conceptual autonomy of criminal law. Admittedly, the line between a forbidden analogical 
interpretation and the autonomy of criminal law is a fine one. In conformance with the latter, the criminal 
judge can give other meanings to the concepts from other areas of law, bearing in mind the legal interest 
which the criminal statute seeks to protect.77 The legal interest that the legislator seeks to protect with this 
offence is clear: an efficient (or more efficient) fight against crime. The increasing communication options 
open to criminals and the provision of services by private companies makes the cooperation necessary 
of those private companies and, specifically, their compulsory contribution to identification.78 From the 
criminal (procedural) law perspective, a wider scope for duties to cooperate with criminal investigations 
72 E.g. Hotmail, Gmail, Yahoo!Mail, etc. 
73 E.g. Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, etc. 
74 “Probably” because applications such as cloud computing divide the data and store them dynamically. 
75 Statement of Solicitor General De Swaef, Nullum Crimen 2011, issue 1, 79 et seq. 
76 N. VANDEZANDE, “Yahoo! als operator of verstrekker”, Auteurs en media 2011, issue 2, 223. 
77 Court of Cassation, 27 March 1995, Court of Cassation judgement 1995, no. 170; F. VERBRUGGEN and R. VERSTRAETEN, 
Strafrecht en Straf procesrecht voor bachelors, Antwerp, Maklu, 2012, 7. 
78 See also explanatory memorandum to the bill amending the Act of 30 June 1994 on the protection of personal 
privacy against eavesdropping, surveillance and recording of private communication and telecommunication, 
Parliamentary Documents Chamber of Representatives 1996-97, no. 49-1075/1, 2. 
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than that afforded under Article 2 of the ECA is a good thing. Without it, the identification of many 
cybercriminals and shady webmail users would not be possible: they would enjoy impunity. It can hardly 
be said that this was legislative intent. It would also create a bizarre inequality in the field. Investigators 
would be able to identify users of a Telenet email address, but not those of a Yahoo email address, as the 
former is a Belgian corporation and the latter is not. 
Moreover, the Court chose an interpretation which is in conformity with the Cybercrime Convention79. 
Indeed Article 18 of this convention compels States to authorise their competent authorities to order “that 
a service provider that offers its services in the territory of the party to submit subscriber information relating 
to such services in that service provider’s possession or control”. Therefore, the convention does not speak 
of operators, but of “service providers”. According to Article 1, a service provider is: 
- any public of private entity that provides to users of its service the ability to communicate by 
means of a computer system; 
- any other entity that processes or stores computer data on behalf of such communications 
service or users of such service. 
Given that webmail is a computer system allowing users to communicate, this falls within the scope of the 
Convention on Cybercrime and Belgium is obliged to facilitate the disclosure of identification data. 
 
The interpretation of the Court and the definition given by the Convention on Cybercrime are rooted in 
the reality of electronic communication, more particularly email traffic, whereby networks, signal 
transmission and applications are needed to achieve communication over the internet. The concepts of 
the ECA are too limited from this perspective. Therefore, we can only subscribe to the interpretation 
offered by the Court of Cassation. 
 
B. Foreign based service providers too? 
 
23. CONSEQUENCES OF A BROAD SCOPE. - This broad interpretation of the concepts of “operator” and “provider” 
in relation to the duty to cooperate has one important consequence. It can quickly be extended to 
foreign service providers, simply because of the possibilities afforded by the internet. This is because in 
order to provide communications services, service providers need not necessarily be based in Belgium. It 
raises the question as to whether foreign companies can also be compelled to cooperate with the 
Belgian police authorities under the threat of a sanction. 
 
24. PROVISION OF SERVICES. - Under a broad interpretation of the territoriality principle, we might say that 
companies that use the internet to do business around the world should abide by the laws of every 
country because their actions (can) have an effect everywhere. This means that their ubiquity leads to 
territorial jurisdiction on the part of every State in the world. 
But it would be going a step too far to suppose that mere “virtual” presence is enough to create territorial 
presence. A claim of jurisdiction must also be reasonable.80 We think it would be too much to expect 
companies with a presence on the internet to abide by all the rules set by all the world’s countries purely 
because they have a website that can be accessed from anywhere in the world. This is because a 
website’s global accessibility is not always something over which they have any control, whereas internet 
users do. Moreover, it makes these companies dependent on an incoherent and potentially conflicting 
legal framework (see supra, no. 13). This legal uncertainty might even discourage the free flow of 
information (and provision of services).81 Nor does it always simply follow that it would suffice for 
companies that provide internet services around the globe to abide by the rules of the country of their 
registered office and/or in which they keep their servers. This might threaten a “race to the bottom” where 
internet players set themselves up in an “internet safe haven” and do business with the rest of the planet 
79 The Budapest Convention of 23 November 2001 on the combatting of crime in relation to electronic networks. This 
convention served as the inspiration for amendments of Belgian law. Eleven years later, Belgium has finally ratified the 
convention (Act of 3 August 2012 endorsing the convention on computer crime, agreed in Budapest on 23 November 
2001, Belgian Official Journal 21 November 2012). This convention came into effect on 1 December 2012. 
80 C. RYNGAERT, Jurisdiction in International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, 134 et seq. 
81 See the statement of Solicitor General P. Cruz Villalón, 29 March 2011, in the cases eDate Advertising GmbH and 
Martinez, www.curia.europa.eu (Court of Justice, 25 October 2011, C-509/ 09, eDate Advertising GmbH/X, and Court 
of Justice, 25 October 2011, C-161/10, Olivier Martinez and Robert Martinez/MGN Limited). 
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from there.82 Nor should the victims of cybercrime be left out in the cold.83 The government must strike a 
balance between legal certainty for service providers and legal protection for victims. 
 
Jurisdiction requires a substantial link between a given country and a service provider. This link must also 
be technologically neutral.84 If it is not, new technological advancements will threaten to supersede the 
claims of jurisdiction.85 Article 18 of the Convention on Cybercrime applies the duty to cooperate to a 
service provider “offering its services in the territory of the Party”. Similar links are to be found in Section 
403 of the American Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, an important 
guideline in problems relating to jurisdiction. The Restatement says that legal jurisdiction is reasonable on 
the basis of “(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity86, between the 
regulating State and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated”. 
 
From this, we can deduce that if a company offers services on Belgian territory consisting in the receiving 
or disseminating of information via an electronic network, it is reasonable for the Belgian legislator to 
subject it to a duty to cooperate. A duty such as this would appear justified when it comes to effectively 
fighting crime.87 It is therefore desirable to determine when service providers offer their services on Belgian 
territory. This problem is not in itself new. The Court of Justice of the European Union has already had to 
determine in several e-commence cases whether or not a contractor, when offering his services via the 
internet, was also “directing his activities” at a particular Member State. These judgements might also be 
a source of inspiration.88 
 
25. “TO ACTIVELY DIRECT TO” - In the case of Pammer89, an Austrian consumer had booked a trip via the 
website of a German company. A dispute arose and the Austrian summoned the German company 
82 See also in this sense ECHR, 18 October 2005, Perrin/United Kingdom, no. 5446/06, www.echr.coe.int. To date, this is 
the only known judgement by the Court in relation to internet jurisdiction. The case involved a French man, residing in 
the United Kingdom, who administrated the pornographic website of an American company from the United Kingdom. 
He was prosecuted in the United Kingdom for publishing pornographic images on the internet. He argued that the 
United Kingdom did not have jurisdiction because it was an American company and the information was published 
on the internet in the US. The Court dismissed Perrin's argument of legal uncertainty and ruled that Perrin, as a resident 
of the United Kingdom, could not argue that the laws of the United Kingdom were not reasonably open to him. The 
Court decided that if the courts of the United Kingdom could only judge “publication-related cases”, when the place 
of publication was situated in the United Kingdom, then this would lead to “safe havens”. 
83 See supra, footnote 5. 
84 See on this principle B.J. KOOPS, “Should ICT Regulation be Technology-Neutral?” in B.J. KOOPS, M. LIPS, C. PRINS 
and M. SCHELLEKENS, Starting Points for ICT Regulation: deconstructing policy one-liners, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, 
2006, 77-108. 
85 Were we to opt, for example, for the place where the server is located as a necessary territorial link, then applications 
such as cloud computing and mobile internet would threaten to make the theory completely unworkable. See also 
supra, no. 16 relating to the vision of the Cybercrime Conventions and H.W.K. KASPERSEN, “Jurisdiction in the 
cybercrime convention” in Cybercrime and Jurisdiction. A Global Survey, The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006, 17. 
86 This is our own underlining. 
87 See for example, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice on internet gambling, in which the Court accepts 
under certain conditions monopolies and other restrictions regarding the number of providers in the gambling game 
sector. Restrictions on freedom of services are, according to the Court, justified by the objective of fighting fraud and 
crime. These national regulations can also apply to foreign companies that offer these activities in a given Member 
State over the internet. See also, among others, Court of Justice, 15 September 2011, C-347/09, 15 September 2011, 
Dickinger and Ömer; Court of Justice, 30 June 2011, C-212/08, Zeturf Ltd./Prime Minister; Court of Justice, 8 September 
2010, C-46/08, Carmen Media Group Ltd./Land Schleswig-Holstein en Innenminister des Landes Schleswig-Holstein; 
Court of Justice, 3 June 2010, C-258/08, Ladbrokes Betting & Gaming Ltd. and Ladbrokes International Ltd./Stichting 
de Nationale Sporttotalisator; Court of Justice, 3 June 2010, C-203/08, Sporting Exchange Ltd./Minister for Justice and 
the Stichting de Nationale Sporttotalisator; Court of Justice, 8 September 2009, C-42/07, Liga Portuguesa de Futebol 
Profissional, Bwin International Ltd./Departamento de Jogos da Santa Casada Misericórdia de Lisbo; Court of Justice, 
6 March 2007, C-338/04, C-359/04 and C-360/04, Placanica et al. In the Stoβ; judgement, the Court judged that the 
State in question would have to make the option of offering these services on its territory via the internet dependent 
on a licence issued by its own authorities. Court of Justice, 8 September 2010, C-316/07, C-358/07-C-360/07, C-409/07 
and C-410/07, Stoβ; et al./Wetteraukreis en Kulpa Automatenservice Asperg GmbH et al./Land Baden-Württemberg. 
88 We will have to wait and see what view the European Court of Human Rights takes on internet jurisdiction. In a recent 
overview of the Court's internet case law, the Research Division noted that there are few cases relating to internet 
jurisdiction to date. The only example is the Perrin judgement that we have already cited (see supra, footnote 73). The 
Research Division does, however, refer to the Ben El Mahi judgement over the Danish Mohammed cartoons, in which 
the Court judged that there was no jurisdictional link between the complainants and Denmark. In the report, the 
Research Division remarked that this decision could be relevant to future internet cases. ECHR, 11 December 2006, Ben 
El Mahi et al./Denmark, no. 5853/06. See Research Division “Internet: case-law of the European Court of Human Rights”, 
5, www.echr.coe.int (Case-law/Case-Law Analysis/Research reports). 
89 Court of Justice, 7 December 2010, C-585/08, Peter Pammer/Reederei Karl Schlüter GmbH & Co. KG. 
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before the Austrian court. The German company contended that it pursued no commercial or 
professional activity in Austria. In the case of Alpenhof90, a German had booked a room in an Austrian 
hotel via the hotel’s website. The German was not satisfied and refused to pay. The Austrian hotel then 
claimed payment before the Austrian court. In both cases, the defendant contested the jurisdiction of 
the Austrian court.91 
The Austrian court therefore asked the Court of Justice whether a company also “directs its activities” to 
a consumer in another Member State when it offers its services over the internet. The European Court 
answered that the mere fact that a company offers its services over the internet does not imply that these 
services are also directed at other Member States. Mere “virtual” presence via an internet site is in itself 
insufficient to establish a territorial link. What counts for the Court is whether the company expressed its 
wish to enter into commercial relations with consumers in other Member States.92 The Court gives the 
following as indications of this wish93: 
 
- paying a search engine advertising service to ensure easier access to the site; 
- the internationally directed nature of the activity. This might be seen from the sort of activity (e.g. 
tourism), but also the way in which a company profiles its activities as transborder, for example, 
the use of a telephone number with an international dialling code, a top level domain name 
such as “.com” or “.eu”, the option to use a language or currency other than those normally used 
in the company’s Member State; 
- the nature of the advertising on the page. This is an important indicator of geographical targeting 
because the company often derives its income from this.94 
These are all cases in which a service provider might reasonably ensure that its website contains 
information that is objectively relevant in a given geographical area. In other words, the online 
information has a distinct meaning or value in a given area.95 
 
A similar theory of jurisdiction can be found in the American “sliding scale” Zippo’s test.96 This theory sees 
the internet as a worldwide forum that brings people and companies in contact with each other and 
looks at the relationship that is established each time. According to this analysis, courts must decide 
personal jurisdiction from the level and nature of the commercial activities on the internet, ranging from 
“passively” to “actively” doing business.97 In broad terms, this gives us three sorts of website. To start with, 
a website can actively direct itself to the citizens of a given country. This unambiguous wish to enter into 
commercial relations with people from that country can suffice as a territorial condition. But a website 
can also have a passive presence. This does, of course, mean that the website can be accessed from 
anywhere, but this does not create a territorial link with countries from which the site is viewed. This avoids 
universal jurisdiction claims from all countries over such websites. Finally, a website can also be interactive. 
This means that the user exchanges information with the administrator. To determine jurisdiction, the level 
of interaction and the commercial nature of the information are important. According to this “sliding 
scale” test, a company will have to respect the laws of any country that it targets commercially. 
 
90 Court of Justice, 7 December 2010, C-144/09, Hotel Alpenhof GesmbH/Oliver Heller. 
91 The EU regulation on legal jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters states that the consumer may lodge a claim 
in the Member State of his residence if the contractor “directs its activities towards” that Member State. 
92 The Court recently applied this theory in a case on trademark law. It ruled that the national judge must check on a 
case-by-case basis whether there are any relevant indications that the sale offer or advertisement displayed on an 
electronic marketplace, which can be accessed from the territory contested by the brand, is intended for consumers 
located there. Court of Justice, 12 July 2011, C-324/09, L’Oréal SA et al./eBay International AG et al. 
93 See also the statement of Solicitor General N. Jääskinen, 10 March 2011, Court of Justice C-462/09, Stichting de 
Thuiskopie/Mijndert van der Lee, Hananja van der Lee and Opus Supplies Deutschland GmbH. 
94 Internet service providers adapt their websites, with the help of geo-location software for example, to suit their users’ 
locations. Y. POULLET, “Towards confidence: views from Brussels: a European Internet Law? Some thoughts on the 
specific nature of the European regulatory approach to cyberspace” in G. CHATILLON, Internet International Law. 
International and European Studies and Comments, Brussels, Bruylant, 2005, 148-149. 
95 Statement of Solicitor General P. Cruz Villalón, 29 March 2011, in the cases eDate Advertising GmbH and Martinez, 
www.curia.europa.eu (Court of Justice, 25 October 2011, C-509/09, eDate Advertising GmbH/X and Court of Justice, 
25 October 2011, C-161/10, Olivier Martinez and Robert Martinez/MGN Limited).  
96 The “minimum contact test” is applied here in internet cases. Under the minimum contact test, it is important to 
ascertain the extent to which the perpetrator carried out acts in a given State and the relationship between these 
actions and the claim for damages. See A.M. SACHVEDA, “International jurisdiction in cyberspace: a comparative 
perspective”, Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 2007, 248 et seq.; M. SADAAT, “Jurisdiction and the 
Internet after Gutnick and Yahoo!”, Journal of Information, Law and Technology 2005, 1717 
(http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2005_1/saadat/). 
97 J.H. GRAHAM SMITH, Internet law and regulation, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2002, 347. 
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26. AND YAHOO? - If we apply these principles to the Yahoo case, we note that the Public Prosecutor’s 
position rests on the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice. In his eyes, Yahoo is subject to the Belgian duty 
to cooperate because the company is economically active in Belgium. The prosecutor stresses that 
Yahoo uses the internet to direct itself commercially to Belgian citizens. For example, the company 
registers a user’s IP address and is able to locate it. Yahoo then adapts its services to suit the user’s 
location. When users log in to their webmail from Belgium, Yahoo adapts its site to the assumed needs of 
these Belgian internet users. It provides free-of-charge services for its users because its entire profits derive 
from such form of advertising. 
 
Therefore Yahoo directs itself actively to the Belgian consumer and so offers services in Belgium, even 
though it is not present here. We might also conclude that the place of establishment does not determine 
the territorial and personal scope of the duty to cooperate. Yahoo is not present in Belgium, but can be 
required to cooperate with the Belgian police authorities. The broad interpretation of the territoriality 
principle, combined with the criteria of the Court of Justice, leads us to conclude that Article 46 bis of the 
Belgian CPC also applies to foreign providers of electronic communications services when they actively 
offer their services in Belgium. 
 
This does not necessarily mean that these foreign companies will always be sanctioned when they fail to 
satisfy a legitimate Belgian request for cooperation. The request might, for example, be inconsistent with 
the legislation of the country in which the company is based and so give rise to a conflict of laws.98 The 
company could in such a case argue that its legal obligations under the law of the country in which it is 
based warrant a refusal to cooperate with the Belgian State (Article 70 Belgian CC). Countries like Belgium 
used to pay no attention to foreign law when crimes were committed on their own territory, but in an 
increasingly globalised world with more and more positive jurisdiction conflicts between States, this 
approach is no longer sustainable. The new trend is identifiable, for example, from the increasing 
importance of transborder ne bis in idem rules, which also apply to Belgian territorial crimes.99 
 
IV.  Procedural criminal jurisdiction: I bark, but only my partner can bite 
 
27. ENFORCEMENT OF THE DUTY TO COOPERATE. - In the above we have tried to show that Yahoo can fall within 
the territorial and personal scope of the Belgian offence in Article 46 bis, §2 Belgian CPC and can be 
prosecuted in Belgium for that offence. However, one can talk of a punishable refusal to cooperate only 
if a procedural duty to cooperate has effectively arisen. On this point, we find that substantive criminal 
jurisdiction is interwoven with procedural profiles. We are left, therefore, with the question of how Belgium 
can impose this duty to cooperate on a foreign subject based in a foreign country. This is because the 
enforcement powers of the Belgian authorities do not stretch beyond the national borders. Where do 
these investigative powers end in this “borderless” digital space? When does this duty to cooperate arise 
for Yahoo? How is it triggered? Can a company based in a foreign country ever be required to respond 
to a Belgian request for cooperation? If so, when? How can the Belgian prosecutor enforce the duty to 
cooperate on foreign companies? 
Below, we start by setting out the general principles of transborder enforcement (title 1). Then we 
investigate whether a prosecutor’s request under Article 46 bis Belgian CPC to a service provider based 
in a foreign country can be considered as transborder enforcement (title 2). Finally, we test our findings 
against the omission offence in Article 46 bis, §2 Belgian CPC (title 3). 
 
1. Ban on transborder law enforcement? 
 
28. LIMITED PROCEDURAL JURISDICTION. - Up to this point, we have covered only substantive jurisdiction or 
jurisdiction to prescribe and to adjudicate. Belgium is entitled to oblige foreign service providers that are 
economically active in its territory to cooperate with the Belgian judicial authorities. But how it can ensure 
that it actually receives cooperation is another matter. This calls into question the limits of the State’s 
98 This concern and the entire judicial issue surrounding it is currently also occupying the Cybercrime Convention 
Committee (T-CY) of the Council of Europe. See their report “Transborder access and jurisdiction: what are the 
options?”, Report of the Transborder Group adopted by the T-CY on 6 December 2012, 11 et seq. and 44, 
www.coe.int/TCY. 
99 For example, Article 54 of the Schengen Implementation agreement prevents the prosecution in Belgium of a Belgian 
territorial offence after a final judgement on that offence in another Schengen country. See also H.W.K. KASPERSEN, 
“Cybercrime and Internet jurisdiction (Draft discussion paper of 5 March 2009 prepared in the framework of the Project 
on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe)”, 11, www.coe.int/cybercrime. 
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jurisdiction to enforce, which is a much more sensitive issue.100 Where the classic Lotus judgement was 
flexible on substantive jurisdiction, a sovereign claim to power, it was not flexible on executive jurisdiction, 
a sovereign exercise of power. This jurisdiction “cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory except 
by virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom or from a convention”.101 States can 
therefore, in theory, only exercise their procedural powers within the national borders. But, where do these 
borders end in the digital environment? Once again, territoriality is the criterion that creates problems in 
an “aterritorial” virtual space. Authorities (just like cybercriminals) can investigate information abroad by 
digital means without physically having to leave their territory.102 And, as in the Yahoo case, they can 
request information from a foreign service provider via modern means of communication, under the 
threat of criminal prosecution if refused. This raises the question of whether, through this, the Belgian 
prosecutor is exercising jurisdiction outside Belgium. Is he, with a request of this kind, exceeding his Belgian-
wide jurisdiction or would this procedure be permissible in the light of international law? 
 
29. NO UNILATERAL ORDERS ON ANOTHER STATE’S TERRITORY. - The territorial scope of the criminal procedure law 
arises, as does substantive criminal law, from the sovereign equality of the States (see supra, no. 13). If a 
State wishes to conduct an investigation on another’s territory, it does in theory require permission.103 This 
is why States conclude bilateral or multilateral conventions on mutual legal assistance allowing, for 
example, to obtain evidence located on another State’s territory. Any unilateral exercise of authority in 
another country’s territory outside the framework of these conventions is, theoretically, contrary to 
international law.104 The law on legal assistance does not prevent States from exchanging information 
voluntarily. A merely informal request is not, therefore, contrary to international law. Neither is fulfilment of 
that foreign request by a private person, for example.105 But once the request is no longer informal, but 
an order, that State is exercising direct authority in another State and this violates the principles of 
international law. 
 
30. NON-PHYSICAL BREACHES OF SOVEREIGNTY. - To what extent do criminal investigative measures constitute a 
breach of another State’s sovereignty? In our opinion, these acts include not only coercive measures 
implemented physically in a foreign country, such as interrogation after deprivation of liberty, a house 
search or a seizure of property, but any action by the detectives or investigators which results in subjecting 
someone or something in a foreign country to state powers. With modern means of communication, 
investigators no longer have to physically travel. They can investigate foreign computer systems from 
behind their own computer screens in Belgium, for example. An investigation physically carried out in 
Belgium can, however, have extraterritorial consequences. 
The Council of State, when commenting the draft bill regarding computer crime and the introduction of 
the Belgian investigative method of network search (Article 88 ter Belgian CPC), addressed the difficulty 
of confining procedural jurisdiction in a digital context: “It is no easy matter to determine the precise 
effect of this rule on the action of the law or police in relation to computer data, particularly where orders 
to detect and seize such data are concerned. This problem is not just the result of the ongoing uncertainty 
that sometimes exists about where computer data are actually located; it also relates to the fact that an 
100 C. RYNGAERT, Jurisdiction in International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, 24-25; P. DE HERT, “Cybercrime 
and Jurisdiction in Belgium and the Netherlands. Lotus in Cyberspace - Whose Sovereignty is at Stake?” in Cybercrime 
and Jurisdiction. A Global Survey, The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006, 102. 
101 Permanent Court of International Justice, 7 September 1927, SS Lotus (France/Turkey), PCIJ Collection of 
Judgements 1927, Series A, no. 10, 19. C. RYNGAERT, Jurisdiction in International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2008, 9 and 22 et seq.; C. VAN DEN WYNGAERT, Strafrecht, Strafprocesrecht en Internationaal Strafrecht in hoofdlijnen, 
Antwerp, Maklu, 2006, 1215. This is our own underlining. 
102 See P.L. BELLIA, “Chasing Bits across Borders”, The University of Chicago Legal Forum 2001, 35-101; C. CONINGS and 
J.J. OERLEMANS, “Van een netwerk zoeking naar online doorzoeking: grenzeloos of grensverleggend?”, 
Computerrecht 2013, 23 et seq. 
103 J. WOUTERS, Internationaal recht in kort bestek, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2006, 115; T. VANDER BEKEN, Forumkeuze in het 
internationaal strafrecht. Verdeling van misdrijven met aanknopingspunten in verschillende staten, Antwerp-
Apeldoorn, Maklu, 1999, 231; F. THOMAS, Internationale rechtshulp in strafzaken in Algemene praktische 
rechtsverzameling, Antwerp, Kluwer Rechtswetenschappen, 1998, 1 and 55. 
104 Unless on the grounds of a permissive rule derived from international practice. Permanent Court of International 
Justice, 7 September 1927, SS Lotus (France/Turkey), PCIJ Collection of Judgements 1927, Series A, no. 10, 19. Note that 
this ban does not generally apply and is not absolutely observed. See T. VANDER BEKEN, Forumkeuze in het 
internationaal strafrecht. Verdeling van misdrijven met aanknopingspunten in verschillende staten, Antwerp-
Apeldoorn, Maklu, 1999, 231-251. 
105 Even if that would be inconsistent with local law, e.g. a European company discloses information to a US authority 
in breach of national or EU legislation. But this is not a matter of international law. 
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authority, thanks to that very information technology, has the ability to investigate data abroad without 
physically leaving the territory of the State in which it is located.”106 
Most Member States of the European Union agreed at that time that transborder access to data or 
networks, if conducted without the permission of the Member State in question, breach the sovereignty 
of that country and the principles of international law. This is true in particular of data stored on the territory 
of another State. In this case, all that remains is the traditional path of mutual legal assistance.107 Intrusions 
of this kind are best regulated by international agreements.108 
 
Article 20 of the EU Convention on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters109 and Article 32 of the 
Convention on Cybercrime are examples of international agreements of this kind of non-physical 
intrusions. They illustrate the broader investigation potential thanks to the use of new communication 
technologies.110 
Problems of jurisdiction in criminal investigations had come up when transborder telephone calls were 
tapped. When a Belgian receives calls from abroad, these calls can be subject to a Belgian tapping 
procedure without the Belgian investigators having to leave the territory and without them having to rely 
on foreign jurisdiction. These telephone calls are, however, multiterritorial because the audio signals move 
through both foreign and Belgian telecommunication networks and a Belgian tapping order can apply 
to foreign subjects. As DE SMET rightly says, these cases often involve nothing more than “a trace that 
‘moves’ to another State without Belgian investigators entering the territory of that State. The breach of 
the other State’s sovereignty is less serious than when the police deliberately cross the border to gather 
evidence on their own initiative.”111 However, it is more difficult to come to this conclusion when this is 
done deliberately. According to DE SMET, this violates the principle of good faith and loyalty in international 
law.112 
The EU Agreement contains a specific regulation on this. Under Article 20, the authorities of one Member 
State can tap a telecommunication address that is used on the territory of another Member State 
provided that they 1) do not require any technical assistance from that Member State in order to do so 
and 2) inform the Member State in question either before the tap order, if it is known that the targeted 
person is on the Member State’s territory or, in other cases, immediately after they are aware that the 
person is located on the territory of the notified Member State. Belgium has transposed this into Article 90 
ter, §§6-7 Belgian CPC.113 Therefore, even if it is technically possible to record a telephone call from 
Belgium with no intervention from the other Member State, Belgium recognises the sovereignty of that 
Member State.114 
 
Article 32 of the Convention on Cybercrime regulates the situation in which investigators are able to gain 
remote access to a foreign network and the data stored therein (see Article 88 ter Belgian CPC). The 
question of whether this was possible unilaterally led to serious discussion during the preliminary 
negotiations. It was thought by some that the physical location of the computer systems and the data 
stored there would determine which State had (exclusive) sovereignty. Others were of the opinion that 
106 Parliamentary Documents Chamber of Representatives, 50-0213/001 and 50-0214/001, 45-47, which also refers to 
recommendation no. R(95)13 concerning problems of criminal procedure connected with electronic networks. 
107 See P.L. BELLIA, “Chasing Bits across Borders”, The University of Chicago Legal Forum 2001. See, however, J.L. 
GOLDSMITH, “The Internet and the Legitimacy of Remote Cross-Border Searches”, The University of Chicago Legal 
Forum, Forthcoming. Available via SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=285732 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.285732 
(posted on 13 October 2001). 
108 See also Recommendation R(95)13 concerning problems of criminal procedural law connected with information 
technology of the Committee of Ministers (of the Council of Europe). 
109 Council Act of 29 May 2000 establishing, in accordance with Article 34 of the Treaty on European Union, the 
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union, Official 
Journal of the European Union - Information and Notices 197, 12 July 2000. Approved by Article 2 of the Act of 11 May 
2005, Belgian Official Journal 22 June 2005, addendum, Belgian Official Journal 23 September 2005 (first edition). 
110 P. DE HERT, “Cybercrime and Jurisdiction in Belgium and the Netherlands. Lotus in Cyberspace - Whose Sovereignty 
is at Stake?” in Cybercrime and Jurisdiction. A Global Survey, The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006, 81. 
111 B. DE SMET, “Registratie en lokalisatie van telecommunicatie” in Strafrecht en strafvordering. Artikelsgewijze 
commentaar met overzicht van rechtspraak, 28. 
112 B. DE SMET, “Registratie en lokalisatie van telecommunicatie” in Strafrecht en strafvordering. Artikelsgewijze 
commentaar met overzicht van rechtspraak, 29; I. ONSEA, De bestrijding van georganiseerde misdaad: de grens 
tussen waarheidsvinding en grondrechten, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2003, 421. 
113 P. DE HERT, “Cybercrime and Jurisdiction in Belgium and the Netherlands. Lotus in Cyberspace - Whose Sovereignty 
is at Stake?” in Cybercrime and Jurisdiction. A Global Survey, The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006, 82. 
114 P. DE HERT, “Cybercrime and Jurisdiction in Belgium and the Netherlands. Lotus in Cyberspace - Whose Sovereignty 
is at Stake?” in Cybercrime and Jurisdiction. A Global Survey, The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006, 83. 
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these systems were part of global cyberspace and were therefore freely accessible, not only by citizens, 
but also by the police and judicial authorities.115 
Eventually, the Member States reached an agreement on just two issues. These kinds of transborder 
investigations are possible only when 1) the computer data are open to the public or 2) the investigators 
have obtained the lawful and voluntary consent of the person who has the authority to disclose the 
information held in that computer system (see Article 32 of the Convention on Cybercrime). The Council 
of Europe is currently looking at whether Article 32 of the Convention on Cybercrime has been 
superseded and must be altered out of practical necessity.116 But, for the time being, no other transborder 
access to computer data is permitted under international law. Article 39 of the same convention does 
not, however, preclude Member States from recognising each other broader powers in other 
conventions. It also states specifically that it has no effect on a party’s other rights, restrictions, obligations 
or responsibilities (Article 39, §3). The parties to the convention explicitly adopted this “saving clause” 
because they did not want to exclude broader options for transborder investigative work in the future or 
between willing States.117 Whatever the case, these other transborder network searches first require 
consensus between the States involved. 
 
Instead of accessing this information themselves (hypothesis in Article 32 of the Convention on 
Cybercrime), law enforcement agencies can request these data from service providers. Belgium obliges 
these companies to cooperate with Belgian law enforcement. This gives rise to the question of whether a 
request for cooperation from a Belgian law enforcement authority to a service provider based in a foreign 
country might also be a non-physical, transborder exercise of authority. 
 
2. The transborder order to cooperate as a transborder collection of evidence 
 
31. COMPULSORY MEASURE? - The duty to cooperate arises only after an explicit request is made by the 
prosecutor or judge (Article 46 bis, §1 Belgian CPC, see supra, no. 18). This investigative measure was 
introduced as an alternative to other, more intrusive investigations, such as the search and seizure.118 Now 
that much of the “necessary information” for criminal investigations is no longer with the authorities 
themselves, obligations of this kind to disclose information to the authorities are quite common. They arise 
in various contexts. The measure is less intrusive than a search, for example, but it is still a form of 
coercion.119 To make the request in Article 46 bis, §1 of the Belgian CPC enforceable, the Belgian legislator 
has introduced an offence for the refusal to cooperate (§2). The threat of a penalty gives the request an 
undeniably compulsory character. Once again, we can take Article 67 ter of the Road Traffic Act as an 
example (see supra, no. 18). In the various cases in which the European Court of Human Rights has had 
to test these duties to disclose information against the non-incrimination principle, it has stressed that 
measures of this type have a compulsory nature. For example, in the Weh case, the Court ruled that 
“without a sufficiently concrete link with these criminal proceedings the use of compulsory powers (i.e. 
the imposition of a fine) to obtain information does not raise an issue with regard to the applicant’s right 
to remain silent and the privilege against self-incrimination”.120 In O’Halloran and Francis, the Court 
reiterated: “The court accepts that the compulsion was of a direct nature, as was the compulsion in other 
cases in which fines were threatened or imposed for failure to provide information.”121 
The request for information is not, therefore, an informal request, but the competent authority does 
exercise coercive powers on the person addressed. This is why it is better to speak of an “order to 
cooperate” in relation to Article 46 bis, §1 Belgian CPC.122 The compulsory power of the investigative 
measure ensues from the very threat of imposition of a fine for a failure to fulfil the duty to disclose 
information. 
 
32. LOCATION OF COERCION.- The next question in the Yahoo case is where the Public Prosecutor exercised 
this compulsory power: in Belgium or abroad? In directing the request to the American company based 
in the US, was the prosecutor actually conducting an investigative act on American territory? The 
115 H.W.K. KASPERSEN, “Jurisdiction in the Cybercrime Convention” in Cybercrime and Jurisdiction. A Global Survey, The 
Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006, 20. 
116 CYBERCRIME CONVENTION COMMITTEE (T-CY), “Transborder access and jurisdiction: what are the options?”, Report 
of the Transborder Group adopted by the T-CY on 6 December 2012, www.coe.int/TCY. 
117 Explanatory Report to the Cybercrime Convention, §293. 
118 See Explanatory Report to the Cybercrime Convention, §170. 
119 This also comes up in §11 of the Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime: “(…) iv. the use, including 
the possibility of transborder use, and the applicability of coercive powers in a technological environment, e.g. (…) 
requiring service providers to comply with special obligations (…)”. 
120 ECHR, 8 April 2004, Weh/Austria, consideration 56. 
121 ECHR, 29 June 2007, O’Halloran and Francis/United Kingdom, consideration 57. 
122 T. INCALZA, “Strafonderzoek in het digitale tijdperk: zoeking en beslagneming”, Jura Falconis 2010-11, issue 2, 372. 
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prosecutor does not believe so because in his eyes, the American company need simply fulfil the Belgian 
legal duty to cooperate in Belgium (see supra, no. 17). Once a company falls within the territorial and 
personal operating sphere of the omission punishable under Article 46 bis Belgian CPC, it is required to 
bring the information to Belgium when so requested by the prosecutor. The offence is committed at the 
place where the prosecutor should have received the information, i.e. in Belgium. The prosecutor 
addressed his request in Belgium to a US subject encountered in Belgium and Yahoo is required to fulfil 
this request in Belgium. 
The prosecutor compares this to Article 67 ter of the Road Traffic Act. As we have said above, the Court 
of Cassation had already ruled on several occasions that the place of the offence of non-cooperation is 
the place where the Belgian authority is to receive the information.123 According to the prosecutor, there 
is also, in relation to the information to be disclosed, a duty to bring them to Belgium, regardless of the 
place at which the person subject to the duty is based. The prosecutor does not therefore deny that the 
requested information is in the United States, but in his view the Belgian law requires Yahoo to bring it to 
Belgium. 
 
In our opinion, the latter is indeed correct, provided that the Belgian prosecutor’s request did indeed 
create a duty to cooperate on the part of Yahoo. But the prosecutor has put the cart (punishment for 
non-cooperative behaviour) before the horse (a duty to cooperate that is binding on the person in 
question). We agree with his position that, on the basis of Article 23, paragraph 1 of the Belgian CPC, he 
has the power to prosecute Yahoo if the latter has committed a Belgian offence of failing to fulfil the duty 
of cooperation. The prosecutor requested Yahoo’s cooperation in the framework of an investigation of 
internet fraud in Dendermonde, in which the perpetrators had made use of communication services 
provided by Yahoo in Belgium. Yahoo therefore came ratione personae under the omission offence of 
Article 46 bis Belgian CPC (jurisdiction to prescribe) and the place of the offence is the place at which 
the information is to be received (jurisdiction to adjudicate). The duty to cooperate must indeed be 
fulfilled in Belgium. From this, the prosecutor deduces that he did not have to request the information via 
a letter rogatory to the American authorities, but that Yahoo was required to “bring” them to Belgium 
after an ordinary request. As we see it, this is where the problem lies: he believes that substantive 
jurisdiction, i.e. that the international law that allows Belgian judicial authorities to “bark” beyond their 
borders, also entails full criminal procedure jurisdiction, without any complications. In our opinion, Yahoo 
is indeed outside Belgium (see supra, no. 26) and beyond its borders, Belgium can “bite” (i.e. exercise 
procedural powers and activate a duty of cooperation) only with the permission or assistance of a local 
authority. The omission offence located here in Belgium requires a prior, compulsory obligation to “bring” 
the information. We are of the opinion that a Belgian prosecutor can only obtain this coercion of a US 
subject present in the US with the cooperation or permission of the American government (jurisdiction to 
enforce). The prosecutor rejects this step as unnecessary. In his eyes, a duty to disclose information exists 
as soon as he directs himself to the foreign company and it is not fulfilled until he receives the requested 
information from that company. 
 
If this information resides with a service provider based abroad - in this case Yahoo in the United States - 
the prosecutor must, as we see it, abide by international law.124 The competent prosecutor could, of 
course, send a request under Article 46 bis Belgian CPC, regardless of the place at which the service 
provider is based (see supra, no. 26). This location does, however, determine the way in which the 
prosecutor can enforce cooperation. The prosecutor has no procedural criminal jurisdiction over this 
foreign company and so cannot issue a direct order or, in this case, enforce the denial of cooperation. 
The procedural rules of play do not suddenly change because a failure to fulfil the duty to cooperate is 
punishable with a fine in Belgium, on the basis of broad rules of substantive jurisdiction.125 That would 
123 Court of Cassation, 27 April 2010, P.09.1625.N; Court of Cassation, 22 April 2008, P.08.0250.N (see supra, footnote 11). 
The matter of international legal assistance was not raised in either case, however, because they were Belgian 
companies. 
124 The argument of an “obligation to bring information to the forum” does apply, as we see it, when a Belgian service 
provider administers the data remotely, with a third party or abroad, for example. In the latter case, in our opinion, that 
service provider could not argue on the basis of legal assistance that these data are not accessible through it because 
they are located abroad. Therefore, the location of the data is not decisive under the duty of cooperation. We are of 
the opinion that this follows from Article 18 of the Cybercrime Convention, which concerns existing data in the 
possession and under the control of the service provider (see the Explanatory Report to the Cybercrime Convention, 
§173). Some see this as a breach of the sovereignty of the State in which the data are stored. See CYBERCRIME 
CONVENTION COMMITTEE (T-CY), “Transborder access and jurisdiction: what are the options?”, Report of the 
Transborder Group adopted by the T-CY on 6 December 2012, 10, www.coe.int/TCY. 
125 See also C. RYNGAERT, Jurisdiction in International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, 23: “Likewise, a State 
cannot resort to legal implementation measures such as penalties, fines, seizures, investigations, or demands for 
information to give extraterritorial effect to its rules.” 
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circumvent the rules of international legal assistance. Obtaining this foreign evidence 126 is still a matter of 
international cooperation.127 
We can compare this to other investigative measures relating to electronic communication, such as 
telephone traffic. Suppose a Belgian prosecutor or investigative judge wishes to register (or order the 
registration of) incoming calls to a Belgian number on the basis of Article 88 bis Belgian CPC. They will not 
know in advance whether calls will come in from abroad and so be included on the list. In this case, there 
is a clear Belgian component and so there can be no objection with regard to the logging of foreign 
numbers.128 If the prosecutor or investigative judge then wishes to identify the holders of these foreign 
telephone numbers (Article 46 bis Belgian CPC), this will have to be done through international legal 
assistance because he will require the help of a foreign entity that is not under his procedural jurisdiction. 
It is not because the telephone traffic can be labelled as (at least partially) “Belgian” that the request for 
identifying information on the foreign number might suddenly become a “purely Belgian” procedure.129 
The country borders have again become the borders to the exercise of jurisdiction. In the case of an order 
to cooperate, the decisive criterion is not, therefore, the location of the requested data130, but the 
location of the subject from whom the prosecutor or examining magistrate seeks to obtain such data. 
The same applies to “traditional” investigations, e.g. interview of a witness to a Belgian territorial offence 
that takes place abroad or the request of Swiss bank account details in a Belgian money laundering case. 
If someone transfers money, which is suspected to have illegal origin, to Belgium from a Swiss bank 
account, a money laundering investigation can be set up in Belgium and the transferred money seized. 
To interrogate the Swiss bank manager or obtain the identity of the holder of the Swiss account, the 
Belgian investigators must, however, ask Switzerland for legal assistance, no matter who holds the 
account or where the account holder resides. 
 
33. OTHER ISSUES. - For the conscientious investigator, this conclusion will probably be quite disappointing. 
But we can turn it around. If Belgium allows its own people to conduct far-reaching, transborder, unilateral 
investigative work, then it must also, in view of the reciprocity principle, allow other States to do the same. 
While we might be able to live with this from our EU partners, it would be more difficult to accept that 
Chinese investigators were able to search the servers of Belgian companies with a territorial link to China, 
or that a Belgian social networking site such as Netlog was forced to disclose its information to the 
American government without Belgium being able to exercise any form of control. The company also 
risks getting into trouble due to non-fulfilment of the European data protection laws.131 
This problem of issuing direct orders to foreign legal subjects actually dates from before the internet era. 
The practice is reminiscent of the American “discovery orders”.132 It consists in obliging US citizens, who 
fall within US jurisdiction, usually under the threat of a penalty (subpoena), to bring documents from 
abroad to the US.133 The US sees this as an indirect territorial exercise of its jurisdiction because it does not 
itself conduct investigations in the foreign territory. Because the documents are brought to the US, the 
“discovery” is made on American territory. Therefore it shifts the border when it orders discoveries on 
126 “Foreign” because it is held by a legal subject based abroad, not “foreign” because the data are abroad. 
127 See, among others, G. HOSEIN, “International co-operation as a promise and a threat” in Cybercrime and 
Jurisdiction. A Global Survey, The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006, 29 et seq. 
128 The masts used to send, forward and receive communication are distributed over various countries. The 
communication is received via Belgian masts, so there is a clear Belgian component. See B. DE SMET, “Registratie en 
lokalisatie van telecommunicatie” in Strafrecht en strafvordering. Artikelsgewijze commentaar met overzicht van 
rechtspraak, 28. 
129 Contrary to what the criminal court judge appears to be stating when he says that an international request for legal 
assistance was not necessary because the order related to the disclosure of data relating to the registration of Belgian 
territorial electronic traffic. 
130 And, moreover, unworkable in times of mobile internet, cloud computing and Wi-Fi. See also J. SPOENLE, “Cloud 
Computing and cybercrime investigations: Territoriality vs. the power of disposal?”, Discussion Paper of 31 August 2010 
and Draft Discussion Paper of 15 January 2010, “Law Enforcement Challenges in Transborder Acquisition of Electronic 
Evidence from ‘Cloud Computing Providers’”, www.coe.int/cybercrime (Project on Cybercrime). 
131 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, Official Journal of 
the European Union - Legislation 281, 23 November 1995, page 31; Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 
November 2008 on the protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters, Official Journal of the European Union - Legislation 350, 30 December 2008, p. 60; see also the proposal 
of 25 January 2012 for a new directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of private 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of prevention, 
investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and the free 
movement of such data, COM/2012/010. 
132 See more on this in C. RYNGAERT, Jurisdiction in International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, 79-83. 
133 See, for example, United States/Bank of Nova Scotia, discussed by G. HOSEIN, “International co-operation as a 
promise and a threat” in Cybercrime and Jurisdiction. A Global Survey, The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006, 37 and C. 
RYNGAERT, Jurisdiction in International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, 82. 
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foreign territory. However, the practice runs into systematic resistance from other States, particularly in 
Europe. Europe views the execution of this type of unilateral request without the permission of the other 
State as an intervention in the territorial sovereignty of that State. A typical example is the controversy 
surrounding the “Belgian” corporation Swift, which was intended to give the American authorities access 
to financial data.134 
Therefore, America may not object too strongly to the case in question. A recent Council of Europe report 
shows that the same US Government uses such a practice in relation to cloud service providers falling 
under their jurisdiction. This is the case when the company or one of its subsidiaries is based in the US, but 
also when a company “conducts continuous and systematic business in the United States”.135 Because 
the US uses the practice itself, it might have no objection to unilateral orders against US private companies 
coming from Belgium. Then again, the practice does not tally with the traditional uncooperative 
European attitude to American orders for information. If Europe, with Belgium at its head, were to change 
track, it would be forced, in view of the reciprocity principle, to stop being uncooperative with these 
unilateral American orders, and this is something that the Americans would only applaud. RYNGAERT rightly 
concludes: “Europeans may indeed reason that arguments of reciprocity counsel against unilateral 
assertions of jurisdiction in the field of the law of evidence. Although such assertions may confer short-
term litigation benefits, such benefits may be outweighed by the burdens of future unilateral assertions of 
jurisdiction of other States.”136 
We should not lose sight of the fact that Belgian investigators might also run the risks of being prosecuted 
in other countries. Unilateral, trans-border tapping orders and network searches could be described in 
other States as unlawful eavesdropping and hacking.137 As KASPERSEN rightly notes: “Under public 
international law, there is no rule that law enforcement officers of one State can lawfully execute their 
duties as imposed by national law, nor can they invoke legal competences or coercive measures in that 
State as provided by their national law.”138 
 
34. “BITING” ABROAD. - When Belgium threatens foreign corporations with fines for non-fulfilment of a 
unilateral Belgian request for foreign evidence directed to a legal subject based abroad, it is exercising 
its power across its borders. In other words, this is a unilateral request with an extraterritorial effect. 
Therefore, it cannot be claimed that this is a purely territorial and domestic affair simply because the 
prosecutor has not physically left the territory of Belgium. The prosecutor’s request is an order, a coercive 
measure (i.e. it carries criminal consequences - in this case prosecution - linked to refusal) and comes 
down to an extraterritorial exercise of Belgian criminal procedure. Without permission from the foreign 
government, an action of this kind is, in our opinion, contrary to international law.  
 
3. Consequences for the offence in Article 46 bis, §2 Belgian CPC 
 
35. EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION BETWEEN BELGIUM AND THE US. - What is the effect of a correct interpretation of the 
international law on the offence in Article 46 bis, §2 Belgian CPC? As of when was there a legal obligation 
that was not fulfilled? To answer this, we have to look at how legal assistance operates between Belgium 
and the United States. To exercise coercion on the American company Yahoo, the prosecutor should 
have honoured the legal assistance agreement. Belgium and the United States concluded a bilateral 
agreement on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters on 28 January 1988 (hereinafter the “MLAT”).139 
This MLAT came into effect on 1 January 2000. According to Article 1, Belgium and the United States will 
134 Which eventually led to the agreement of 28 June 2010 between the European Union and the United States of 
America concerning the processing and disclosure of data in relation to the financial messages from the European 
Union to the United States as part of the terrorist finance tracking programme (TFTP agreement), Official Journal of the 
European Union - Legislation 195, 27 July 2010. 
135 CYBERCRIME CONVENTION COMMITTEE (T-CY), “Transborder access and jurisdiction: what are the options?”, Report 
of the Transborder Group adopted by the T-CY on 6 December 2012, 48, www.coe.int/TCY. 
136 CYBERCRIME CONVENTION COMMITTEE (T-CY), “Transborder access and jurisdiction: what are the options?”, Report 
of the Transborder Group adopted by the T-CY on 6 December 2012, 83, www.coe.int/TCY. 
137 See, for example, the American Gorshkov and Ivanov case in which FBI agents lured two Russian suspects to the US. 
The FBI gained access via the internet to Russian servers using the passwords they had obtained from the Russian 
suspects. Russia then accused the FBI agents of hacking. See, among others, N. SEITZ, “Transborder Search: A New 
Perspective in Law Enforcement?”, International Journal of Communications Law & Policy 2004, issue 9, 1-18. 
138 H.W.K. KASPERSEN, “Jurisdiction in the Cybercrime Convention” in Cybercrime and Jurisdiction. A Global Survey, The 
Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006, 19. See also P.L. BELLIA, “Chasing Bits across Borders”, The University of Chicago Legal 
Forum 2001, 35-101. 
139 Treaty of 28 January 1988 between the Kingdom of Belgium and the United States of America on mutual legal 
assistance in criminal matters, Belgian Official Journal 8 December 1999. 
95 
B-CCENTRE Report – Legal Research – 2014 
 
                                                          
 
assist each other legally in all matters relating to the detection, prosecution and punishment of crime. The 
legal assistance relates to matters such as the location and identification of people (Article 1.2.a).140 
 
Article 17 of the MLAT stipulates the procedure to be followed. All requests for legal assistance must be 
submitted and executed with the assistance of the central authorities. They maintain direct contact with 
each other with a view to implementing the provisions of the agreement. For Belgium, this is the Minister 
for Justice, his representative or his deputy. For the United States of America, this is the Attorney General 
or his appointed representatives.141 
 
36. INTERPRETATION IN CONFORMITY WITH MLAT. - In this case, the prosecutor has not acted in accordance with 
Article 17 of the MLAT, but sent his request directly to Yahoo in the US. This has an effect on the offence in 
Article 46 bis, §2 Belgian CPC. 
 
It means that the Belgian courts and tribunals must interpret national law in conformity with international 
law. For example, the International Court of Justice ruled against Belgium in the Yerodia case because 
the Belgian warrant for this man’s arrest did not respect the criminal immunities under international 
common law.142 By attempting to execute that arrest warrant around the world, Belgium was in violation 
of international law. The Yerodia judgement said nothing about the Belgian claim to substantive criminal 
jurisdiction in Yerodia’s alleged crimes; it merely forbade the exercise of procedural criminal jurisdiction 
contrary to international law. Here, too, international law imposed limitations on the action of a magistrate 
prosecutor who was operating from a national framework. If the execution of an arrest warrant is contrary 
to international law and is not permissible, then neither is an order to cooperate or, a fortiori, a trans-
border attempt to enforce it. 
The Court of Cassation recognised this obligation of interpretation in conformity with international law in 
the Sharon judgement: “Whereas, however, this rule of internal law would contravene the principle of 
customary international criminal law referred to above if it were to be interpreted as aiming to dismiss the 
immunity established by this principle; that the rule in question cannot therefore have this objective, but 
must be understood as excluding only a situation whereby the official capacity of a person leads to that 
person being considered irresponsible from a penal point of view for crimes relating to international law 
and set out by the law.”143 
 
An interpretation in conformity with the MLAT reduces the prosecutor’s request for cooperation from 
Yahoo to an informal, obligation-free request. As we have already said, the MLAT would not prevent a 
direct, informal request for information from being sent and the addressee responding (see supra, no. 29). 
In this sense, we support the recent Court of Cassation judgement of 4 September 2012. The mere fact 
that the request was sent from Belgium to an address in a foreign country does not in itself invalidate the 
request. It is therefore a valid procedural action and Yahoo can respond. But it is not a coercive request 
to which Yahoo must respond. 
 
A unilateral request of this type cannot be a coercive request, or order, because if it were, Belgium would 
be unilaterally exercising its sovereign power on US territory. To make it coercive, Belgium must make the 
request in conformity with Article 17 of the MLAT and the US must respond. To interpret Article 46 bis, §2 
Belgian CPC in such a way as to compel a legal person based in a foreign country to bring information 
to Belgium upon simple request and on penalty of a fine is contrary to international law. 
As a consequence, Yahoo has not (yet) committed a Belgian omission offence because there is not (yet) 
an obligation to respond to the “request” sent directly to their address. 
 
37. WHAT IF…? - What if the court were to rule against Yahoo in the end (with or without legal assistance) 
on the grounds of Article 46 bis, §2 Belgian CPC? This would raise the question of the enforceability of the 
140 In the meantime the EU and the US have also agreed a legal assistance treaty (agreement of 25 June 2003 on 
mutual legal assistance in criminal matters between the European Union and the United States of America, Official 
Journal of the European Union - Legislation 181/34, 19 July 2003). This agreement led to an amendment of the Belgo-
American Legal Assistance Treaty (coordinated by instrument, 16 December 2004, Belgian Official Journal 8 March 
2010 (ed. 2), commencing on 1 February 2010). 
141 Since 2010, it has been possible to send requests for legal assistance using rapid communication techniques 
(including fax equipment or electronic mail). A formal confirmation must follow the request if this is required by the 
requested State (Article 17, §3 Legal Assistance Treaty). 
142 International Court of Justice 14 February 2002, Case concerning the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic 
Republic of Congo/Belgium), International Court of Justice Reports 2002, 3. 
143 Court of Cassation 12 February 2003, Pasicrisie Belge 2003, I, 307, Revue de jurisprudence de Liège, Mons et Bruxelles 
2003, 364. 
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penalty imposed, a fine in this case.144 This is also a matter of jurisdiction to enforce. Therefore, the same 
international rules apply. In this case, the judgement would probably be no more than a paper tiger 
because Yahoo has no assets in Belgium and its execution could not be taken any further on Belgian 
territory.145 To execute the penalty extraterritorially, Belgium requires the assistance of the American 
government. But we fear that the US will not offer much cooperation to the judgement.146 RYNGAERT has 
described the situation eloquently in his thesis: “If a person outside the territory does not abide by the 
norm prescribed extraterritorially, he could be sued in the territory of the enacting State. If he does not 
pay the fine, his assets in the territory could be seized. Similarly, he could be precluded from entering the 
territory or registering with a government agency. Thus, territorial enforcement jurisdiction could compel 
persons to comply with norms prescribed extraterritorially. When a person has no assets in the territory of 
the prescribing State and does not entertain contacts with that State, extraterritorial jurisdiction will 
ordinarily prove ineffective.”147 
 
4. Need for international cooperation “2.0” 
 
38. LEGAL ASSISTANCE UPDATE. - “Belgian” evidence need not necessarily be on Belgian territory, but it can be 
on foreign servers or held by foreign third parties, which quite easily makes modern evidence gathering 
very “multi-territorial” extraterritorial. So we see the development from uni- to multi-territoriality not only in 
the implementation of substantive criminal law, but also in criminal proceedings. But international law 
draws the line between the different sovereign legal orders and, when compared with the 
extraterritoriality of substantive criminal law, it seems more flexible than that of procedural criminal law. 
This gap is normally bridged by international legal assistance.148 Why then, did the prosecutor not simply 
take the path of legal assistance? Probably because it is too cumbersome and slow. Belgium would have 
to explain the whole background of the case, everything would have to be officially translated, with the 
right stamps, signatures, etc. Also, a study of the practice reveals that the American authorities have often 
returned requests for legal assistance in the identification of users of electronic communication services 
without processing them.149 Although the US is conventionally obliged to assist Belgium150, this traditional 
legal assistance contains no mechanism by which to penalise the US or force it to act if assistance is not 
forthcoming or is too late. It is just not worth the effort for the average criminal case. Diplomatic pressure 
is the only possible solution, but we fear that Belgium will not really have much impact on the American 
authorities at that point. 
It goes without saying then that increasing internationalisation and digitisation will increase pressure for 
flexible and efficient international cooperation.151 For the time being, compromises are being sought, 
such as the aforementioned Article 20 of the EU agreement and Article 32 of the Convention on 
Cybercrime.152 These two articles make legal assistance slightly more flexible, but they constitute an 
insufficient attempt to render the cooperation practical and efficient. For example, we see that Article 
144 Or the very surprising order for the “return” (Article 44 Belgian CC and 161 Belgian CPC) of the information under 
the penalty of a fine, following the criminal court judge in Dendermonde. Criminal Court of first Instance Dendermonde, 
2 March 2009, T. Strafr. 2009, issue 2, 116, note. 
145 To remedy this “fault”, the legislator could link the additional sanction in Article 36 Belgian CC (temporary or 
permanent ban on carrying out activities) to Article 46 bis, §2 Belgian CPC. Yahoo's site in Belgium could then be 
blocked. But it is debatable whether a block like this would be proportional and conformant with Article 10 of the 
ECHR. See ECHR, 18 December 2012, Yildirim/Turkey, no. 3111/10. See also Court of Justice, 16 February 2012, C-360/10, 
Sabam/Netlog and Court of Justice, 24 November 2011, C-70/10, Scarlet/Sabam. In these cases, the Court ruled that 
imposing a filtering system on an internet provider is inconsistent with the basic rights of the Union. The Court took into 
account the fact that this order could limit freedom of information because communication with legal content could 
also be blocked. 
146 See the French-American Yahoo case in which the American judge refused to implement a French judgement in 
the US because it was inconsistent with the American right to freedom of speech (Yahoo! Inc./La Ligue Contre Le 
Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 169F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1192). M. SADAAT, “Jurisdiction and the Internet after Gutnick and 
Yahoo!”, Journal of Information, Law and Technology 2005, 20-21 
(http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2005_1/saadat/); E. SCHEFFEL, “Court refuses to enforce French order 
attempting to regulate speech occurring simultaneously in the U.S. and in France”, Computer & High Technology Law 
Journal 2003, 549- 558. 
147 C. RYNGAERT, Jurisdiction in International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, 24-25. 
148 P.L. BELLIA, “Chasing Bits across Borders”, The University of Chicago Legal Forum 2001, 44. 
149 Unless it involves terrorism, international drug or arms trading, or there is a proven American interest in the request 
(e.g. linked to a current American case file or concerning an American citizen). 
150 See also G. HOSEIN, “International co-operation as a promise and a threat” in Cybercrime and Jurisdiction. A Global 
Survey, The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006, 34-35. 
151 See also M.A. SUSSMAN, “The Critical Challenges from International High-Tech and Computer-related Crime at the 
Millennium”, Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 1999, issue 9, 468 et seq. 
152 H.W.K. KASPERSEN, “Jurisdiction in the Cybercrime Convention” in Cybercrime and Jurisdiction. A Global Survey, The 
Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006, 20. 
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32 of the Convention on Cybercrime is much stricter on transborder network searches than its counterpart 
provision, in relation to the trans-border tap, in the EU’s Convention on Mutual Assistance. This is because 
the EU States tend to go for intra-EU transborder cooperation. 
But even the provision of Article 20 of the EU Convention applies only when there is no need for active 
cooperation from foreign intermediaries. This shows that the Parties to the Convention considered it a step 
too far to allow States unilaterally to coerce foreign IT-intermediaries to cooperate, which Belgium 
undeniably tried to do in the Yahoo case. 
Other compromises in the Convention on Cybercrime are, for the time being, the expedited preservation 
measure (Article 29), the expedited disclosure measure (Article 30) and the setup of permanent points of 
contact (Article 35). These measures should relieve the problems relating to the speed and transience of 
electronic communication to a certain extent and prevent States from acting on their own initiative. On 
the basis of Article 29, a State can request that another State impose an expedited preservation of stored 
computer data on its legal subject. The requesting State must then, however, send a legal assistance 
request in order to obtain these data.153 There is one important exception to this. Article 30 stipulates that 
if, when implementing a request made under Article 29, the requested State discovers that a service 
provider in another State was involved in transmission of the electronic communication, the requested 
State must provide the requesting State with the necessary “traffic data” as soon as possible154 so that 
this service provider and the path through which communication was transmitted can be identified.155 
The combination of these two articles therefore appears to solve (at least on a theoretical level) the 
prosecutor’s problem in this case and enables, more generally, a faster acquisition of the data held by 
service providers based abroad. The procedure sounds great in theory, but in practice appears to run 
into the same problems experienced with traditional mutual legal assistance. Implementation of the 
measure may yet be too slow to allow the capturing of the needed data156, and the willingness of some 
States to cooperate with requests of this type is often limited. 
It is to be hoped that Article 35 will satisfy the high expectations of those who look for better cooperation. 
This article stipulates that States establish a point of contact that is to be continually available and 
guarantees immediate assistance, among other things for the location of suspects.157 The setup of a 24/7 
network of this type is, in our opinion, one of the most important achievements of the Convention on 
Cybercrime. The long-awaited ratification of the Convention on Cybercrime by Belgium offers new 
prospects for an advancement of legal assistance. 
 
39. THE “POWER OF DISPOSAL” - As we have said, the Council of Europe is currently considering amendments 
to Article 32 of the Convention on Cybercrime. The report by the Cybercrime Convention Committee 
gives several interesting suggestions to “update” trans-border access to data.158 Of the policy options 
under consideration, we think that the suggestion to replace the location of the data as a condition for 
procedural criminal jurisdiction with “the power of disposal” is a deserving one. It binds the data to the 
person or people who have the right to access and “administer” them (edit, delete, deny others the right 
of access and use, etc.). For these data to fall under the jurisdiction of the investigating State, this 
“administrator” would have to physically be in the territory of the investigating State or be a national 
subject.159 This new criterion offers prospects for transborder network searches but not for coercive orders 
issued to foreign service-providers. When the latter is the case, it is not the place where the data are 
153 Explanatory Report to the Cybercrime Convention, §283 and 284: “At the same time, a requested party is permitted 
to use other procedures for ensuring the rapid preservation of data, including the expedited issuance and execution 
of a production order or search warrant for the data. The key requirement is to have an extremely rapid process in 
place to prevent the data from being irretrievably lost. (…) Finally the requesting Party must undertake to subsequently 
submit a request for mutual assistance so that it may obtain the production of the data.” 
154 Article 1, (d) of the Cybercrime Convention states that this includes data relating to the origin of the communication 
(IP addresses, numbers, etc.). See Explanatory Report to the Cybercrime Convention, §30. 
155 See Explanatory Report to the Cybercrime Convention, §290: “In doing so, the requested Party may discover that 
the traffic data found in its territory reveals that the transmission had been routed from a service provider in a third 
State, or from a provider in the requesting State itself.” For example, if the data lead back to the requesting State itself, 
it can obtain the necessary information through internal measures. If they lead back to a third State, the requesting 
State can again make an expedited preservation or expedited disclosure request, this time to the third State. 
156 H.W.K. KASPERSEN, “Cybercrime and Internet jurisdiction (Draft discussion paper prepared in the framework of the 
Project on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe)”, 28, www.coe.int/cybercrime.  
157 States can themselves choose who to appoint. For Belgium, it is the Federal Computer Crime Unit (FCCU). See 
Explanatory Report to the Cybercrime Convention, §298. 
158 The scope of the present contribution does not allow us to go into this in any more detail. See the report of the 
CYBERCRIME CONVENTION COMMITTEE (T-CY), “Transborder access and jurisdiction: what are the options?”, Report of 
the Transborder Group adopted by the T-CY on 6 December 2012, www.coe.int/TCY. 
159 J. SPOENLE, “Cloud Computing and cybercrime investigations: Territoriality vs. the power of disposal?”, Discussion 
Paper of 31 August 2010, www.coe.int/cybercrime.  
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stored that should be relevant, but the place where the person charged with the duty to cooperate (the 
“administrator”) is located (see supra no. 32). 
Unfortunately, the report pays little attention to the problems posed by Yahoo-like cases (transborder 
request instead of transborder access). It merely states that when data are in the hands of a service 
provider in a foreign country, the investigating authorities must generally take the path of legal assistance. 
However, they will experience technical and legal difficulties in this regard. Some States do allow service 
providers to respond directly to requests from foreign law enforcement authorities. Under some 
circumstances, information might be voluntarily exchanged.160 
The time has come to find an international generally agreed solution to this problem. With the right 
guarantees, it might be possible, for example, to oblige service providers to respond to requests to 
disclose identification data to foreign law enforcement authorities, provided that data has links with the 
territory of the investigating State, such as the suspect or victim is a national subject of that State.161 In this 
case, the data is identification information relating to electronic communications. Those communications 
were generated for the most part in the investigating State, and use was made of internet access and/or 
service providers based in that State. The role of the foreign service provider was merely secondary, the 
communication had its centre of gravity in the investigating State. 
Just as the US first negotiated an agreement with Belgium and then with the EU over more rapid American 
access to financial data of the type held by companies like Swift in its fight against terrorism, it would 
seem recommendable that the US oblige its internet companies to comply directly with requests for user 
information coming from judicial authorities from EU-states or the EU as such. It would be desirable, of 
course, to have a standardised electronic communication system for this, which could guarantee speed, 
authenticity and confidentiality. In more sensitive cases, such as when the request could endanger 
relevant interests (e.g. medical confidentiality, professional secrecy, business confidentiality or other 
national interests), the US government could then intervene. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
40. BARKING DOGS CAN AWAKE POLICYMAKERS. - The channels of traditional international legal assistance are too 
slow to be suited for cyber-investigations. In the Yahoo case, the prosecutor attempted to circumvent 
the inadequate system of legal assistance in cybercrime cases by subjecting a foreign service provider 
to unilateral Belgian authority via the offence provided for in Article 46 bis, §2 Belgian CPC. In our opinion, 
the decision was wrong, or, as the Americans would say, the prosecutor was “barking up the wrong tree”. 
The broad substantive reach of the Belgian duty to cooperate does not, in our opinion, present an 
international legal problem, and Belgium can use its criminal law to enforce that duty. It is wrong, 
however, to employ this offence in order to obtain foreign evidence without respecting the international 
rules. The broad geographical scope of substantive criminal law cannot, in other words, lead to a breach 
of the more strict rules of international law when it comes to the actual cross-border enforcement of 
national laws. Unlike the, we do not consider the case at hand to be a purely Belgian territorial matter 
which Belgium can resolve on a unilateral basis. Belgium, or better yet the EU, should first take international 
initiatives to speed up the legal assistance process. The Yahoo case illustrates all the more clearly how 
pressing the need for workable instruments in the digital context is. It is to be hoped that, through his 
actions, Belgium’s “barking Pac-Man” has finally woken up the powers that be, which should urgently 
develop the much needed legal assistance “2.0”. 
 
160 CYBERCRIME CONVENTION COMMITTEE (T-CY), “Transborder access and jurisdiction: what are the options?”, Report 
of the Transborder Group adopted by the T-CY on 6 December 2012, 31 and 44, www.coe.int/TCY.  
161 As in this case, the communication had a Belgian-territorial component. See also the reasoning of the criminal court 
judge, Criminal Court of Dendermonde, 2 March 2009, T. Strafr. 2009, issue 2, 121. We refer in this matter to the current 
doctoral dissertation by Lewis Chezan Bande at KU Leuven entitled “Cross-Border Access to Computer Data by Foreign 
Law Enforcement and the Position of Private Actors: Reducing the Role of Requested-State Authorities in International 
Cooperation against Cybercrime?”. 
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